Valdai Club

The reaction of Moscow, Pyongyang and Beijing, voiced essentially in unison by states which are organisationally independent and despite the lack of any special coordination on their part, is not only not accidental, it is quite natural: it reflects a common or very similar vision of strategic threats and challenges to their own national security both in the East Asian region and in the world as a whole, Alexander Vorontsov writes.

North Korea, for the first time since the existence of the Russian Federation, has become a more important partner for Moscow on the Korean Peninsula than South Korea, which, albeit without enthusiasm, was forced to implement Western economic sanctions against Russia, Alexander Vorontsov writes.

Washington continues with indomitable energy to build a new global architecture of military-political alliances which are under its direct control, along the perimeter of the borders of Russia and China, uniting the security infrastructure from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean into a self-contained power infrastructure, writes Alexander Vorontsov.

Russia has a realistic view of the situation and understands that some Central Asian states have a cautious attitude to the special military operation in Ukraine and do not support all actions by Moscow. Under the circumstances, Russia will not speed up the SCO’s transformation into a military-political coalition, writes Alexander Vorontsov, Head of the Korea and Mongolia Department, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

There is the understanding that, along with the events that took place on March 31 this year with the launch of ICBMs, the alleged test of a nuclear weapon, also carried out for the first time since 2017, will begin a new cycle of aggravation of the military-political situation on the Korean Peninsula, writes Valdai Club expert Alexander Vorontsov.

The experience of the JCPOA is very useful and positive for the efforts of the international community to find ways to involve Pyongyang in a dialogue in order to determine a mutually acceptable formula aimed at stopping and freezing the DPRK nuclear programme, writes Alexander Vorontsov, Head of the Korea and Mongolia Department, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

It is common knowledge that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has always believed that normalizing relations with the United States is the only possible way to overcome the crisis on the peninsula and remove the threat to its very existence.

The above question is what is troubling most people in China today. And the answer is: “If they want our money, which means cutting the trade deficit and making the Chinese environment more comfortable for US business, this challenge can be easily met. But if they want our life and are blocking our technological development, as in the case of Huawei, and are impeding the further economic growth in order to take it, then we have an intractable, long-lasting conflict on our hands.”

Pundits of many countries note that disagreement grows between Washington and Pyongyang on the issue of the DPRK’s denuclearization. First, no universal definition of the very concept of denuclearization has been determined and agreed upon. One side interprets it as the elimination of nuclear weapons while the other sees it as elimination of the entire nuclear-missile military-industrial infrastructure.

From the onset of this year the military-political situation on the Korean Peninsula made a U-turn from war to peace and, much to the surprise of many politicians and analysists, started speeding full steam ahead when it came to politics and diplomacy.