The decision of whether or not to revive Petersburg Dialogue (PD) has been postponed until May at the earliest. The political and public figures engaged in the German PD coordination committee generally agree that some changes are needed, but have not yet reached any consensus on the nature and format of these changes.
An interview with journalist and political analyst Oleg Zinkovski.
Last year, for the first time in 13 years, Berlin announced a rescheduling of the Petersburg Dialogue, a Russian-German forum that was due to take place in October 2014 in Sochi. Instead, the German coordination committee of the Petersburg Dialogue met the end of March. What decisions were made at this meeting? What follow-up will the forum have? Given the current situation, how would you assess its prospects?
The decision of whether or not to revive Petersburg Dialogue (PD) has been postponed until May at the earliest. The political and public figures engaged in the German PD coordination committee generally agree that some changes are needed, but have not yet reached any consensus on the nature and format of these changes.
President Vladimir Putin and then German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder created the PD to be the main platform where representatives of the two countries’ civil society could meet annually, or at least that was the idea behind it. In fact, a broader assortment of participants including politicians, business leaders, church and culture figures, and journalists gather there, alongside civil initiative activists. If we interpret civil society mainly to be an alternative to the government, and a way of responding to civil rights issues on a cross-border scale, public diplomacy requests, and humanitarian exchange, then these elements of civil society were clearly underrepresented in PD. Yet, if we view it with a wider lens – which was the dominant in the creation of the PD – and assume that it relates to all aspects of Russian-German ties — economic, cultural, and scientific — both governmental and non, then we see that the eight PD working groups actually covered a broad scope of cooperation.
Six months ago, the German side started having second thoughts. The forum was initially canceled on Berlin’s initiative at the peak of the Ukrainian crisis. Then the very format was questioned. A group of critics, among them some Bundestag members and prominent human rights activists, have reproached the German executive committee about being in what Russians would describe as "stagnation" – namely, a lack of transparency in its management structure and rotation of participants, along with the negligible role of proper civil society. There were also some criticisms related to ideology. Critics claimed the majority of the German members were not critical enough of what was happening in Russia and of its government, and not demanding democratic change from their Russian partners. The German members argued that there is no such thing as too much dialogue and that spurring confrontation between the Germans and the Russians on PD would not benefit the cause. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier then cooled things down a bit when he said that replacing the Petersburg Dialogue with a Berlin monologue was the last thing they needed.
Sitting politicians in both Germany and Russia seem to understand that both sides need the PD. It would be unwise to block an important channel of communication amid a crisis; it might not have been perfect, but it was working. But there will definitely be reform in the German executive committee. Most likely, it will be converted into a sort of open-ended fund, supplemented by a number of human rights organizations and research institutes. We’ll know the details in a month or more.
As is known, the chairman of the German Coordinating Committee will be replaced. One of the potential candidacies being discussed is the former head of the Federal Chancellery Ronald Pofalla. How do matters stand with the planned reshuffle?
Pofalla was nominated by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s team. Judging by this, he will soon lead the PD, possessing the vast support resources needed to carry out the stalling reform.
Do you think the Petersburg Dialogue conferences will remain linked, as they were in the past, to high-level intergovernmental consultations between Germany and Russia?
Unlikely. This link cannot be entirely ruled out, although the PD will most likely become more independent. German critics were unhappy with the event being overly politicized. Having been tied to intergovernmental consultation and the news conference between the two heads-of-state having been at the top of its agenda, the dialogue itself couldn’t really remain the focus of attention.
Despite the productive economic cooperation, it is believed that politically Russian-German relations are not exactly in their heyday. Would you say German-Russian relations are complicated? If so, why? And what steps are needed to return the countries to the relationship they had not all that long ago?
Right now, economic cooperation is not exactly productive either. In January, trade between Germany and Russia fell by a third, mainly due to the EU-imposed sanctions. Bilateral relations across the entire range are now worse than they have been since Gorbachev came to power, along with growing alienation and loss of mutual trust. The erosion of the partnership is affecting public sentiments. Opinion poll results aren’t good and Germans and Russians think of one another worse and worse. It is difficult to find a way to improve the situation when the underlying irritant – Crimea and the controversy over Ukraine – hasn’t been removed. Moscow understands that the EU will never recognize Crimea as part of Russia. Berlin understands that Russia will not give up Crimea. Things will be frozen in this position for a long time. The parties are now trying to make some progress on an agreement in eastern Ukraine, which seems achievable. If the second Minsk agreement is observed at least to the point where the main actors can agree that it has been observed, then tensions between Germany and Russia may begin de-escalating. Then we will be able to return to a more pragmatic level and stabilize trade. But this situation is difficult to view as separate from the EU policies and, increasingly, Germany’s binding transatlantic obligations.
What national interests do you think Germany and Russia have in Europe? Over which issues do the two countries clash? Are there differences among the ruling elite over the policy towards Russia?
Anyone trying to describe Germany’s political priorities in regard to Russia would often talk about the conflict of “values” and “interests.” It is not worth exaggerating, but still, it’s there. The realists, who follow the wake of Willy Brandt’s new “Ostpolitik,” defend interests. They would even prefer grudging peace to quarrelling with Moscow, believing that a European security system is impossible to rebuild without Russia, which is important for Germany as a market and energy supplier. Values, especially the human rights agenda, are more important to idealists who are frustrated by Russia's retreat from the Western democratic course “back to totalitarianism” as they see it, never making good on their Perestroika expectations. Proponents of this view are ready to give up the benefits of economic cooperation with Russia, until the latter complies, in their opinion, with the consensus on the rules of global politics that have developed over the last quarter of a century.