The US attack on Iran sent shockwaves throughout oil markets as prices soared following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and subsequent critical disruptions in global energy flows. From the chaos emerged three energy leaders that are set to shape market dynamics for years to come, writes Konstantin Simonov, Director General of the National Energy Security Fund.
Experts had already begun summing up the latest conflict surrounding Iran when the situation around the Strait of Hormuz flared up sharply once again. This is, in truth, not altogether surprising. It seems there is no need, at this point, to guess what exactly will happen in the Strait of Hormuz in the near term. What can already be done, however, is to draw some conclusions about the transformation of the global oil market.
The Hormuz crisis has clearly identified three key players, and the relationships between them will largely determine the future course of the oil industry. One might say that the oil market now rests on three load-bearing columns. Unlike columns providing secure support for the structure above them, however, these three find themselves in a highly fraught relationship with one another—producing not stability, but rather heightened turbulence.
The first Column is the United States. Its logic deserves closer examination, given that it was the instigator and principal driving force behind the new major war in the Middle East.
The United States has long held first place in both oil and gas production. The real revolution, however, was its transformation into an exporter of crude oil, refined products, and LNG alike. The Hormuz crisis has cemented precisely this role for the US, which is fundamentally important.
For a long time, the US was seen chiefly as the world’s largest consumer of hydrocarbons. According to Energy Institute data, by the end of 2025 the US still remained ahead of China: US consumption stood at just over one billion tonnes of oil, compared with only 793 million tonnes in China. The war with Iran demonstrated that it is now the United States’ function as a supplier of oil and LNG to the global market that must be reckoned with. And this supplier, well aware that global demand for oil and gas is not growing as fast as producers might wish, is dealing extremely harshly with its rivals—the other hydrocarbon exporters. Russian oil companies have already felt the effects of American sanctions. Now the US has also demonstrated its military tools of market influence, which are needed to “disconnect” competitors from it. The new military conflict with Iran not only led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but also provoked Iranian strikes against the oil and gas infrastructure of the Gulf’s producing states.
The US should now be recognised as a “pushing-out supplier”—an exporter that will remove competitors from the market by any means available, including military and political tools. The US has demonstrated an entirely new attitude towards armed conflicts. I call this the “tap-water war”—one that the US can, as needed, turn on swiftly and just as swiftly turn off. Indeed, the events of mid-July, when the US began striking Iran and Iran in turn resumed restricting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, offer a clear illustration of this. Trump paused the war, kicked off the World Cup, marked his own birthday and the 250th anniversary of American independence—and then “turned the tap back on”.
The US has exposed the vulnerability of other countries’ logistics while simultaneously reminding the world of the strength of its navy, which serves both as a threat to the delivery of “foreign” hydrocarbons (including as a means of combating violators of American sanctions) and as a guarantee of the reliability of shipments from the United States itself.
Today, shipping in the Hormuz area depends not only on Iran but also on the United States, which can treat the war in the region as a managed conflict—one that can be extinguished, and just as readily reignited. In this sense, the US does not even need to force a change of regime in Iran towards one fully loyal to Washington (along the Venezuelan model). What matters is that the Gulf states and key hydrocarbon importers understand that the US could, if it wished, easily close the Strait of Hormuz. It is telling that, during the war, Trump repeatedly urged buyers to purchase hydrocarbons from the United States. This was especially insistent during Trump’s state visit to China in May 2026.
Another important factor for the US is the rather timely rise in world oil prices. The fact is that oil production in the United States has run into certain technical difficulties. Water cuts in wells are rising, as is the gas-to-oil ratio of what is being extracted. These problems can only be solved through fresh investment—investment for which shale producers, at the prices seen at the start of 2026, were wholly unprepared. Low prices had made drilling new wells in a number of basins unprofitable. The sharp rise in oil prices, however, has increased the appeal of new projects in the United States—not only in shale, but also in the Gulf of Mexico. This also lends a certain logic to the change of power in Venezuela: projects in the Orinoco River valley, with their very high production costs, were simply untenable at the prices seen at the start of the year. Now, however, interest in them could grow considerably. New investment in American shale and in offshore projects, both within the US and in countries under Washington’s political control, is becoming potentially lucrative.
Crude oil production in the US itself is already approaching 14 million barrels per day. If one counts condensate and biofuels as well (that is, what in the US is termed “liquids”), the gap becomes even more striking: the US is approaching a figure of 24 million barrels. During the Hormuz crisis, the US became a net exporter of crude oil for the first time since 1943. In May, US crude exports reached a record 5.6 million barrels per day. Imports, admittedly, ran at roughly the same volume. At the same time, an active sell-off of strategic reserves began. The US has, in effect, seized Europe’s oil market, from which Russian suppliers have been squeezed out. Today, just under 50 per cent of US crude exports go to Europe alone.
But the most important point is that the US has continued to expand its exports of refined products. In its June report, the US Department of Energy put net exports of refined products at 6.3 million barrels per day.
Admittedly, prices that are too high drive up petrol prices on the domestic market and hand ammunition to advocates of renewables who argue for reducing crude oil consumption. A balance is needed. This is why Trump put the military conflict on pause. Yet, after a short interval, he started it up again. Such a tactic will allow the US to regulate oil prices not only through the behaviour of speculators on the oil futures market, but also through managed wars.
The second Column is OPEC+, of which Russia is also a member. It is under clear pressure, and the United States’ aggressive policy is an obvious challenge to it. OPEC+ was created ten years ago with the aim of influencing world prices. This worked, but gradually it was precisely the expansion of US production and exports that became the main problem. In order to push prices up, OPEC+ had to restrict output—but this produced a “free-rider effect”. Countries outside OPEC+ (the US, along with Canada, Norway, Guyana, and Brazil) calmly went on ramping up production, taking market share for themselves.
Having recognised the behaviour of the other Column—the United States—the OPEC+ countries found themselves facing a serious problem. They can no longer function simply as a market regulator that raises or lowers output at will. What is more, the US has also set about reducing OPEC+’s market share through military-political means: sanctions against Russia, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz against Saudi Arabia. On top of this, over the course of the Hormuz crisis OPEC+ lost the UAE. That country’s oil production in June stood at 3.8 million barrels per day.
The OPEC+ countries party to the deal produced 27.6 million barrels per day in June. This represents a shortfall against target of more than 7 million barrels per day—precisely what the alliance has lost as a result of aggressive US actions.
If one takes all formal OPEC+ members together, output is higher, at 36.3 million barrels per day. But even this figure shows that OPEC+ now controls less than 40 per cent of global oil production. At the same time, countries leaving OPEC+ would turn many producers into smaller “fish”, ones unlikely to be able to withstand the pressure of the US—the dominant Column in the market. Even so, the question of changing OPEC+ policy in a shifting market has become an urgent one.
Finally, the third Column: China. Recognition of its role in the oil market may fairly be counted among the important outcomes of the Hormuz crisis. I recall clearly how, in the first days of the crisis, many Western experts insisted that if the closure of Hormuz lasted more than a month, the market would face catastrophe and prices of at least $150 a barrel. China, as the world’s largest oil importer, was supposed to be the chief victim. But this did not happen. Why? Because China drew on its strategic and commercial reserves, which together, before the crisis, stood at around 1.2 billion barrels of oil. Over the course of 2024–2025, China carried out one of the largest stockpile-building programmes in history, preparing well for Hormuz.
As a result, China simply cut its imports sharply—without any damage to domestic consumption (though it did have to cut exports of refined products). Comparing May 2026 with May 2025, the drop in purchases from external suppliers amounted to more than 13 million tonnes, or just under 100 million barrels. (Official customs statistics for June have not yet been published, but preliminary estimates suggest the fall in imports was no less significant.) Over the longer period from January to May, oil imports fell year-on-year by roughly 5 per cent. China, meanwhile, kept a significant portion of its reserves intact.
However, the US has “claimed” Venezuela for itself, a country from which China had been actively buying oil. And it continues to pile pressure on Iran (it is no secret that Iranian oil is sold mainly to China). So the battle between the Columns continues. Importantly, the United States’ overly aggressive imposition of its own energy resources is already provoking firm resistance from China. Trump has enough bravado to declare a tariff war on China while simultaneously offering it his own energy resources. Meanwhile, China has not imported oil or LNG from the US for more than a year now.
The Hormuz crisis has shown that oil remains an indispensable commodity, and that the creation of an artificial shortage causes problems for many states. At the same time, the period of calm, orderly functioning is now behind us—the United States’ drive for global energy dominance has created enormous turbulence, including in logistics and trading. Yet this challenge can be met with a response, including through the formation of coalitions between major producers and buyers on new foundations. Geopolitics, meanwhile, has not simply returned to the oil business—it has taken centre stage there.
