Central Asia is well aware that stable, predictable relations between the two largest nuclear powers, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, are a crucial factor in maintaining global stability, including regional stability, Rashid Alimov writes.
The resumption of dialogue between Russia and the United States, which culminated in a three-hour meeting between the leaders of the two countries in August 2025 in Anchorage, USA, elicited the expected positive response in the Central Asian countries and was perceived as a cautious signal of a possible reduction in global tensions. The region is well aware that stable, predictable relations between the two largest nuclear powers, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, are a crucial factor in maintaining global stability, including regional stability.
It was particularly symbolic that immediately after the meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally called the leaders of the five countries of the region and detailed the essence of the talks and the atmosphere that prevailed. These conversations served not only as a formal announcement of the content of the talks but also as a confirmation of special trust. Thus, Moscow demonstrated that it views the Central Asian countries not as objects of foreign policy, but as full-fledged partners whose opinions are important and whose interests are taken into account when discussing global issues. Dialogue with Central Asian leaders continued in late August and early September on the side-lines of the SCO summit in Tianjin, China.
In the region, this approach was perceived as a sign of deep political engagement and recognition of Central Asia’s strategic importance. This development has given new impetus to the search for a sustainable balance in relations, not only with Russia and the United States, but also with other global and regional centres of power. The leaders of the “regional five” countries continue to consistently adhere to a conscious multi-vector policy as a necessary condition for long-term national development. This strategy places special emphasis on both proven allies and new partners willing to engage in an equitable, respectful dialogue and cooperation.
The multi-vector foreign policy of the Central Asian countries has long ceased to be a tactical response to external challenges. Today, this is a mature, well-considered strategy. It aims to ensure national resilience, economic security, and political independence. Amid global turbulence, a rapidly changing architecture of international relations, and the transition to a multipolar world order, the states of the region are consciously seeking to diversify their external ties, prioritising strengthening traditional partnerships.
Relying on a Proven Ally: Central Asia’s Strategy Toward Russia
Russia has traditionally occupied a special, privileged place in the foreign policy and foreign economic strategies of all five Central Asian states. Russia is the largest trading partner for the Central Asian states, a major investor in the region’s real economy, and a key labour market for millions of migrant workers. By the end of 2024, Russia’s trade turnover with the countries of Central Asia exceeded $47 billion, accounting for approximately one-third of the region’s foreign trade. Of particular importance is the expansion of mutual settlements in national currencies, underscoring the stability and trust-based nature of this interaction. Russia’s construction of nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is opening a qualitatively new technological chapter in this strategic partnership. Kyrgyzstan also sees its “nuclear” future in the construction of a small nuclear power plant.
Russia has been and remains a key partner in the security sphere: cooperation within the CSTO, CIS, and SCO forms a sustainable architecture for countering modern threats, including international terrorism, transnational crime, drug trafficking, and extremism. Most importantly, the mechanisms for this cooperation are well-established, effective, and ensure continuity regardless of foreign policy changes.
It also should be emphasised that the stability of Russian-Central Asian relations is ensured not only by continuous political dialogue but also by the high density of humanitarian ties, in which the Russian language plays a central role. In 2025, over 270,000 students from Central Asian countries were studying at Russian universities, which is several times more than the number of students studying in all countries elsewhere in the world combined. Furthermore, the existence of joint educational institutions, branches of Russian universities in the region, exchange programmes, and cultural and humanitarian projects that operate systematically and consistently are of great importance.
Expecting Strategy Instead of Pressure: Central Asia and the United States
Unlike Russia, the US role in the region is perceived more fragmentarily. Historically, the US has shown only moderate interest in Central Asia, viewing it more as part of a broader agenda regarding Russia, China, and Afghanistan than as an independent entity. Since the independence of the Central Asian countries, no US president has visited the region, which contrasts with the intense bilateral and multilateral interactions between the leaders of the five regional countries and their key partners, primarily Russia and China.
Despite the existence of bilateral ties, grant programmes, and educational initiatives, Washington has not offered Central Asia a large-scale, long-term strategic framework for engagement. The “C5+1” format, launched in 2015, has not transformed into an effective platform for coordinating interests, particularly in the economic and investment spheres. Joe Biden’s meeting with the regional leaders on the side-lines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2024 was largely symbolic. No strategic decisions were made.
The new phase of American policy in the region, which began with Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, was marked by a tightening of visa policies and an unexpectedly sharp reduction in USAID programmes. The curtailment of programmes for the development of education, healthcare, and entrepreneurship, which had served an important social function in several countries in the region, caused a negative reaction. The US inclusion of countries in the region in the list of potential violators of anti-Russian sanctions was perceived as interference in domestic affairs and an attempt to exert pressure, as well as the introduction of tariff restrictions on products from Central Asian countries.
In 2024, trade turnover between the US and countries in Central Asia amounted to $7.26 billion. Kazakhstan, whose exports to the US face the highest tariff in the region—27% (versus 10% for other countries), had $5.5 billion in trade turnover with the US in 2024. Uzbekistan had $1 billion, Kyrgyzstan $373.7 million, Tajikistan $172.4 million, and Turkmenistan $218.5 million.
Clearly, the American market is not significant for most countries in the region. It is understandable that the Trump administration’s policy toward Central Asia is perceived as a signal of the lack of a real economic strategy for the region. However, changes are possible if Trump attends the “Central Asia plus the United States” summit in Samarkand.
The countries of Central Asia are not rejecting interaction and cooperation with the United States. They are interested in developing mutually beneficial relations in high technology, energy, environmental sustainability, and countering international terrorism and extremism. However, this requires avoiding dictatorship and pressure. Arrogant diplomacy and cooperation based on dominance are unacceptable for the region. The countries of Central Asia are interested in developing a pragmatic and equitable dialogue. Along with Russia, China can serve as an example of this.
A Balanced Partnership Strategy: Central Asia and China
Central Asia and China are more than just neighbours. They have been bound for centuries by a shared history: a millennium of trade, cultural exchange, and mutual respect. As they transition to a multipolar world, the countries of Central Asia are building their foreign strategy based on the principles of neighbourliness, equality, and respect for sovereignty. In this context, relations with China occupy a special, truly strategic place. China remains one of the region’s key foreign economic partners: in 2024, trade turnover between China and the countries of Central Asia reached $94.82 billion, and in the first five months of 2025, it grew by a further 10.4% year-on-year. Exports from Central Asia to China are growing particularly rapidly, by 21%, reflecting not only increased trade complementarity but also an improved export structure.
The Second Central Asia-China Summit, held on June 17, 2025, in Astana, marked a new stage in the development of bilateral dialogue. The signed Treaty of Eternal Good-Neighbourhood, Friendship, and Cooperation symbolised the transition to a qualitatively new phase of relations based on shared values, strategic trust, and shared responsibility for the region’s stability. The countries expressed unity in their desire to develop cooperation in three key areas: economics, security, and culture. Nineteen multilateral cooperation platforms were established and 58 agreements worth approximately $25 billion were signed in areas such as green energy, agriculture, industry, and digitalisation. China also allocated 1.5 billion yuan for social projects in the region.
The parties attach great importance to transport connectivity within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative: construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway has begun, the Trans-Caspian route is being modernised, container shipping between China and Europe is expanding, and the multimodal “China-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe” corridor is being formed. These projects not only transform the region’s logistics map, they open up new horizons for economic growth.
The humanitarian dimension of the partnership is also expanding: China has provided 3,000 educational grants to countries in the region; plans include the opening of cultural centres, university branches, and Luban workshops. 2026 has been declared the Year of High-Quality Development Cooperation, which will include cultural events, tourism, and youth exchanges, and the “Central Asia-China Friendship Train” will continue to explore new routes.
Contemporary cooperation between Central Asia and China is based on the enduring “Central Asian-Chinese spirit” that has emerged over three decades – a spirit of respect, mutual benefit, and strategic vision. In the new global reality, this partnership exemplifies a balanced and sustainable model of regional interaction focused on long-term prosperity.
