There is always room for uncertainty and interpretation in international relations. But world leaders today are no longer able to face unpleasant truths. Governments in Europe, the US and Russia face enormous challenges, and yet political leaders think that they can just shut their eyes and the problems will go away. After all, it’s easier to point out your rivals’ mistakes than to recognize your own.
Self-deception has been the theme in global politics this summer.
There is always room for uncertainty and interpretation in international relations. But world leaders today are no longer able to face unpleasant truths. Governments in Europe, the US and Russia face enormous challenges, and yet political leaders think that they can just shut their eyes and the problems will go away. After all, it’s easier to point out your rivals’ mistakes than to recognize your own.
Take the United States. President Barack Obama is behaving as if a few cosmetic reforms will quiet the international outrage over NSA surveillance. Just promise safeguards for ordinary people and let the NSA to go on monitoring phone records and e-mail correspondence and eavesdropping on foreign leaders. The fuss will soon blow over and things will go back to normal, right?
That seems unlikely.
All nations feel vulnerable in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations about US spying. Mr. Obama has faced the wrath of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In Germany, the outrage has been compounded by the outing of a CIA spy in the German government. But Rousseff and Merkel are just the first two names on a long list of angry allies.
It’s hard to imagine anything more damaging to US “soft power” than this endless series of exposures, which distracts diplomats and politicians all over the world. Both the US public and US allies think that something more significant than the proposed half-measures is needed to restore confidence.
Congress, for its part, suffers from the illusion that it can lecture the President and foreign leaders at a time when its approval rating in the US stands at an abysmal 7%. Mr. Obama’s own approval rating, while also hovering around a record low, is nevertheless at 29%.
As for Europe, leaders there are pretending not to notice the results of the EU parliamentary elections in May, which elevated far right parties and opponents of European integration. Ignoring the popular anger at European elite, Merkel backed Jean-Claude Juncker for EU Commission President. (Mr. Juncker is a Brussels insider mostly known for his long service as Prime Minister of Luxembourg, which he turned into a tax paradise for billionaires.)
British PM David Cameron can be criticized for his awkward politics, but he is absolutely right when he says that the EU must restore its prestige in the eyes of the ordinary Europeans, who tend to think in the wake of the euro-zone crisis that EU economic policies aren’t designed to work for them. Mr. Juncker’s promotion shows that European leaders are simply out of touch.
As for Russian President Vladimir Putin, his principal error is to believe that the West has forgotten Crimea and won’t mention it as long as the Russian army keeps out of Eastern Ukraine.
Conciliatory gestures every now and then are usually enough to restore Russia’s relations with Western countries to their ordinary state of mild irritation as they were a year ago.
But that may not be enough this time. World leaders can forgive a lot, occasionally even self-seeking aggression, but they cannot tolerate irrational behavior. From the outside, it is clear that Russia stands to lose more than it gains from its annexation of Crimea, which has made Putin look like a reckless and unpredictable gambler.
The paradigm has shifted irrevocably. France will be able to sell Mistrals to Russia, and German businesses will continue chasing deals there. But even if ties are outwardly restored, foreign leaders will no longer take anything for granted in relations with Russia. They will treat Putin like a bomb that can go off at any minute.
And yet some in the Kremlin are certain that Russia has won rather than suffered a huge defeat. Within a few months, Russia’s leadership has accelerated capital flight, frightened away most foreign investors (possibly for years), and spurred NATO to strengthen the defensive capabilities of some of Russia’s neighbors. Rather than prevent the signing of EU partnership agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, Moscow has accelerated the process. Finally, Russia’s image has deteriorated the world over. According to Pew Research Center, unfavorable views of Russia increased in 27 out of 36 countries polled within the past year.
The Eurasian Union, a project with limited promise even before, will have enormous trouble trying to expand beyond Belarus and Kazakhstan. Although both countries import a lot from Russia, they would like to export to the EU as well. Some people imagine that Russia can teach Europe a lesson by pivoting to China. But the cost of such an about-face makes it tantamount to a defeat. After ten years of patient talks, the Kremlin opted to sign a gas deal with Beijing at the most inopportune moment. Even if budget deficits and kickbacks are lower than usual, Russia will barely make a profit from selling gas to China for decades.
Add to this the popular belief that the Kremlin can ally with West European conservatives and declare a crusade against bearded ladies, lace panties, nude Greek statues and other threats to public morality.
Clearly, some people live in a realm of profound delusion.
An equilibrium based on self-deception cannot hold for long. Deep down all world leaders (with the exception, perhaps, of a few Russians who support anything that raises oil prices) hoped that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) would simply disappear. But this hasn’t happened. History will not be kind to short-sighted politicians who confuse fact and fiction.
This article was originally published on www.forbes.ru on 15.07.2014
