Many in the world are following events related to relations between the new US administration and the leading centres of power like Russia, China, the European Union and NATO, and arguing about how soon the transformation of the existing system of international relations will occur and what direction it could take. Meanwhile this very system, without prior arrangement, is moving from one qualitative state to another. This is expressed in the fact that the role of a number of actors in international relations at the global and regional levels is noticeably changing, the level of their subjectivity in world politics is increasing. As a result, some of the geopolitical, geoeconomic and socio-cultural processes taking place in different parts of the world are formed and implemented without the grandees of world politics exerting direct influence on their foreign and domestic policies, although the role of the larger players in shaping the agenda of world politics still remains quite high.
Among such actors in international relations are the states of the South Caucasus - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia: their foreign and domestic policies were built mainly with an eye on the restrictive framework of the existing system of international relations. To a large extent, this was due to the fact that the process of statehood formation in these countries turned out to be closely linked to their involvement in armed conflicts: in Azerbaijan and Armenia, this resulted in full-scale wars over Karabakh, and Georgia attempted to restore its power over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
By the mid-1990s, all participants in the aforementioned conflicts found themselves in a stalemate. Due to various circumstances, they could not achieve a final solution to the conflict in their favour via military means, and for this reason were forced to turn to the mediation efforts of global players, who, in their opinion, should help them in solving the identified problems within the framework of international law. However, the mediators were in no hurry to seriously engage in the reconciliation of the parties and resolve the conflict, since they were guided by their own interests in this region.
Thus, a direct dependence of the countries of the region arose on a policy of double standards, mainly maintained by Western countries, which did not allow them to become full-fledged subjects of international relations. The protracted nature of the negotiations and the ineffectiveness of the mediation activities of the leading countries of the world compelled the governments of the South Caucasus states to recognize their dependence on their will and actually abandon their subjectivity in international relations, or take steps aimed at increasing their weight in the international arena, at least at the level of regional politics.
Baku was the first to come to terms with this reality; it started to build close partnerships and alliances with various countries throughout the world, and intensified interaction with the post-Soviet states on a bilateral basis, with special attention paid toward interaction with Russia. At the same time, Azerbaijan began to develop and implement various models of interaction with Western countries, not only in the political and economic spheres, but also militarily. At the same time, again, Baku, earlier than many post-Soviet countries, was able to “designate for itself red lines, the crossing of which would threaten Russia's security.”
Tbilisi ignored this circumstance, and embraced a utopian confidence that the main players in world politics were the leading Western countries and especially the United States, leading to the events of 2008. As a result, Georgia not only failed to restore control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also seriously lowered the level of its subjectivity.
At the present stage, Georgia continues to experience difficulties associated with the growth of its level of subjectivity in the international arena.
First of all, this is due to the unresolved nature of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian problems, since in order to arrive at an enduring political solution to this problem, Georgia must fully correlate its capabilities with the position of both the Western countries and Russia. At the same time, it is obvious that the views of these centres of power regarding the solution of this problem are diametrically opposed, which means that depending on them would present a serious obstacle to increasing the subjectivity of this country, both in regional and global politics.
Second, the growth of Georgia's subjectivity is hampered by the processes taking place in its domestic politics. It is already obvious that despite the victory of Georgian Dream in the parliamentary elections, and the promotion of its candidate for the post of president of the country, the party was never able to fully take control of the country's political field and seriously weaken the influence of the opposition. For its part, the Georgian opposition does not try to oppose the ideas of the current authorities of the country or its political views. Instead, it calls on Western countries to exert political and economic influence on the leadership of Georgia. At the same time, the official authorities of Georgia, although they reject the Western countries and institutions’ attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, haven’t dismissed the thesis that it is Georgia’s strategic choice to integrate into Western structures, including in the sphere of security, albeit in a few years.
As for Armenia, at first glance, being in close relations with Russia, it has never set as its goal the creation of a situation that would threaten the interests of Moscow. But in fact, since gaining independence, within the framework of its policy of complementarity, it has closely cooperated with Western countries in various areas, while shifting the concerns about the development of its economy and military security sphere to Moscow. This allowed Yerevan to direct the freed-up resources for many years to maintain control over Karabakh. At the same time, the strategic goal of Armenian diplomacy was to delay the negotiation process, with the hope that someday, in the future, a situation will arise in world politics that will allow Armenia to legitimize the status quo that has developed in the Karabakh conflict zone. It was precisely the dependence on foreign countries in the sphere of ensuring national security that radically reduced Armenia's subjectivity in the system of regional security and global economic projects.
Armenia fully came to terms with the fallacy of this approach during the Second Karabakh War, when, despite all diplomatic efforts, it failed to attract to its side in the fight against Azerbaijan the actors it believed lent weight to its foreign policy. However, despite abandoning the illusion that the subjectivity of the state in the international arena can be ensured by playing on the opposing interests of the leading countries of world politics, Armenia followed the beaten path for some time, even despite the fact that the country's authorities understood that the road was a dead end. This became finally clear after Azerbaijani armed forces established full control throughout the country in September 2023 and Baku, in fact from a position of strength, began to demand that Yerevan fulfil the terms of the November 10, 2020 agreement, especially paragraph 9, which provides for Azerbaijan's unhindered access to Nakhichevan.
Awareness of new realities prompted the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to begin a radical revision of the role of his country in the modern system of international relations, which resulted in the voicing of the ideology of “Real Armenia”, which in its substantive part de facto calls on the citizens of Armenia to abandon territorial claims to their neighbours and focus on the development and preservation of the territories of the Republic of Armenia, thereby increasing its subjectivity in world politics. At the same time, it is noted that “the ideology of Real Armenia identifies the homeland with the internationally recognized state - the Republic of Armenia.” However, this approach was perceived negatively in the country as well as among the Armenian diaspora (especially in France and the US), who for many years have been engaged in supporting and promoting the idea of a “Greater Armenia from sea to sea”.
Another initiative aimed at increasing Armenia's subjectivity in the international arena was Yerevan's desire to implement the "Crossroads of the World" project to ensure that trade and logistics routes connecting the states of the South Caucasus region, Russia, Turkey and Iran pass through Armenia.
However, the implementation of this project clashes with the desire of Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and even Iran to implement the idea of the "3 + 3" platform, an integral part of which should be the "Zangezur corridor" and Armenia does not want to allow unimpeded movement along this route, believing that it will lead to a decrease in its subjectivity in regional politics in the absence of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev has openly said that “without Azerbaijan, this ... ‘project’ is not worth a penny, and we have repeatedly conveyed this to the Armenian side through various channels. If they really want to implement this project, then first of all they should turn to Azerbaijan.”
For its part, the Armenian leadership, in order to increase the subjectivity of its country, is trying to prove to its neighbours and partly to the world community that it is determined to both implement peace initiatives in the region, and independently ensure the security of logistics routes. To prove their words, the Armenian authorities have refused the services of Russian border guards, but have invited EU observers to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which irritates Baku.
Obviously, the current turbulence in world politics will have a direct impact on the subjectivity of the South Caucasus states in world politics, while the development of relations with other countries, both inside and outside the region, will strengthen their positions, whereas focusing on using the resources of the major powers to confront their neighbours will doom them to failure.
