The new Eurasian security system will have a powerful position in Europe, geographically relatively small, but strategically invaluable, Nikolay Mezhevich writes.
Questions about the future of the Union State of Russia and Belarus do not suggest an answer without referring to its past, and the past of the Union State is the Soviet Union. Within the European perimeter of the Soviet Union, Soviet Belarus was the last to take steps that meant complete state independence. In Minsk, they watched the disintegration processes with the deepest concern and consistently agreed to a renewed federation and some confederative formats.
If we consider the prelude to integration, it was in Belarus that this initiative had become quite obvious by 1994. Already in 1992-1994, the diplomats, politicians, and experts of the Republic of Belarus declared the need to build relations with the Russian Federation within the framework of a special format.
The convincing victory of Alexander Lukashenko in the first presidential elections of the republic and subsequent referendums initiated a process that ultimately led to the creation of the Union State, the anniversary of which we recently celebrated.
All the achievements and all the difficulties of integration within the Union State should be assessed based on the fact that theories of integration within the framework of economic science unanimously indicate that the processes of destruction always work quickly and achieve very effective results. The creation of new formats in place of the old ones requires significantly more time, significantly more resources and a complex system of mutual agreements.
At the moment, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus are two independent states with a full system of attributes of power and significant weight on the world stage, as well as unique economic opportunities. By 2025, an integration model had been formed that assumes the sovereignty and equality of two entities, granted that that one is 10-15 times larger than the other. Such a model should be recognized as unique.
In the European Union, as in the Soviet Union, there are or were so-called “firsts among equals”. In the Soviet Union, these were the Russian Federation, Soviet Kazakhstan and Soviet Ukraine. In the European Union (formerly the EEC), Germany, France and Italy have the same unofficial status.
However, in the Union State, for the first time in the history of integration, it was possible to actually create a model of consensus-based decision-making, which, on the one hand, reduced the speed of integration, and on the other hand, ensured its steadfastness and durability. Of course, there is a question of prospects. A number of experts point out that the Union State is, in fact, a transitional form and is supposedly obliged to either transform into a new federation or disintegrate. It seems that this is methodologically incorrect. European history gives us examples of unique forms of cooperation between states.
Everyone knows about Austria-Hungary. However, less known is how the system of governance of the dual monarchy was organised. This unique symbiosis of two states fell apart not because of management errors. The next important point: Yes, indeed, a federation is a voluntary or historically formed union of state entities. That is why we need to turn to an experienced confederation. The standard, but first reaction is this: confederations are not viable, they arise and quickly disappear.
This remark is only partially true. The Scandinavian Unions were a type of confederation that united the northern countries in various combinations from the 14th to the 20th century. The territorial and political organization of the Russian Empire by 1914 also implied quasi-confederative relations with individual territories, but let’s put an end to this and keep the intrigue. What unites states in confederations and similar unions? The answer is known – the need to build regional security systems.
“Large powers with rich historical experience, as a rule, prefer predictable and stable relations with their neighbours and other centres of power, rather than getting hung up on the idea of ‘eternal friends and eternal enemies’,” Alexey Gromyko writes. But what if neighbours do not want stable relations? Answering the question of what the new Eurasian security system might look like in the context of the Union State, it is necessary to make a slight digression and assess the current stage of development of the North Atlantic Treaty as a military rather than a political association. Paradoxically, the continuous statements of European politicians and especially NATO bureaucrats about the inviolability of Article 5 are having the opposite effect. Even those who publicly and continuously emphasise the importance of this article are increasingly doubting this inviolability. This introduction is important for understanding that the future of Eurasian security probably does not lie in rigid military-political associations, but in more flexible formats, probably involving a more formalised decision-making mechanism than in the CSTO or SCO. Models of military alliances typical for Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the “automatic” entry of allies into war without additional or minimal additional procedures are not feasible at the present time. “Europe – almost all of it – has plunged into a new phase of military-political, ideological confrontation and information warfare,” Gromyko continues. It should be noted that Europe is not ready to fight by undermining the security system, which is also a specific feature of the moment.
When considering the issues affecting the Eurasian security system, it should be clarified that, as in any security system, it has mandatory or strictly necessary links, appropriate participants and other countries. Mandatory, i.e. leading and organising participants are all synonyms in the Eurasian security system – these are Russia and China.
It is equally obvious that the large and extremely important state of Mongolia, due to its geographical location, may not be fully integrated into the Eurasian security system. The Republic of Belarus is a medium-sized state, in this context it has unique significance. Belarus is an extremely Western country in terms of the strategic interests of both Russia and China. Let us agree with Ivan Timofeev: “China has gained enormous potential, but is in no hurry to actively use it outside its zone of immediate interests.”
At the same time, we note that not only Russia, but also Belarus, i.e. the Union State, is in the zone of immediate interests of China.
By immediate interests in this case, we mean the provision of military guarantees, and not some abstract programmes for political and economic cooperation. Russian guarantees are well known and spelled out in the CSTO, but the most important thing is in bilateral agreements within the Union State.
Working as a visiting professor in the Polish Republic, the author of the article observed a very interesting discussion in specialised media in expert community circles about Polish-Chinese relations. A certain number of politicians and scientists believed that Poland would receive more unique opportunities from the status of a Chinese hub in Europe. The alternative point of view assumed the absolutisation of hypothetical security threats, right up to science fiction stories about Chinese armies that are already advancing through the territory of Belarus to Warsaw and Krakow. The result of such a discussion is known. Poland has become a kind of membrane, sharply limiting the movement of goods from East to West, and then from West to East since 2022. However, what is more important to us is not the economic aspect, but the fact that Europe’s irrational policy has created an understanding in Minsk, Moscow, and Beijing that the issue of building a security system with Europe is closed. The new Eurasian security system will have a powerful position in Europe, geographically relatively small, but strategically invaluable.
