On March 12, 2026, the Valdai Club hosted an expert discussion titled “Strategic Instability and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Modern Era.” Moderator Oleg Barabanov called the topics of nuclear non-proliferation and maintaining strategic stability particularly quite important in the context of ongoing military conflicts and emphasized the crucial role of scientific organisations in the fight for non-proliferation. He also noted that politicians often fail to hear the voices of public opinion and scientists and some countries plan to acquire nuclear weapons, which leads to escalation and crises.
Karen Hallberg, Secretary General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, presented a brief overview of the movement’s history and current activities. She emphasized that the movement is guided by the principles of open and honest discussion of both technical and theoretical issues and reliance on scientific methods, rational arguments, and concrete facts. The movement was founded in 1957, two years after the publication of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto against weapons of mass destruction, and played a major role in laying the foundation for several key international treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A key strength of the movement is its ability to engage in dialogue with all parties, thereby maintaining channels of communication. It currently has four working groups: on nuclear weapons in general, on emerging technologies affecting the nuclear sphere (including AI and sensor technologies), on peaceful conflict resolution, and on chemical and biological weapons.
Naeem Salik, executive director of the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Vision, pointed out the dangers associated with the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing in the military sphere, and particularly in the area of nuclear deterrence. AI does not discriminate between objectives based on ethical principles and lacks the human-like ability to “read” the behaviour of others and perceive relevant signals, while quantum computing accelerates decision-making, leaving no time for deliberation. He concluded that it would be right for humanity to prevent AI from making decisions in this area, but this will only work if all nuclear powers adopt this approach. According to Salik, the world lacks AI regulation and it needs to be introduced urgently. “Concrete restrictions and specific rules in this area are needed,” he said.
Nelson Wong, vice president of the Shanghai-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted that the US and Israeli military operation against Iran and the expiration of the New START Treaty reflect a serious flaw in the global security structure and also pose a threat to the non-proliferation regime. In the context of the NPT, it is important that states possessing nuclear weapons do not threaten states that do not possess them. Iran signed the NPT and does not have nuclear weapons, yet it was attacked. This sends a dangerous signal to all countries that rely on international treaties that the only guarantee is the presence of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the expired New START Treaty limited the two largest nuclear powers. Now the United States wants to include China in the new agreement, and Russia wants to include the United Kingdom and France. These demands may not be without logic, but ultimately, it could take many years to develop and sign a new document. The absence of a treaty limiting arsenals could lead to uncontrolled competition, miscalculations, and escalation, Wong is convinced. Thus, the principles that have underpinned strategic relations for many decades are now eroding. However, there is no need to despair: creating a new architecture of strategic stability is still possible, although it will require considerable effort.
Tariq Rauf, Senior Advisor to the Chairman of the 2015 Committee on Disarmament under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, discussed issues related to the role of the IAEA. All NPT signatory countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, consider the IAEA the only organisation capable of conducting verification and concluding that countries are using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, despite the IAEA monitoring the situation in Iran and conducting comprehensive inspections across all parameters, the country became the target of a military operation. This undermining of the agency’s authority has negative consequences for the entire world, leading to a decline in trust. According to Rauf, there is a significant gap between what countries say about the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and what they are actually doing. The situation is fraught with the risk of an uncontrolled arms race, that is why a dialogue on strategic stability is required, and scientists should do important preparatory work for this dialogue, he believes.
Alexander Nikitin, Professor at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE, and Chief Research Fellow, Sector for Military-Political Analysis and Research Projects, Centre for International Security, IMEMO RAS, refuted the widespread thesis that arms control is dead. While prevailing paradigms are changing, most agreements remain in force at one level or another. Thus, many components remain that could be used in the next phase of political development to construct new agreements. This, of course, requires a change in the political atmosphere and political will on the part of states, but experts should have proposals ready in advance, Nikitin said. In his opinion, the principle of quantitative parity is unlikely to be discussed in the future, as the systems of different countries have already become too diverse. A more likely approach is the principle of “system for system exchange.” It is also unlikely that a new major treaty will be concluded between all five nuclear powers; rather, negotiations will be multi-track, with a range of agreements at the end.
Adlan Margoev, Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies, MGIMO, regretfully acknowledged that nuclear non-proliferation experts have little influence on practical decision-making, as demonstrated, in particular, by the IAEA and US intelligence community’s assessments of Iran’s nuclear program, which failed to lead the US to abandon its plans to launch a military action. Accordingly, in this situation, scientists have only one goal: to continue to publicly and privately call a spade a spade, he believes. According to Margoev, a repeated US and Israeli invasion of Iran directly undermines the nuclear non-proliferation regime, although it will certainly not lead to its complete collapse in the short term. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to continue discussions on nuclear deterrence, the analyst believes.
