From the Russian point of view, the choice is of two evils: the entire Turkish political establishment is far from being pro-Russian. Erdogan is, in that case, the lesser evil, which means he is pro-Russian in the context of interior and exterior political situations.
The importance of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which were held in Turkey last Sunday is due to a number of reasons. First, the country passes to the presidential – or even super-presidential – form of government. So the president is provided with a large number of full powers, which allow him to make decisions without the parliament participating. Everything could start from the beginning, which means that Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be able to run for the office again the required number of times.
Second, Turkey has lowered the election threshold for parties. For the first time in a long period, two coalitions emerged. One is the ruling Justice and Development Party plus the nationalists. The other one is the Islamists from the Felicity Party (Saadet) plus the secular Republican People’s Party (quite pro-Western and pro-American) established by Kemal Ataturk, and the new nationalist Good Party (İYİ), which pays much attention to the Turkic factor in its election program, which also touches upon some Turkic-speaking peoples of the Russian Federation.
The two coalitions stood on similar ground: there are some secular, Islamist and nationalist elements in both, while they were trying to cater to all groups of voters. Since both coalitions are practically identical to each other in terms of their platform, the struggle was based on personal rather than on ideological things. The Justice and Development Party is able to create a government in alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party led by Devlet Bahceli. However, Erdogan and his party will no longer own that government. The accent in the parliament will shift to nationalists and the other parties represented.
From the Russian point of view, the choice is between two evils: the entire Turkish political establishment is far from being pro-Russian. Erdogan is, in that case, the lesser evil, which means he is pro-Russian in the context of interior and exterior political situations. In his campaign, Erdogan actively used the factor of cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. One could assert that he really tries to quit the pro-American line: it is not about rhetoric, but about some real actions related to national interests and security issues. But his Western colleagues are weary of his attempts to play his own game, disobedience to NATO and usage of his confrontation with both the US and Europe as a positive factor in his election program. In case the West is unable to make a deal with Erdogan, it may try to destabilize the situation in the country.
