Political Economy of Connectivity
Eurasian Security: New Principles and New Reality

The dismemberment of the former Soviet Union catalysed the end of the Cold War—a war that gripped the entire world for almost half a century. However, within less than two decades, the world is once again grappling with various power centres supposedly nudging the global order towards multilateralism. Unfortunately, multilateralism has been the biggest casualty in the emerging order, which is now characterised multiple power centres as regionalism and minilateralism are gaining ground.

Post-Cold War Order

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the demand for equal and indivisible security has been a mirage at multilateral forums. After the end of the Cold War, unilateralism, led by the US, took over. In the 21st century, security is not limited to military issues (although these remain fundamental). It pertains to a broader range of topics, including “hybrid threats” in information campaigns, digital security, interference in internal processes, and the politicisation of the economy and finance. Unipolarity gave way to multipolarity with the rise of China, the EU and Russia as different poles of political and economic power. This multipolarity is less stable than bipolarity due to the risk of competing coalitions and confrontational bloc politics.

According to some political scientists, the present world represents an era of “unbalanced multipolarity” where multiple poles are emerging as Middle Powers but some poles are getting stronger than others. Despite this multipolarity, political, military and economic power is being increasingly concentrated in the two global powers i.e. China and the USA.

China, as an emerging global power, is challenging the hegemony of the US-led West’s dominance of global finance and politics, while the US, as the old global power, is resisting the rise of this competitor.

Competing security alliances like SQUAD, QUAD, AUKUS, and I2U2 (Middle East QUAD) are being established under American stewardship to contain the rise of China. Such containment-oriented security alliances are being referred to as minilateral alliances with regional flavour. For instance, the Asia Pacific alliances like SQUAD, QUAD and AUKUS are aimed at containing China and expanding the US maritime footprint under the pretext of ensuring “Freedom of Navigation” for all nations. 

Is the world safer now than it was during the stable bipolar era of the Cold War? Are states and their societies, economies and cultures secure or under threat? What shape could the “multi-polar” trend take as the world moves towards renewed tensions reminiscent of the Cold War? Unbalanced multipolarity is giving way to bipolarity, where military and economic strength is increasingly concentrated in two rival poles: China and the US. The return of bloc politics is therefore a logical corollary of this return to bipolarity, though the full transition to bipolarity has not yet taken place.

Factors Impacting Eurasian Security

Eurasian security cannot divorce itself from the threats of the past, be they those encountered during the Cold War or the brief, subsequent unipolar world order. The challenge to the unipolar order is considered a direct threat to the supremacy of the established power, which swayed its way throughout the 20th century and still possesses immense destructive power, enough to destroy the world many times over.

The following factors deserve scrutiny when discussing security amid the new realities, both in Eurasia and beyond:

  • Eurasia, due to its history, especially since the First World War, is no longer limited to its present geographic boundaries, but security threats, both military and economic, plague all states in equal measure. Parallel to Eurasia, Asia, led by China, has emerged as a new power centre; its economic boom and evolving military prowess are putting the existing power centres on edge.

  • In Eurasia, Russia and China are facing economic sanctions instigated by the US-led West, which is weaponising the economy in order to achieve political objectives. Immanuel Kant’s liberal internationalist maxim that “trade is a prerequisite for peace” has essentially been dismissed as a Utopian dream, as high trade turnover could not stop the souring of political dialogue between Russia and the West against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis.

  • Similarly, the high level of economic interdependence between China and the United States ($575 billion in trade between the two states) has not reduced the political competition between the two giants; Washington’s attempts to hinder China’s technological growth are a case in point. Also, despite China and India having $135 billion in trade, the political difficulties between them have only increased.

  • Experience suggests that economic benefits can create the conditions for political cooperation, but they do not protect against confrontation regarding fundamental security issues.

Economic Statecraft
Asynchronous Multipolarity: Control Parameters and Development Vectors
Ivan Timofeev
A multipolar world has long become a reality. We are already living in a new world order, the contours of which we are not fully aware of. An adequate understanding of the new order requires a clear understanding of what exactly we mean by a multipolar world, and what kind of multipolarity we are dealing with today. This new world can be called “asynchronous multipolarity,” writes Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev.
Opinions

New Principles and New Realities: The alternative to a polarised World Order

Regionalism is gaining ground as states assert their sovereignty, independence, and economic and cultural choices. However, given the threats at the regional level as well as threats emanating from great power rivalry, the regional states are constrained to creating a security paradigm to protect their collective interests. Despite the presence of Eurasian alliances like the Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), there is a desire for more multilateral forums to promote the security and economic interests of the Eurasian countries.

The multilateral alliances in Eurasia like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are the new reality. It holds great promise for its member states and the rest of the world. With four nuclear powers, 40 percent of the world’s land, 30 percent of the global economy, 35 percent of its energy reserves, tremendous mineral and natural resources, and over three billion people, the SCO, with its present shape and membership, can make its impact felt internationally. Incidentally, the majority of the Eurasian states are members of the SCO. Analysts believe that the most optimal format for dialogue on issues related to both the formation of the Eurasian security architecture and the economic development of the Eurasian region is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Although not directly linked to Eurasia, BRICS is another formidable bloc that can offer a parallel, if not alternative, system of doing business without fear of sanctions. The use of BRICS currencies for business transactions can offer states relief from American and Western sanctions. The growing speed with which BRICS membership is expanding reflects the enhanced realisation that countries can forge economic cooperation and opt for an alternative transaction system without being coerced.

The hunger for more multilateral forums and alliances to present a united Eurasian front against the hegemony of the West is evident in the establishment of cooperative fora like the “Conference on interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia” (CICA), which are being actively promoted by Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan.

Connectivity initiatives such as the North-South Corridor and Middle Corridor offer enhanced options for trade and security cooperation. The Middle Corridor that links Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-Georgia and Europe is a network of routes being developed under the BRI as well as the Central Asian countries’ initiative. This route will provide greater options for trade, especially after the risks posed to sea trade through Suez and Red Sea due to war in the Middle East.

However, everything may not go as planned. Eurasian security would be prone to instability if intra-Eurasian disputes remain festering, such as between China and India or between Pakistan and India. Moreover, the Eurasian security paradigm is still in its nascent stages and has to devise mechanisms to address disputes or irritants that states in the region may face. Such a paradigm may be vulnerable to setbacks if issues continue to fester between the states, whether in SCO or BRICS.

The new global realities include the global power competition and consequent de-globalisation due to fears that global pre-eminence can be lost to to the rising global power China and its allies. Job losses due to Chinese products concern voters and are one of the dominant election themes in the US; it is highlighted in US President Trump’s speeches. The same paranoia and xenophobia gets translated into foreign policy when the containment of China is made a major policy plank of US and its allies’ European and Asia-Pacific policies, giving rise to restrictive trade policies and the eastward over-extension of NATO. The expansion of NATO to the Baltic and Nordic countries, in addition to encouraging countries like Ukraine to militarise their regional policies, poses a direct threat to Eurasian security.

Energy politics and technology are appearing as two important areas that affect international security due to their impact on the economic strength of nations. The European energy linkages with the Russia acted as a strong leverage with Russia to exercise diplomatic as well as economic clout with the European countries. The Ukraine War and the aggressive expansion of NATO have severed these energy corridors with Russia, giving a boost to the US “Military Industrial Complex” and energy sales. Such policies disincentivise the European economies from forging economic links with Russia in  addition to creating a turbulent environment for the benefit of the “Military Industrial Complex”.

The protectionist policies clothed in euphemisms like “de-risking” and “decoupling” indicate a propensity for de-globalisation that threaten the economic interests of Eurasia. The US’ obsession with the containment of China has manifested as the “Chips Four Alliance” plan to stonewall China’s domination of the semi-conductor industry. Similarly attempts to contain the rise of 5G giant Huawei are direct violations of WTO rules, according to which the forced transfer of technology cannot be used as a trade-off for market access.

The Eurasian countries beset with the new realities of a multipolar world transitioning towards bipolarity need to make the most of emerging opportunities for trade, connectivity and partnerships that create permanent stakes for peace in the region. In addition to acting as globally relevant multilateral alliances, the security alliances like SCO need to be expanded in scope to include infrastructural connectivity and trade in local currencies using a Eurasian alternative to financial messaging systems like SWIFT. The establishment of a common bank and a common currency could also be an objective worth pursuing in the future to ward off dependence on dollarised transactions.

The above realities and opportunities need to be capitalised upon by the Eurasian countries in order to promote regional peace and security and to keep out the pernicious influence of aggressive military alliances like NATO. One way of doing  that could be to encourage the participation and membership of Eurasian countries in the globally influential emerging alliances like BRICS. A common outlook on all security issues, including human security, should be the mainplank of Eurasian political, economic and security cooperation.  
Multipolarity and the Charter International System
Richard Sakwa
The Ukraine conflict brought into sharper focus the emergence of competing alignments, which in broad terms can be conceptualised as the US-led political West against a nascent political East. The Sino-Russian alignment is at the core of the latter, along with a host of non- and weakly-aligned powers in the Global South. A new era of multipolarity is evident, with a new constellation of actors in international politics, writes Richard Sakwa especially for the 22nd Annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Opinions
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.