Multipolarity and Connectivity
Russia-DPRK: New Horizons of Anti-Sanctions Cooperation

The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty), which was signed on June 19, 2024 in Pyongyang and came into force on December 4, became the successor to previous bilateral interstate documents, including the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 1961

The agreement was concluded in the context of the consistent build-up of the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, provocative actions by Washington's allies in the region, as well as the unstable domestic political situation in the Republic of Korea, which peaked with the introduction by President Yoon of martial law on December 3, 2024, aimed, in his words, at “eradicating pro-North Korean forces and protecting the free constitutional order.”

Thus, there is no doubt about the timeliness of the document, Article 4 of which implies the provision of military or other assistance on a bilateral basis in the event of an armed attack.

One of the features of the Treaty is the readiness recorded in Article 16 to counter the use of unilateral coercive measures, including those of an extraterritorial nature, designated as illegal and contrary to the UN Charter and international law. Moreover, it was declared that efforts will be coordinated and cooperation to support multilateral initiatives aimed at eliminating the practice of applying such measures in international relations.

If unilateral coercive measures are introduced against one of the states, the parties will make practical efforts to reduce risks and eliminate or minimize the direct and indirect impact of such measures on mutual economic relations, individuals or legal entities or their property under national jurisdiction, as well as goods, works, services, information, and results of intellectual activity, including exclusive rights to them.

Thus, the issue of jointly counteracting unilateral sanctions is becoming increasingly important in international relations. Earlier, Russia signed relevant declarations with Iran and Nicaragua as well as a memorandum of understanding with Venezuela. The final declaration of the Kazan BRICS summit  recorded a common determination to counter the practice of applying sanctions.

Stagnation of the UN Security Council sanctions regime against the DPRK

Since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted 10 ‘sanctions’ resolutions in response to the DPRK conducting six nuclear tests and a number of ballistic missile launches, which is unprecedented in the history of the UN both in terms of quantity and content. At the same time, Russia, with the support of China, has repeatedly called on the United Nations, especially after the tightening of the sanctions in 2016-2017, to conduct an impartial assessment of their effectiveness and the impact they have on the humanitarian situation in North Korea.

In March 2019, the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Committee on the DPRK in its report to the UN Security Council  pointed out the concerns of a number of states, UN agencies and humanitarian organisations that, despite exemptions from the sanctions regime, serious problems still exist which make it impossible to implement humanitarian programmes in North Korea. The main problems were:

  • delays in obtaining exemptions from the UN Security Council sanctions regime;

  • lack of a banking channel;

  • delays in customs clearance of export goods;

  • reduction in the number of interested foreign suppliers;

  • increase in expenditure on humanitarian goods and on humanitarian operations;

  • reduction in funding for operations.

In this regard, the Panel of Experts recommended that the UN Secretary-General instruct the Secretariat to conduct an assessment of the humanitarian consequences of sanctions on the DPRK. However, due to opposition, mainly from the United States, no significant work was carried out.

Multipolarity and Connectivity
How to Implement the New Treaty Between Moscow and Pyongyang
Georgy Toloraya
Until recently, Russian-North Korean relations were regulated by the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation of 2000, as well as the Pyongyang and Moscow Declarations of 2000 and 2001, signed at the highest level, which the DPRK side considered even more important.
Opinions


During the warming of relations between North Korea and the United States, as well as with South Korea, in December 2019, Russia and China circulated a draft humanitarian resolution in the UN Security Council, which proposed lifting a number of sanctions. Despite the provisions contained in each UN Security Council resolution on the readiness to strengthen, change, suspend or cancel certain measures depending on the DPRK's attitude towards compliance with the provisions of the resolutions, the US and other Western nations showed no readiness to move away from their destructive logic in relation to Pyongyang. At the same time, the leadership of the United States and the Republic of Korea allowed them to “turn a blind eye” to the non-compliance with the UN Security Council sanctions regime against the DPRK in favour of their political interests. As it is known, on the eve of the summit between the 45th US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June 2018, the North Korean leader announced the suspension of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nuclear tests. At the same time, Washington and Seoul tried to ignore Pyongyang's numerous launches of other types of ballistic missiles, which were nevertheless carried out in violation of UN Security Council decisions. Not a single request from Washington or Seoul to the UN Security Council regarding the adoption of a new ‘sanctions’ resolution against the DPRK was sent at that time. With the arrival of the Joe Biden administration in January 2021, the frequency and scale of US-South Korean military exercises with the involvement of the Japanese side, aimed mainly at practicing strikes on North Korean strategic targets, sharply increased. Regular visits to the Republic of Korea by US nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers still take place, as well as flights of US strategic bombers along North Korean territory. These manoeuvres essentially discredit the decisions of the UN Security Council. Each resolution, among the obligations of UN member states, emphasizes the importance of working to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

This "escalation game" provoked a reaction from Pyongyang, which in March 2022, after a five-year pause, launched the Hwasong-17 ICBM, capable of reaching any target in the US. However, while previously North Korean ICBM launches were punishable by the tightening of restrictions, Moscow and Beijing used their veto against the adoption in May 2022 of the US-initiated draft UN Security Council resolution condemning the launch due to Washington's opposition to the Russian-Chinese proposal to ease the sanctions regime against the DPRK.

In March 2024, Russia vetoed the US-proposed Security Council resolution to extend the mandate of the 1718 Panel of Experts with respect to the DPRK. This was due to the fact that Western delegations did not show a readiness to establish specific deadlines for the restrictive measures against Pyongyang, conduct their review, and use these in making further decisions. As noted by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova, “the panel of experts of the UN Security Council Committee 1718 has lost all the standards of objectivity and impartiality that should be integral characteristics of its mandate, and has turned into an obedient tool of the DPRK's geopolitical opponents.”

Following the Russian-Korean talks on June 19, 2024, President Vladimir Putin pointed to the need to counter the practice of sanctions strangulation as a tool that the West has become accustomed to using in order to maintain its hegemony in politics, economics and other spheres. The indefinite restrictive regime of the UN Security Council against the DPRK, inspired by the United States and its allies, according to the President of Russia, “should be revised.”

On June 26, 2024, Maria Zakharova pointed out that the so-called ‘sanctions’ resolutions of the UN Security Council against the DPRK had been adopted in 2016-2017 amid a completely different geopolitical situation. They were not intended to punish Pyongyang, but to encourage it to take reciprocal steps by easing restrictive measures, which would contribute to the de-escalation of tensions and the advancement of the political and diplomatic process of Korean settlement with the participation of all involved states in the region. According to Zakharova, since then, the situation has changed dramatically. The US, having essentially caused a split in the Council, instead of moving towards de-escalation on the basis of the aforementioned resolutions, is actively trying to use them to tighten the completely bankrupt sanctions regime in order to undermine the socio-economic structure of the DPRK and create a serious humanitarian catastrophe there.

Thus, the basic principles underlying the system of international relations are becoming an inconvenient obstacle for the US and its satellites and, as a result, are subject to unfair interpretations or are simply bypassed. Due to the actions of the Americans and their disrespect for the foreign policy interests of Russia and China, permanent members of the UN Security Council, the UNSC sanctions regime in relation to the DPRK can be considered a relic.

Economic Statecraft
Russia-North Korea-China: Reactivation of the Strategic Triangle
Vitaly Sovin
The prerequisites for the resumption of strategic cooperation between Moscow, Pyongyang and Beijing were brewing against the background of the tightening of Washington's policy towards North Korea under the Biden administration, as well as NATO's military deployment in the Indo-Pacific region.
Opinions

 

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.