Elections in Russia: Dreams and Reality

The first direct regional and municipal elections had the inordinately low turnout. This gave the impression that the majority of regions were still hibernating and had no intention to wake up.

The first direct regional and municipal elections in years have taken place. What have they demonstrated? What future have they opened up, and who stands to benefit from them?

Following the vote, the head of the ruling party told activists that they had done better than last December. It is clear, however, that their “success” owes much more to electoral apathy and new tactics that improved on the setbacks of last winter than to dynamic leadership.

But they prepared in earnest: after all, these were the first direct elections in years, ones preceded by months of unremitting protests representing a new and unfamiliar phenomenon for the authorities. With the lessons of hundreds of scandals in December, they certainly took into account the presence of numerous observers at polling stations, new mass technologies, such as mobile phones with cameras that are able to register both triumph and disgrace, and, of course, the web cameras as remnants from the last elections.

A candidate’s charisma and engaging manner are again in high demand. Some of the most despised unfortunates were removed from public view; others were helped or held back.

Another factor is that the public is traditionally distrustful of the authorities in general and the local authorities in particular. But… as soon transpired, there was more apathy than distrust.

The ruling party also took into account the consequences of their own self-confidence in December, which led to defeats and erosion of its own image. New approaches and stratagems were being devised in quiet offices. New blocs and coalitions were being discussed. The Communists and a number of experts spotted an alliance between United Russia and LDPR. This alliance used to crop up now and then in the past as well, but it is particularly obvious at the present stage. It appears that in a number of regions (the former “red belt”), the ruling party had to neutralize its traditional opponents, the Communists (who could benefit from the protest voting), rather than the liberal opposition, which had never existed in that part of the country.

The KPRF leader, Gennady Zyuganov, intimated that “a left-wing turn has become more pronounced.” Though it is an exaggeration to speak about a “turn,” a certain radicalization of even the young electorate has been noticed by many observers. But this has nothing to do with the attractiveness of the communist ideas. It is simply that social differentiation and the vulnerability of provincial populations have reached such a degree that even successful people (if, of course, they are still able to see and sympathize) are often terrified by the conditions in which the locals have to exist. This is what makes them think about a more just social model. A conscious radicalization on the basis of Marxism-Leninism is out of the question. What we see here is an almost spontaneous reaction to the atrocious standards of living in the provinces.

What surprised the most in connection with the recent elections was the inordinately low turnout. This gave the impression that the majority of regions were still hibernating and had no intention to wake up.

It is difficult to calculate a ratio for the entire country, because many regions that went through Sunday's elections had never been in the vanguard of social protests. It is logical to expect, on the other hand, that weeks-long media scandals in the Bryansk and Ryazan regions, in Voskresensk and Sergiyev Posad near Moscow, let alone Khimki, a focal point for the world at large, should have woken up the local inhabitants. They could have turned up at the polling stations, led by the sense of their newly found importance.

But they didn’t come. Nikolai Levichev, the leader of A Just Russia party, tossed this up to people’s indifference. Despite months of protests, many regions are still absolutely indifferent to those on-high, be it an appointed ruler or someone elected.

So, it seems there is some truth in the assertions of the political scientists who say that the provinces are inveterately passive and that all activity is concentrated in big cities, where people are not indifferent to what is going on around them and are ready to swap stability for authorities’ efficiency.

Sociologists and spin doctors provide some other explanations: if it is clear that the incumbent regional or municipal head is going to win elections, people would rather stay at home in the belief that he or she is going to be elected anyway. Again, the existing authorities, if they have not committed some utterly irreparable mistakes, enjoy more trust. People fear that newcomers will prove to be worse than someone they already know.

Political consultants with much experience of past elections believe that the Sunday turnout was not low at all. According to them, the indices were normal for a regional ballot. It looks as though the average provincial voter is not particularly concerned by the fact that free elections were indeed held for the first time in many years. “People vote where there is an interest in elections,” sources in the ruling party said. But this interest was not particularly encouraged. More than that, opponents claim that efforts were being undertaken in some localities to reduce the turnout.

But this still fails to explain why there was no rush to the polls in cities located around Moscow. Some say there were too many scandals. Yet according to certain spin doctors, an artificial scandal occasionally helps to whet interest. The important thing is to dissolve it in time. But if you go on with the scandal, voters will understand that they are being dragged into something nasty.

It is clear, however, that a number of factors were at play: it would be silly and short-sighted to try to find just one explanation, such as the attractiveness of the ideas put forward by the party of power or the ugliness of those of the opposition. A very profound and all-embracing explanation, this one…

The preliminary ballot count gave rise to other, no less extravagant conclusions. Some people said that the party of power was the loser and had to devise new methods for working with the electorate. Others claimed that it was the opposition that lost and therefore had to devise new methods for working with the electorate.

In any event, profound conclusions cannot be drawn on the day after the elections. The wisest thing would be to make use of detailed sociological studies, well-thought-out questionnaires, and direct talks. This knowledge will help to understand what to do next.

One way or another, both the ruling elite and opposition-minded people have one year until the next elections in the fall of 2013. Many things can change in a year. Or not change.

This article was originally published in Russian on www.RIA.ru

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