Valdai Club

The COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to become a turning point, forcing the American elite to completely abandon its dismissive view of China and begin to perceive it as an equal, and therefore more dangerous, opponent, suggests Artyom Lukin, Associate Professor and Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University.

South Korea may well follow in the footsteps of Thailand, which maintains close and friendly relations with Beijing despite its strictly formal alliance with the United States. At the same time, Seoul will build up its military potential in the direction of greater autonomy and self-sufficiency. In addition, it is quite possible that the Republic of Korea will decide, similar to Japan, to acquire a “virtual nuclear power status”.

Unfortunately, Russia’s “turn to Asia” and the development of the Far East face several serious impediments. The head winds have been stronger than the tail winds so far. Despite expectations of potential dividends from the US-China confrontation, Russia should take additional measures to enhance the appeal of its Far East for Chinese business.

The long-term objective pursued by Beijing and Moscow could be to achieve the Finlandization of South Korea, i.e. turning it into a neutral state that would refrain from taking any steps that could be detrimental to the interests of China or Russia.

The meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, held on 27-28 February in the Vietnamese capital Hanoi, was a disappointment. The parties announced that they had failed to reach an agreement.

On February 27-28, Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, will host the second summit between US President Donald Trump and DPRK leader Kim Jong-un. The first meeting of the two leaders was held last June in Singapore in a very friendly atmosphere. In their joint statement, both sides expressed a desire to strive for the establishment of a “new relationship”, lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and its “complete denuclearization”.

When Moon Jae-in became President of the Republic of Korea in May 2017, he designated Russia as one of Seoul’s priorities in its foreign policy towards great powers, alongside China, the United States and Japan. The new president was quick to appoint a special envoy to Russia in the person of his close associate Song Young-gil, an influential South Korean politician who also chairs the Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation.

The leaders of the two Koreas not attending the forum in Vladivostok indicates that Russia is not among the most influential players on the Korean Peninsula, which, in addition to both Korean states, include only the US and China.

After a string of high-profile summits that culminated in the Kim-Trump meeting in Singapore on June 12, there has been a lull on the North Korean diplomatic front. Judging by all appearances, the parties maintain confidential working contacts but their results are unknown. Trump’s numerous open and hidden detractors at home point to the lack of serious North Korean movement toward denuclearization as proof that the White House’s policy of détente with North Korea is a fiasco. The US press regularly publishes leaks from the intelligence community claiming that the DPRK, far from disarming, continues to build up its nuclear arsenal at a rapid pace.  Doubts have even been raised about the authenticity of the remains of American soldiers that Pyongyang has returned to the US as a goodwill gesture.

It is still too early to judge whether Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in deserve the Nobel Prize, of which one of these politicians is clearly dreaming. But all the same we owe these three for the coinage of a new word, “diplotainment,” to describe a new phenomenon in international relations, where diplomacy is mixed with modern media and the natural theatrics of politicians to become something indistinguishable from a reality show.