Domestic and foreign policy changes will only become possible in the future when Kim Jong-un gains a firm grip on the reins of power. If the international environment is more tranquil and the economy is more open, North Korea may start to gradually enhance its cooperation with the rest of the world. In this case, it will also be able to step up its domestic development.
Although Kim Jong-il's death on December 17 was sudden, it was not entirely unexpected. In the last few years the former leader had serious health problems, and it was clear that he was not long for this world. I assume that the participants of the six-party talks had contingency plans in the event of complications following his death. At any rate, Russia, China and the United States have continued their close contacts in the spirit of mutual understanding since Kim Jong-il’s death.
Regardless of personal opinions of Kim Jong-il, other participants in these talks understood the logic behind his domestic and foreign policy – it was stable. Now the succession of his young son has considerably muddied North Korean policy. It will be rather difficult to predict precisely the directions of his policies in the near future.
I am inclined to think that Kim Jong-un will primarily focus on winning the trust of seasoned party veterans and military leaders, shoring up the power of the state. During this critical period of transition, he will most likely stick to the old political line in order to avoid making mistakes and incurring criticism from the party and military elites. The ruling team that will guide the new leader and help him face political challenges has not changed after his father’s death and will continue its old policy. To sum up, no drastic changes will take place in this country’s domestic and foreign policy in the short term, at least during the official three-year mourning period.
Domestic and foreign policy changes will only become possible in the future when Kim Jong-un gains a firm grip on the reins of power. If the international environment is more tranquil and the economy is more open, North Korea may start to gradually enhance its cooperation with the rest of the world. In this case, it will also be able to step up its domestic development.
There are numerous factors of uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula, which is making dialogue between major world powers, including Russia and China, very important. This particularly concerns the six-party talks that may resume in the near future. Following Kim Jong-il’s death, some progress may be made towards North Korea’s denuclearization. For now all countries should refrain from unfair criticism of its domestic and foreign policy. Otherwise Kim Jong-un may try to shore up his position with a show of force towards other countries, which would be met with a negative response. Any conflict would harm the interests of all parties.
Therefore, Russia and China, which have shared interests on the Korean Peninsula, must actively pursue bilateral and multilateral consultations with countries like the United States, Japan and South Korea with a view to ensuring North Korea’s stable and peaceful transition. It is in all countries’ interests.
However, Russia’s role in the Asia-Pacific region is still limited and does not accurately reflect its potential. Russia has already shown itself capable of shifting its foreign policy focus from the West to the East. For example, in 2012 Vladivostok will play host to the annual APEC summit.
The change in North Korea’s domestic politics provides Russia with a unique opportunity to play a more constructive role in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2006, Russia headed the Working Group on Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, which was established by the six-party talks. Perhaps this mechanism could be revived. Its goal should be not to exert pressure on North Korea but to suggest ways of ensuring its rights and tension-free contacts with the rest of the world.
I don’t think Kim Jong-il’s death will affect Russian-North Korean or Chinese-North Korean relations too much. As for his son, the best thing Russia and China can do for him is to support his country’s efforts to consolidate the power of the state. Otherwise, the young leader may face directly domestic and foreign pressure at the same time.
As regards economy, China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner. North Korea still greatly depends on Chinese imports. As for food aid, China has not had any advantages over the United States or South Korea in the last few years, and Kim Jong-il’s death will not change anything in this respect. Russia should probably step up economic cooperation with North Korea. The trend to stronger cooperation became pronounced toward the end of Kim Jong-il’s rule. Thus, last summer President Dmitry Medvedev and Kim Jong-il discussed a project to build a Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline.
However, this project is more geopolitical than economic. Russia hopes that this project will help consolidate ties between the North and the South and make the policy of both Koreas more predictable. In theory, the gas pipeline running across the Korean Peninsula would help both Koreas and the rest of Northeast Asia to get on the track of sound development.
At the same time, there are apprehensions that this project will remain on paper as a subject of political dialogue. The chances for its successful implementation and real economic profit are negligible. Many analysts in Russia believe that political risks in North Korea are very high and prefer supplying gas to South Korea. Moreover, the construction of the gas pipeline will cost about $3 billion without any guarantee that the cost will be recouped in the near future.
Initially, talks regarding this project were scheduled to start late last year but Kim Jong-il’s death has resulted in some adjustments. The logic here is very simple. Right now Kim Jong-un must try to mitigate any risks that could threaten the political system, and for this reason the pipeline is unlikely to be a priority for the new leadership.
I believe this project points to an obvious desire to more actively pursue an agreement on Russian-Chinese gas cooperation. In other words, it is more an element of Russia’s strategic branding. The discovery of shale gas deposits has already considerably affected the world gas market. Russia may encounter some pressure during its efforts to enter the Asia-Pacific markets, and South Korea has been aware of this. However, Seoul gives greater weight to the project’s political component and views it as an opportunity to influence North Korea’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the current foreign and domestic situation in North Korea may make it quite difficult for South Korea to start talks on the project. This is why I don’t think this project is likely to be carried out in the near or long term.
