Even in an age of fragmentation, cooperation remains humanity’s most powerful instrument and its surest path to a lasting peace, prosperity, and the best of all possible futures, writes Wang Huiyao.
We live in a world seemingly defined by fragmentation. The post-war liberal order of globalisation is under threat, not the least of all due to the inward turn of the United States, creating the conditions for a potent Kindleberger trap. Economically, new trade barriers and tariffs have been erected. All while politically, we contend with the weaponisation of sanctions, conflict, and climate change.
The easy takeaway from all this is the wrong one: that globalisation is at its end and that the multilateral cooperation it entails will be fundamentally torn apart.
But cloaked behind the collapse of the old order are two deeper movements: A regionalisation of trade as globalisation changes faces, and even more saliently, the rebalancing of global power as the world majority in the Global South rises and the era of US hyperpower draws to a close. Even the West’s predominance in global affairs is at an end, as a new multipolar era takes shape.
First, globalisation remains resilient. One cannot turn back the time on what changing technology has already wrought.
To illustrate, let us start with an observation regarding economic globalisation and regionalisation: World trade as a share of global gross domestic product levelled off in 2011 in a process that started with the 2008 global financial crisis, and has remained steady since, well before claims of an end to globalisation entered the mainstream. The ratio of trade contribution to world GDP has since remained steady, even throughout the recent tumult.
Indeed, trade rebounded particularly strongly after the pandemic, and in 2022, global trade was estimated to be 25% higher than in 2019, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. US–China trade hit a record $690.6 billion that same year, despite widespread rhetoric about “decoupling.” Even with trade disruptions caused by the conflict in Gaza in late 2023 and cooling demand due to inflation and energy prices, merchandise trade volume in 2023 was still up 6.3% from 2019, and commercial services rose 21% in the same period.
Instead, what we are really seeing today is a period of regionalisation where the West, especially, is trading increasingly with its ideologically or proximally close friends and allies. Here, an IMF report details that since the start of the active phase of the Ukraine conflict, trade between the politically aligned has held steady, while trade between rival blocs has declined. While this “geo-economic fragmentation” presents its own unique challenges, it shows the deep interconnections still present in the global economy.
The other area of note is the changing locus of power. There has been a continued shift towards the Global South in general and BRICS in particular which represents more than the world majority of nations and people. According to the IMF, when adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) the Global South represents a larger economic group than the developed economies. In 2022, for example, developing economies accounted for 58.3 percent of global economic activity, 16.5 percentage points greater than developed economies. This is a significant change from 1990, when developed economies accounted for 63.1 percent of global GDP. Today the Global South continues to rise, and by 2028, emerging markets are projected to account for 1.6 times the GDP of developed economies, continuing the long-term shift in power toward the Global South.
With greater weight has come a greater voice: nations once seen as rule-takers are now helping to write the rules of globalisation itself.
This evolution stands in contrast to the trend toward bloc politics and value-based alliances that characterise much of Western diplomacy as well as its inward, increasingly hostile vision of the world. Thus, while some advanced economies are turning inward, pursuing decoupling or “de-risking,” the World Majority continues to engage. Its approach is reformist, not revisionist. It is aimed at keeping globalisation open while making it fairer and more representative.
At a time when some are turning away from trade, BRICS is embracing it through customs, logistics, and general cooperation. Under BRICS there is an expanding trend towards local currency settlements and payment cooperation that lowers risks and dependency. An interbank cooperation mechanism has been established both to empower development banks and provide a financial backstop. In short, BRICS is building its own multilateral order, while the US-centred liberal-order faces obstructionism from its former champion.
From the creation of new multilateral institutions to its constituent members’ rising prominence and power, BRICS stands before an opportunity ripe for the taking. It will not just confirm the establishment of a new multilateral coalition, but also demonstrate that it can play a greater role than that of a simple economic club.
An End to Conflict
Fundamentally, the two central practical issues beleaguering attempts to bring about peace in the Ukrainian conflict are bridging the gap in negotiation positions and ensuring the security and long-term viability of the peace.
Here it is BRICS members that are well-suited to break the deadlock over the conflict in Ukraine, as interlocutors and by platforming peace negotiations. They can also do so by using their ability to pierce the thorny thicket of issues surrounding security and the disposition of troops, NATO or otherwise, in the aftermath.
Regarding the first issue of arriving at mutually acceptable terms, BRICS and especially China has great leverage in that it may convey power through the carrot of reconstruction. War is destructive, and Zelensky’s government may well be persuaded into considering a freeze or even relinquishment of territory should there be sufficient incentive. Here the end to the destructiveness and suffering of the conflict can be paired with the prospect of a prosperous post-conflict reconstruction for all involved. China is the largest trading partner of both Ukraine and Russia at US $12.8 bln and $240.1 bln respectively as of 2023, and would be happy to support a drive towards peace in the region. BRICS, more broadly, could offer even more to all involved.
A peace enforced by NATO divisions in the conflict zone, regardless of US participation, is not a solution at all. However, a multilateral and UN-linked mission could be. Here a force would be needed to enforce that ceasefire, a force that is not only militarily capable but politically neutral. One sourced from actors with no direct stake in NATO, or the regional battlefield, to bypass the thorny thicket of security issues around the conflict in Ukraine.
Here a global effort to stabilise the conflict could draw on personnel from BRICS+ countries such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Egypt to ensure a durable deconfliction zone with real operational legitimacy. It could rely on peacekeepers who are not instruments in service of a single power. Instead, they would stand as guarantors of stability, drawn from every major region, allowing for a durable peace that would not violate core security interests and ensure that all could rest easy.
Thus, the BRICS countries’ relative distance from European security affairs can be turned into an advantage. Because they are less historically entangled, they are more capable of offering creative guarantees and confidence-building measures that all parties can accept.
Plans for post-war recovery will, of course, be vital. Not only as a means to bring negotiating positions closer together but also because, when paired with long-term development assistance, it will help align incentives. Humanitarian corridors could be reopened and conflict-affected areas restored to basic economic functionality and then improved upon further. These efforts will be financial, but also logistical and technical. BRICS countries have the engineering expertise and financing capacity to aid in reconstruction.
Ultimately, the continued future of globalisation and a global order is not in doubt. Rather, its shape is changed and changing, and the task before the international community is not to resurrect the order of the past, but to construct the architecture of the future and the multilateral peace and global governance mechanisms suited to a new century. Even in an age of fragmentation, cooperation remains humanity’s most powerful instrument and its surest path to a lasting peace, prosperity, and the best of all possible futures, both for the Ukrainian conflict and for global peace more broadly.
