Valdai Club

Africa is the embodiment of the global majority, which Russia sees as the central subject of the new world order. The countries of the continent (not all, but many) are gradually acquiring this subjectivity, developing relations with those who are important for their social and economic growth. Igor Makarov, head of the Department of World Economy at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, writes how Russia can build an effective strategy for interaction with African countries.

Over the past two years, Africa has become one of the key areas of Russian foreign policy. Russia is following with great interest the rise of Africa's status in international affairs and is happy to contribute to it. The continent's colonial past and its legacy serve as a vivid illustration of the results of the West's long-standing dominance. The continent, which is currently home to 1.5 billion people and is projected to be home to 2.5 billion by 2050, is the embodiment of the "global majority," which Russia sees as a central subject of the new world order. African countries (not all, but many) are indeed gradually acquiring this subjectivity; they have stopped expecting that someone outside will solve the continent's numerous problems and are moving towards a pragmatic foreign policy, building relationships with those who are important for their social and economic development. Africa is rising to its full height. The African Union's entry into the G20 was taken for granted. The African peace mission regarding the conflict in Ukraine, although it had no chance of practical success, had enormous symbolic significance for the continent: in the past, peacekeeping missions were sent from Europe to Africa, now it is happening the other way around.

Recently, significant progress has been made in building Russian-African relations. Delegations from 49 (out of 54) African states were present at the second Russia-Africa summit of 2023, and Egypt and Ethiopia have joined BRICS. African states have refused to implement sanctions against Russia (the only exception was Liberia, which has agreed to introduce a price ceiling on Russian oil), and only a few of them attended the so-called peace conference in Switzerland, organized by the Western countries. New institutions are being created, particularly the Sahel Alliance, consisting of countries committed to close cooperation with Russia. Russian-African trade is growing. In 2023, Russian exports to Africa grew by 43% and exceeded total exports to both North and South America. The Ministry of Economic Development has set a goal of doubling trade turnover by 2030 from 2022 levels.

It is too early to say, however, that Russian-African relations have acquired a solid foundation and will continue to develop just as dynamically. How to use the momentum of recent years to systematically expand cooperation was the key question discussed at the Valdai Club Russian-African conference “Russia – Africa: A strategy for cooperation in a multipolar world.” 

The first answer was given in the very title of the Valdai Conference. At the moment, this cooperation is developing mainly situationally – as a response to international political manoeuvring. Russia has so far found relatively successful responses to the West’s attempts to set African states against it. However, building long-term cooperation requires a proactive strategy that links the key challenges facing African countries with Russia's capabilities.

At first glance, such links are obvious: Russia can be useful to Africa in terms of ensuring food and energy security, adapting to climate change, developing infrastructure, finding digital solutions, extracting a wide range of minerals, and military-technical development. However, these areas should be tied to each specific subregion.

The GDP per capita ratio between the richest (Seychelles) and the poorest (Burundi) countries in Africa is almost twice as great as in Europe (Luxembourg and Ukraine). The cultural differences between, for example, North and West Africa are no less than those the differences between the western and eastern parts of Asia. The contrasts in safety are even more striking: while, for example, the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo are consistently among the most dangerous countries for travellers, the crime rate in Rwanda is lower than in Switzerland.

Different strategies for interaction with African countries are necessary not only because of the differences in their needs, but also because the subjectivity that Russia is so happy to see in African countries is not limited to the continental level. More and more countries on the continent will strengthen their voice and expect a respectful and substantive dialogue not only within the region, but also on their own. In South Africa, the country with the continent’s largest economy, there are already active discussions about the fact that it is not appropriate for the president to travel to meetings with other countries “as a member of a group of African leaders,” that bilateral relations should be developed. This demonstrates that platforms like the Russia-Africa summit, which have proven extremely successful “for the start,” may be limited in their effectiveness in the long term.

In addition to strategy, Russia needs new tools for economic interaction with Africa. Previously, Russian-African trade depended on global traders. Now it is necessary to organise logistics, insurance, and financial support for transactions independently. It is necessary to create conditions for settlements in national currencies, sign bilateral free trade agreements, and organise "entry points" into the African economic space, through which Russian producers could enjoy all the advantages of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It is also important to think about reverse flows: Russian exports to Africa exceed African exports to Russia by 6.2 times, and in the long term such a situation cannot be acceptable. Finally, Russia needs to lay the cultural, humanitarian and personnel foundation for long-term interaction with African countries. In many of them, there is still a layer of representatives of the political and intellectual elite who are closely associated with the Soviet Union and traditionally sympathetic to Russia, but it is gradually disappearing. Building something new through expanding scientific, educational and cultural interaction is a task that is national in scale. Perhaps the Valdai Club can contribute to its solution.