MENA countries have already begun to adjust, internalize lessons, and reduce risks. Other regions may want to look at the Middle East more closely as it offers valuable insights into policy behaviour and adaptive strategies that are likely to become increasingly relevant in coming years, Alexey Khlebnikov
writes.
Nearly a decade ago, I wrote an article analysing changes taking place in the Middle East. I argued that the traditional 20th-century regional security system was fragmenting while a new security architecture was beginning to emerge. Nine years later, no such architecture has yet taken shape. Given recent developments and shifts in the region, it is therefore worth reassessing where this transformation process currently stands and what characteristics of a new system are already visible.
Today’s world, shaped by the post-Cold War international order, entered a new fluid phase—a grand transformation or transition—some time ago. This process is unlikely to be short-lived and may take years, if not decades, to unfold.
It is entirely possible that we will not witness a fully formed “brave new world” order within our lifetime. The transition itself may constitute a distinct, stand-alone stage in the evolution of international relations. If so, we are already living within a new normal—a provisional world order defined by uncertainty, fragmentation, and adaptation, that may persist for quite some time. Examining its features is therefore not only relevant, but necessary.
Global context: a changing world
The bipolar world ended roughly 35 years ago. The unipolar moment that followed—dominated by a single power or coalition—has proven unsustainable and is gradually giving way to a more pluralistic, yet less stable, configuration.
The concept of multipolarity, pioneered by Russian diplomat Yevgeny Primakov in the 1990s, remains in formation. Primakov viewed multipolarity as a world with several power centres (states, groups of states with no singe hegemon), cooperating and balancing one another through integration and transnational connectivity. While new power centres have indeed emerged and strengthened, this has so far intensified confrontation rather than cooperation and stronger connectivity. As the hegemon is gradually losing its absolute power, a new equilibrium between it and the emerging power centres has yet to be defined. The current phase can therefore be described as asymmetric multipolarity.
Whether fortunately or not, a multipolar world appears neither simpler nor more stable construction that bipolar or unipolar systems. An analogy from mathematics illustrates this complexity—the more variables equation contains, the harder it is to solve. In practice, it seems that a multipolar world is not a place of balances but rather of imbalances, as it is extremely difficult to align the interests of multiple major actors simultaneously. As a result, state behaviour increasingly reflects competition rather than cooperation producing more assertive foreign policies.
The international system is thus moving towards greater complexity rather than simplification. This shift requires more nuanced and adaptive approaches from states seeking to operate effectively in this new system. It also reinforces a familiar pattern: systemic transformation is rarely smooth and accompanied by instability—a reality current developments continue to confirm.
In order to understand it better, the following sections examine features of the transforming world politics that are already apparent today.
1. One of the most visible features of this grand transformation is the fragmentation of widely accepted rules and norms.
Over the past decades, the established international order has been repeatedly challenged: NATO’s eastward expansion, the bombing of Yugoslavia, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the waves of “colour revolutions” in 2000s and 2010s, the Russia-Ukraine escalation, the widespread use of sanctions as a diplomatic instrument; and the emergence of new regional institutions including EAEU, BRICS, SCO, and ASEAN.
The world started to fragment and regionalize contrary to the earlier model of globalization. Since the late 2000s, globalization changed its form and direction, giving rise to what can be described as glocalisation (globalisation + localisation)—a combination of global interdependence and regional or local consolidation. The world remains interconnected, but with a stronger emphasis on regional dynamics and localized forms of integration.
This shift has been driven in part by the socio-economic rise and growing political agency of developing countries. The so-called “world majority” has increasingly recognized structural imbalances in the international system and responded by establishing and strengthening alternative regional institutions—such as the EAEU, BRICS and its New Development Bank, the SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the African Union, etc.—which they often view more responsive to their interests and effective than global institutions like the World Bank, IMF, WTO, or UN structures.
2. Another key feature of the world in transition is the deepening division lines between newly formed centres, particularly between the West, the East and the space in between.
Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East, East/Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America have grown both economically and politically accompanied by a stronger determination to defend their national interests not only through global frameworks, but also through regional ones, which they often see as more effective.
This is not to say that modern states withdraw from the global institutions. Rather they increasingly use them as complementary tools, while prioritizing regional formats.
3. These dynamics are also accompanied by reginal repositioning.
States are trying to adapt to the changing reality, recalibrating their economic, political, and security relations with the focus on their own region. The COVID-19 pandemic, the US-China rivalry, Washington’s changing focus away from Europe and the Middle East, the Russia-West confrontation, and the expanded use of unilateral sanctions have all accelerated this transition, forcing regional actors to redefine their roles.
The Middle East, and particularly the Gulf sub-region, illustrates this trend clearly. Sustained economic growth has enabled ambitious development plans that depend on stability and predictability. This has encouraged hedging, diversification, and pragmatic diplomacy. The region has increasingly served as a venue for dialogue and mediation, involving the Taliban, Hamas, Iran, the Houthis, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. In addition, many regional countries not only refused to join anti-Russian sanctions but even expanded economic cooperation with Moscow, despite significant external pressure.
4. Another defining feature of the current global environment is uncertainty.
While forecasting has always been difficult, political, economic, and military developments have become especially unpredictable. Events such as the Hamas attack on Israel in 2023 reshaped regional dynamics. The power change in Syria brought yesterday’s jihadists to power in Damascus, setting a controversial precedent. Houthi missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea have a serious impact on global energy trade. The 12-day Iran-Israel war, culminating in US strikes, brought the entire region on the brink of wider escalation.
Where is the Middle East in this transformation?
As a region which often serves as a litmus test for global change, the Middle East entered an active phase of transformation roughly 15 years ago—earlier than many other regions. Long exposed to conflict and crisis, regional states are acutely aware of the costs of instability and increasingly rely on diplomacy, mediation, and pragmatic adaptation to mitigate risks.
Looking into the region several key characteristics of a newly formed regional system are already visible. Essentially, Middle Eastern political-security landscape is being reconfigured. Power is becoming more diffused, roles are getting more fluid, and threats are more multidimensional. So, the overarching trend can be described as a rise of regional autonomy/agency guided by increasing uncertainty and a multipolar logic.
Key features of the transforming Middle East include:
1. Genuine pragmatism
Regional states increasingly prioritize national interests while maintaining flexibility in partnerships. Traditional ties with the US and Europe remain important, but they no longer preclude building new ones, engaging with Russia, India, China, Iran, and Southeast Asia.
This approach reflects a desire to avoid overreliance on any single external actor. By expanding partnership networks, regional states seek to hedge risks and increase room for manoeuvre. Growing regional engagement—including normalization processes and renewed diplomatic channels—has contributed to a stronger regional voice that is increasingly difficult to disregard externally.
2. Transactionalism
Partnerships are becoming more issue-based and transactional. They have already become less predictable and with prioritization of short-term bilateral gains/cooperation which depends on pragmatic needs rather than ideology, alliances or long-term strategy. A good example here is GCC states pragmatism when they deal with Israel despite domestic public opinion, when they develop ties with Iran and Russia despite US and EU pressure not to do that, or when they selectively comply with certain Russia sanctions, while using ways to bypass them. This transactionalism is rooted in this very transformation period which is characterized by increased uncertainty. Such approach increases flexibility while also contributes to unpredictability.
3. Diversification
Risk-hedging through diversified partnerships has become a priority. Growing scepticism toward the Western “double standard” and inconsistent policies on issues of refugees, arms transfers, security guarantees, Israel-Palestine, etc., convinced regional countries to be more cautious. Now regional states increasingly avoid putting all their eggs in one basket and try to maintain balances for greater autonomy. It doesn’t imply radical change in relations with traditional partners, but signals that countries want to have a bigger room for autonomous actions, that do not necessarily undermine their old partnerships.
4. Careful neutrality and strategic hedging
Rather than formal neutrality, most Middle Eastern states are practicing strategic hedging within a fragmented international environment. This approach does not imply equidistance from all major powers, nor does it suggest the absence of external dependencies. Instead, it reflects an effort to preserve maximum flexibility under conditions of increased uncertainty.
The regional states have generally avoided explicit alignment choices, at least openly. Russia-West confrontation is a vivid example. While maintaining security cooperation with the US and Europe, they have not joined anti-Russian sanctions and have continued political and economic engagement with Russia and China. The majority of Arab rulers remain silent over recent US seizure of Maduro. This is not to say that regional states have become immune to any US pressure, but to underline that they chose not to take sides on global issues and to avoid being put in confronting camps under increased uncertainty.
It seems such behaviour is rooted in both ideological shift (multipolar logic) and in a calculated response to the shrinking predictability in great-power relations.
Countries of the region try to keep balances and to invest in multi-vector policy emphasizing their choice towards strategic autonomy trajectory and flexible partnerships. Undoubtedly, military-technical dependence on Western partners, exposure to regional escalation, and domestic political pressures impose clear limits on strategic autonomy and neutrality. However, such behaviour has already produced the cumulative effect—the emergence of informal norms favouring dialogue, diversification, mediation, and de-escalation. Therefore, today it may represent an early-stage trajectory toward greater collective agency, which later can transform in institutional neutrality.
5. Fragility
Despite adaptation, the region remains highly fragile and vulnerable to conflicts. Security challenges are no longer purely military; they have become multi-dimensional and include cybersecurity, food and water security, climate risks, domestic legitimacy, governance issues, economic resilience. In general, today’s risks come increasingly from internal weaknesses and governance failures, rather than exclusively from external threats.
Emerging opportunities
Under current conditions, the Middle East, particularly Gulf States, has a unique opportunity to position itself as a platform for genuine dialogue and mediation. They could also launch various expert-level initiatives involving scholars from opposing sides, potentially with support of the US, Russia and China in order to set the ground for uninterrupted dialog.
As previously neutral European states—such as Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland—ceased to be such, demand for alternative formats capable of accommodating conflict-specific sensitivities is likely to grow.
Ultimately, this may evolve into a renewed form of Non-Alignment Movement uniting neutral states around shared interests and strengthening regional cohesion.
Limitations
At the same time, the West should not be expected to abandon its attempts to put pressure on its Middle Eastern partners whether it is about Israel and Gaza or Iran and Russia. While many regional states have so far resisted this pressure, it still imposes real constraints.
Overreliance on the US and EU remains particularly strong in military-technical sphere. According to SIPRI’s 2024 annual report, five MENA countries—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait and the UAE—are among the top 11 global arms importers, accounting for 22.4% of global imports. Over 70% of their arms purchases come from the US and EU. And that is in addition to hosting US and European military bases. Basically, bigger part of the region outsources its security. It is quite clear that complete detachment from traditional Western partners is unrealistic.
At the same time, neither the US, nor the EU are the region’s primary trade partners. Such imbalance is quite telling as it underscores MENA’s diversified external strategy.
That said, if Middle Eastern countries succeed in preserving their pragmatic approach, and in continuing their multi-vector policies, they will have more chances for gradual development and a smoother transition to a new architecture of international relations and security.
Fostering relations with everyone makes it possible to maintain a balance net and to rein in excesses. Therefore, multi-vector policy appears to be one of the major features of the emerging system.
In conclusion
As the world undergoes a prolonged and uncertain transformation, clarity about the final destination remains elusive. Middle Eastern states have entered this phase earlier than many others and have been adapting through constructive pragmatism, transactionalism, diversification and strategic hedging. These approaches reflect an understanding that future stability requires flexible, multi-vector diplomacy rather than rigid alignment, which they quite successfully utilize.
Even if this transition proves long-lasting, MENA countries have already begun to adjust, internalize lessons, and reduce risks. Other regions may want to look at the Middle East more closely as it offers valuable insights into policy behaviour and adaptive strategies that are likely to become increasingly relevant in coming years.
