Today, debates about the UNSC veto power have become particularly acute: it is described either as an “anachronism” or as a “pillar of the international order”. In reality, the issue is broader: can this mechanism be abandoned in an era of multipolarity? This question is examined by Lilia Romadan, a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
The Security Council is the principal organ of the United Nations, bearing, in accordance with the UN Charter, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Its original architecture, designed by the “founding fathers”, embodied a unique balance between the principle of the sovereign equality of states and the actual distribution of power on the international stage at that time. The central element of this structure was the veto power, granted to the five permanent members of the Council—Russia, China, the United States, the United Kingdom and France.
The establishment of the veto in 1945 was directly related to the negative experience of the League of Nations, the international organisation created after the First World War. The absence of an effective enforcement mechanism and the inability to secure compromise between the great powers led to its downfall. Participants at the San Francisco Conference assumed that a collective security system could function only on the basis of consensus among the victorious powers. The veto was therefore not so much a concession to the ambitions of individual states as a pragmatic formula: it is better to let some decisions get struck down than to destroy the system itself.
In practical terms, the veto performs several functions. Above all, it guarantees that the great powers remain within the collective security system. Without obtaining a privileged position, neither the United States nor the USSR would have been likely to approve the organization’s original architecture. The mechanism also serves as an instrument of political bargaining. The veto has become part of the diplomatic game: the threat of its use is intended to encourage compromise. In addition, it creates a kind of “filter” against escalation. The ability to block resolutions helps prevent situations in which UN decisions come into direct conflict with the vital interests of key actors.
During the first decades of the UN’s existence, it became clear that this arrangement had a downside. Between 1946 and 1960, it was the USSR that became the principal beneficiary of the mechanism, exercising the veto more than 70 times—while the other powers rarely used it. The Soviet side justified its frequent vetoes as necessary to protect the world from decisions imposed by a Western majority in the UNSC.
With the end of bipolar confrontation, hopes emerged for more compromise-based solutions. Indeed, in the 1990s the UNSC demonstrated rare unity, for example in authorising peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Somalia and Mozambique, as well as missions in Angola and El Salvador. However, by the early 2000s it had become clear that the great powers would not renounce their right to block decisions affecting their interests. China and Russia increasingly used the veto in matters related to intervention and regime change. The United States, for its part, used it to shield its allies in the Middle East. Thus, the veto once again became a symbol of systemic competition. Between 2007 and 2024, Russia exercised the veto 36 times, China 26 times, the United States 8 times, while the United Kingdom and France did not use it at all.
At the same time, the veto remains a safeguard against the majority’s arbitrary will. Without it, the Council could become a tool of majority pressure upon the minority. Notably, questions about revising voting procedures are also being debated within the EU, where proposals have been made to abandon the principle of unanimity in favour of qualified majority voting. Such an approach may increase the speed of decision-making, but it is also likely to provoke resistance from states that see it as a threat to their sovereignty. For the UN, which is responsible for dealing with issues of war and peace, such a scenario would be doubly risky.
Second, the veto has given rise to a system of checks and balances that encourages the search for compromise. The negotiation process has become complex and protracted, yet this is what allows to ensure that all are on the same page when it comes to the most sensitive issues—something particularly important during a period of transformation in the international system. Third, the veto serves as a symbol of responsibility: the great powers alone bear the burden of averting direct conflict among themselves, and it is this mechanism that prevents systemic collapse.
Today, criticism of the veto institution rests on several arguments. Its inefficiency in times of crisis is frequently highlighted. In particular, the Security Council’s inability to adopt unanimous decisions on Syria, Ukraine and Palestine is seen as evidence of institutional deadlock. Attention is also drawn to the unequal way privileges are distributed. For example—states of the Global South argue that the current balance of power does not reflect the multipolar reality of the 21st century. India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria and other actors have called for an expansion of permanent UNSC membership.
Since the early 2000s, various UNSC reform proposals have been discussed. In the year marking the UN’s 80th anniversary, debate over the need for reform has intensified. For example, the French have promoted an initiative to limit the use of the veto in cases of full-blown humanitarian crisis. However, no consensus has been reached. As a result, reform remains more a rhetorical tool than a practical prospect. The “Big Five” are unlikely to agree to self-restraint that would diminish their global influence. Moreover, the very logic of contemporary international competition reinforces the role of the veto: it is increasingly becoming a key mechanism for defending strategic interests.
The growing diversity of the international order raises the question of whether the veto can adapt to the realities of multipolarity. In the countries of the World Majority, there is a growing realization that their voices in the Council remain secondary. Expanding permanent membership without extending the veto right is something that they regard as a half measure. A paradox thus emerges: without the veto power, new permanent members would not feel genuinely equal. The need to restructure the Council in line with new realities has been repeatedly emphasised by representatives of the Russian Federation in the context of UNSC reform. In particular, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, has called for democratising the Council by providing additional representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America. Russia supports the bids of Brazil and India for permanent membership and considers it necessary to “correct the historical injustice towards Africa”.
The experience we draw from history makes one thing clear: an organisation of universal nature can only function successfully if its rules reflect the actual distribution of power. In 1945, the veto formula corresponded to the post-war balance. In the 21st century, it no longer aligns with the aspirations of new centres of power for recognition. Yet no alternative model currently exists that could replace it without risking the destruction of the UN’s institutional architecture.
Thus, the discussion around the veto power is no mere procedural dispute. It reflects a deeper contradiction in international politics: between the equality of states and hierarchy, between universalism and the realities of power. The arguments of the veto’s critics are in many respects justified: a system built on the post-war status quo is indeed ageing and requires reform. However, abolishing the veto is unlikely to enhance the effectiveness of the UNSC. On the contrary, it could provoke a crisis of legitimacy and even the withdrawal of key powers from the UN. The veto is an outdated yet functionally necessary mechanism that keeps the nuclear five within a single institutional house. The discourse surrounding its “anachronism” is unlikely to subside—yet as the political cost of using the veto rises and representation within the Council expands, its practical legitimacy may also increase. In essence, the veto power has become a firm foundation of the contemporary international system, without which the existence of the United Nations would now be inconceivable.
