The new White House administration in the US has given rise to speculation about negotiations with Russia on the Ukrainian conflict. Newly elected US President Donald Trump has stated that the settlement of the conflict is a high priority task for the new authorities. Russia has voiced its openness to negotiations based on the Istanbul agreements of 2022. After the inauguration of Trump in January 2025, a window of opportunity for negotiations may indeed open. However, the prerequisites for dialogue are more than offset by a number of negative factors. Both the success of the negotiations and the sustainability of possible agreements are questionable.
There are several possible prerequisites for the United States to begin contacts with Moscow. The first is the expectation of a crisis on the Ukrainian front, further territorial losses for Kiev and military successes for Russia. Freezing the conflict would give Ukraine the necessary breathing space.
The second reason is limited resources. Supporting Kiev requires tens of billions of dollars. This expenditure is justified by the tasks of containing Russia and wearing down its potential. Washington can afford such expenses for a long time. But the lack of clear political results and prospects raises more and more questions, especially given American budgetary needs in other areas.
The third reason is the political ambitions of Donald Trump, who may try to end the costly conflict on terms that are acceptable to the United States, and chalk up a diplomatic victory or its appearance as an asset.
The fourth is the fear of excessive escalation of the conflict and a direct military clash with Russia, which would inevitably result in the weakening of the United States in its rivalry with China.
The fifth is the strengthening of the United States' opponents, including the DPRK and Iran, thanks to Moscow's support.
Sixth, the West’s limited leverage over Russia, including economic sanctions and other restrictive measures have caused significant damage, but have not affected Moscow's determination to achieve its foreign policy goals in Europe.
On the Russian side, the prerequisites for negotiations are less obvious. Despite high defence spending and economic strain, Moscow retains its ability to conduct military operations without excessive mobilisation. The Russian army is increasing pressure on the enemy, albeit slowly. Possible escalatory steps, including strikes on Russian territory with Western missiles, are countered by even larger strikes, including with new systems. Moscow's stated openness to negotiations does not necessarily entail a readiness to make concessions. The distance between the demand positions of the United States and Russia is likely to be high, which initially makes the possibility of their rapprochement questionable. There are other factors as well.
The first is the almost complete lack of trust between the parties. The main lesson of the recent Minsk agreements for Moscow is that the new agreements may simply not be implemented; their terms will be interpreted extremely broadly, which will allow them to be manipulated. Decisions are made not by machines, but by people. Their perception of the recent past matters. It is also compounded by deeper trust issues related to the post-Cold War structure of European security. The Russian leadership has repeatedly made it clear that it perceives Western policy over the past three decades as an attempt to exploit the results of the Cold War, contrary to the principle of equal and indivisible security.
The second is the high probability of a new outbreak of hostilities after Ukraine gets a respite, an opportunity to regroup its troops, train them more thoroughly, and arm and equip them. In anticipation of such a scenario, Russia will have to keep significant forces and resources on the borders with Ukraine. The militarisation of Ukraine, of the West and Russia itself will be in full swing. This is why Moscow may not be satisfied with the scenario of freezing the conflict, while Washington itself and its allies may not be ready for tougher commitments and concessions.
The third factor is possible attempts to strengthen negotiating positions through military and non-military escalation. They will have the opposite effect. These include new exchanges of missile strikes and the supply of more modern and long-range systems to Kiev. A separate step in the escalation ladder could be the deployment of contingents of individual NATO countries on Ukrainian territory. They could play a supporting role and not appear on the line of combat contact, but the prospect of any agreements given such conditions becomes quite illusory.
Fourth - the emptiness of individual "chips" in the negotiating game. For example, Washington may agree that Ukraine will not be invited to NATO. However, in the current conditions, Kiev is unlikely to receive such an invitation anyway. Moreover, the level of military-technical and political cooperation between Ukraine and the West is already so high that it does not require formal membership in NATO. Security guarantees for Ukraine remain open. But it is also unlikely that anyone will be able to provide them under the current conditions. Ukraine will remain a springboard for Western military-political interests. Another empty "chip" is the lifting of sanctions against Russia. The experience of US relations with its opponents (North Korea, Iran, China, etc.) shows that Washington is extremely slow in easing sanctions, framing the process with new conditions, returning the cancelled restrictions and introducing new ones. There is no point in counting on the lifting of sanctions.
Fifth, the unresolved fundamental problems of European security that gave rise to the Ukraine crisis. Trump has declared that it is desirable to end the conflict in Ukraine, but he is unlikely to want to reach broader agreements with Moscow in terms of European security. Unlike the USSR, Russia is simply not perceived as a party with which new principles can be established on an equal basis or with which Moscow's demands on this issue at the end of 2021 can be seriously taken into account.
American diplomacy will probably try to stop the conflict by offering mutual exchanges and concessions. Even if the parties manage to reach such agreements, despite the factors mentioned above, they will be viewed by all participants as a temporary respite and will not systematically resolve the contradictions that gave rise to the crisis. Stopping hostilities in Ukraine is unlikely to end the confrontation between Russia and the West. History knows examples when, after the most brutal conflicts, the guns fell silent for a long time, despite the subsequent decades of political alienation. This happened, for example, in the case of the war on the Korean Peninsula. The question of whether the guns fall silent may arise as early as in 2025, but the question of for how long will remain open.