The “Donald Trump revolution,” primarily focused on domestic US issues, has already become a significant factor in global politics. A potential reduction in US-Russia tensions and the resolution of the Ukraine conflict would positively impact Eurasia’s politics and economy, creating favourable conditions for a functioning multipolar system. The coming years will require intense diplomatic, economic, and security efforts, ultimately leading to a new quality of interstate relations in Eurasia, Stanislav Tkachenko writes.
The crisis of the unipolar world, which accelerated in the 2020s, has sparked widespread discussions about what will replace the American-centric order. Two decades ago, during the era of unfettered globalization, Robert Keohane’s question about what would happen in world affairs “after US hegemony” seemed relatively straightforward. The prevailing assumption was that the model of American hegemony, established after the Cold War, would be succeeded by hierarchically structured integration blocs: the EU as the ideal prototype, with regional replicas emerging elsewhere. Between 2002 and 2004, the author participated in numerous conferences in Latin America (Argentina and Uruguay) and Asia (South Korea), where the creation of economic and monetary unions by MERCOSUR and East Asian states was discussed in depth. Topics included regional currencies, the elimination of customs barriers, and even the harmonization of tax policies.
A new era has since dawned. The modern concept of multipolarity no longer views regional integration blocs as a viable alternative to the classical balance of power pursued by sovereign states. Instead, the emerging polyphonic world order will revolve around distinct centres of power, each defined by a unique combination of attributes: civilization, internal and external sovereignty, technological platforms, military strength, and soft power. These poles will inevitably form an informal hierarchy, and over time, rules governing their interactions and spheres of influence will emerge.
By the second half of the 20th century, the United States had already lost its military supremacy, failing to maintain its lead over the USSR and later Russia in advanced weaponry, including nuclear missiles. Washington’s “soft power,” if it ever truly existed, eroded further through a series of global crises, from the dot-com crash of 2000-2001 to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2025 Munich Security Conference (MSC) report openly acknowledged this decline, heralding the arrival of a “multipolarised” world. According to MSC experts, this new world will feature multiple centres of power across the globe, but it will also be marked by intrinsic polarisation – an inability of these centres to collaborate effectively, even at the level of the 19th-century “European concert.”
Drawing parallels to the famous manifesto Asia Can Say No by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Tokyo Mayor Shintaro Ishihara in the late 1970s, the sovereign states of Eurasia today must assert their refusal to tolerate external interference or internal destabilization, particularly in Central Asia. Initiatives such as the AUKUS partnership, the fluctuating QUAD alliance, the Asian NATO projects under the Camp David Agreement (2023), and the institutionalization of the Washington-Tokyo axis with the Philippines and Vietnam threaten Eurasian stability, potentially igniting conflicts whose repercussions would inevitably reach Central Asia.
According to US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s plan, only three of the 11 unified US military commands – Indo-Pacific, Northern, and Space – are shielded from the “optimization” led by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. Notably absent from this list is the US Central Command, which oversees the Middle East and Central Asia. The reduction of the US military presence in this region will undoubtedly impact regional security, though the precise consequences remain uncertain.
With the diminished capacity of external players (the US, Europe, and Turkey) to project military and political-economic power into Central Asia, the region’s five nations have an opportunity to remain on the sidelines of the impending US-China conflict. However, such hopes should not be overstated. Any confrontation between the world’s two largest powers – boasting the biggest economies, militaries, and defence budgets – will inevitably have global ramifications. Even if the conflict remains non-military, involving sanctions, technological decoupling, trade wars, and transport blockades, all nations, including those in Central Asia, will feel its effects.
In 2024, Russia underwent a significant shift in its strategy regarding the UN’s role in shaping a multipolar world. Prior to the Kazan BRICS summit in October 2024, Moscow actively pushed for the institutionalization of BRICS, envisioning it as a viable alternative to the UN in the event of its paralysis. However, by fall 2024, Russia reversed course, deciding instead to reassert the UN’s centrality in global governance. Beginning with the “Summit of the Future” at UN headquarters on September 22-23, 2024, Moscow intensified efforts to restore the UN’s role as a platform for multilateral cooperation and conflict resolution – a role largely neglected since the Cold War’s end and the rise of American unipolarity.
The Biden administration staunchly opposed the rise of multipolarity, focusing its efforts on containing China and Russia as the primary threats to US dominance. Surprisingly, Washington prioritized inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia, deferring its confrontation with China. This strategy failed, as it proved impossible to decisively defeat a nuclear superpower deeply integrated into the global economy and supported by over a hundred nations of the “World Majority.” The Trump administration, by contrast, appears to have more modest goals: slowing the development of Russia and China as independent poles and shifting the balance of power in Washington’s favour. While some in the US may still hope to align Russia against China, Moscow has no incentive to comply.
Today, no Central Asian state seeks to sever or artificially curtail economic ties with the US and Europe. Many benefit significantly from Western aid programs, delivered bilaterally (e.g., through the notorious USAID) or via international organizations like the UN and EU. At the same time, Russia, China, and India are actively engaged in development assistance, collaborating with regional powers both bilaterally and through organizations such as the EAEU and SCO. This dynamic exemplifies real multipolarity, characterized by mutually beneficial cooperation and competition under established rules.
A significant step toward a transparent and sustainable interstate system in Eurasia is the initiative proposed by Belarus, with Russian support, in the autumn of 2023: the development of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century. Currently, the Charter serves as an open invitation for dialogue on the challenges of interstate relations in Eurasia. As its title suggests, it emphasizes multipolarity as the foundation for addressing current and future issues. A final draft, to be published in Minsk later this year, will outline goals such as strengthening international security, fostering a fair world order, and respecting diversity and multipolarity as key pillars of the emerging global system.
In conclusion, the “Donald Trump revolution,” primarily focused on domestic US issues, has already become a significant factor in global politics. A potential reduction in US-Russia tensions and the resolution of the Ukraine conflict would positively impact Eurasia’s politics and economy, creating favourable conditions for a functioning multipolar system. The coming years will require intense diplomatic, economic, and security efforts, ultimately leading to a new quality of interstate relations in Eurasia.
Over half a century ago, in 1968, Swedish economist and Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal published Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, arguing that poverty and backwardness were inherent to Asia due to archaic institutions, lack of initiative, and superstition. Today, Myrdal’s predictions have been proven wrong. Asian states are now the engines of global economic growth, striving to preserve the positive aspects of globalization that the US, EU, and Russia have grown disillusioned with. There is every reason to believe that Asia will also lead in building a new international security architecture, with the global multipolar system taking root on our continent and spreading worldwide.
