Turkmenistan represents a distinctive case in the post-Soviet space—while proclaiming a policy of permanent neutrality, the country skilfully manoeuvres between partners, balancing their influence and pursuing its own objectives. Anastasia Pogorelskaya, Associate Professor, Department of World Politics, Tomsk State University, identifies five key features of Turkmen foreign policy that have emerged as a result of prioritising gas exports in its foreign relations. These features indicate that, despite the recent intensification of trade and contacts between Russia and Turkmenistan over the past three years, it is yet premature to speak of a long-term trend.
From a foreign policy perspective, Turkmenistan has become one of the “tough nuts to crack” in the post-Soviet space, demonstrating a high degree of resilience to external influence—even though in terms of territory, population, and military expenditure it qualifies as a small state. This resilience is explained by the political regime established in the country, which has made a strategic choice in favour of limiting contacts with the outside world in order to ensure state consolidation and stable governance. Thus, the country has introduced a visa regime, including for citizens of CIS states. Turkmenistan has not formally joined multilateral regional initiatives, including the CIS and the SCO, although in practice it participates in their activities.
In this context, Turkmenistan is often portrayed by analysts and the media as an unreliable and intractable partner on the international stage, whose actions—including towards potential allies—appear “illogical”. In reality, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy is dictated by its vast natural gas reserves, and therefore ensuring their export is Ashgabat’s priority in relations with foreign partners. Turkmenistan’s strategic objective has been the diversification of gas export destinations, which would reduce excessive dependence on the Chinese market.
Russia should take into account the gas factor in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy as a determinant of the dynamics of bilateral relations. Under the pretext of its neutral status, Turkmenistan is unlikely to abandon trade with Russia due to the threat of sanctions. In the first seven months of 2025 alone, trade turnover between the two countries increased by more than 30%. The prioritisation of trade and investment cooperation, transport connectivity, and energy—alongside the secondary role of other areas of interaction—was also reflected in the speech of President Serdar Berdimuhamedov at the CIS summit in October 2025. Nevertheless, Russia and Turkmenistan have a complex history of relations, which prevents the current intensification from being unequivocally assessed as a long-term trend.
The principle of “permanent neutrality” proclaimed by the country and confirmed by three UN General Assembly resolutions implies non-participation in associations “with binding obligations or those presupposing collective responsibility of participants”. Neutral status has proved the most suitable formula for preserving Turkmenistan’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and for implementing pragmatic and selective cooperation, primarily aimed at ensuring gas exports. Consequently, over the past 30 years the country has repeatedly and dramatically shifted its geographical foreign policy priorities.
Distinct Features of Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy
The second feature is the dependence of bilateral relations on the success of resolving the gas issue. For example, the rapprochement with Russia that emerged in the mid-1990s was curtailed by the Turkmen side by the early 2000s in favour of isolationism: the initiative to create a Russian–Turkmen military-political alliance failed, and the agreement on dual citizenship with Russia was terminated. However, relations quickly warmed following the conclusion in 2003 of a 25-year agreement on cooperation in the gas sector. At the end of 2007, a trilateral agreement involving Kazakhstan was signed on the construction of the Caspian gas pipeline and the reconstruction of the Central Asia–Centre system, which was expected to ensure the sale of up to 80 billion cubic metres of Turkmen gas annually. Against this backdrop, in 2009 an intergovernmental agreement on the mutual recognition of educational qualifications was reached, and a number of cultural events were held. Turkmenistan even permitted the establishment in its capital of the only branch campus of a foreign university—the Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas. The unilateral closure of this branch by the Turkmen side in 2012 was, among other things, a reaction to the gas dispute with Russia in 2009–2010.
Similarly, in 2006 Turkmenistan signed an agreement with China on the construction of a gas pipeline through which Turkmen gas would be supplied to the Chinese market for 30 years. As early as 2007, trade turnover between the countries tripled to 377 million US dollars, and by 2014 it had reached 4.9 billion US dollars. Amid the subsequent sharp increase in trade turnover and Chinese investment in Turkmen gas fields, Ashgabat’s debt obligations to Beijing also grew, becoming critical by the late 2010s.
The third feature is that flourishing economic relations do not guarantee mutual understanding in the political sphere. Thus, despite the development of trade and economic ties with Turkey, Ashgabat has distanced itself from political cooperation with Ankara, declining to support its ambitions to expand influence in Central Asia on the basis of pan-Turkic ideology. At the same time, Turkmenistan has occasionally made gestures towards its partner. For example, given the importance of economic relations with Turkey in the 2000s and 2010s—when its share in Turkmen imports reached up to one third and Ankara even supplied Ashgabat with arms - the Turkmen leadership showed understanding of Turkey’s campaign against the movement of Fethullah Gülen. Ashgabat even dismantled the network of Gülen-affiliated lyceums on its territory and restructured the International Turkmen–Turkish University.
The fourth distinctive feature of Turkmen foreign policy is the desire to diversify markets for natural gas exports. In particular, in the second half of the 2000s, dependence on Russia as a buyer of Turkmen gas increasingly came to be seen by Ashgabat as problematic. Accordingly, in the mid-2000s Turkmenistan began increasing exports of natural gas to China. However, from the mid-2010s onwards, the geography of Turkmen gas exports began to narrow. Gazprom ceased purchasing Turkmen gas in 2016 after failing to secure a revision of contract prices. From January 2017, Turkmenistan stopped supplying gas to Iran due to outstanding debt on the part of Tehran. As a result, the Chinese vector of Turkmenistan’s gas diplomacy became dominant, prompting Ashgabat to seek ways to balance it through other directions.
To this end, in 2017 relations with Russia were elevated to the level of strategic partnership; in 2019, Gazprom concluded a five-year contract for the purchase of Turkmen gas, while Tatneft agreed to drill wells in Turkmenistan. In continuation of these arrangements, mutual visits by Russian and Turkmen officials intensified; in June 2022, a Declaration on the Deepening of Strategic Partnership was signed, and trade turnover began to grow. However, unlike trade and economic cooperation, political interaction remains largely declarative, while humanitarian cooperation is stagnating. For instance, the issue of establishing a joint university in Ashgabat, announced as early as 2022, remains at the stage of agreeing the text of the relevant agreement.
At the same time, due to the threat of US sanctions, a route of interest to Ashgabat for exporting gas to Iraq via Iranian territory was abandoned. The prospects for the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline, which would enable exports of Turkmen gas to South Asia, remain unclear in light of recent tensions between India and Pakistan, as well as between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Against this backdrop, the diversification of Turkmen gas supplies is proving difficult, and China’s share in these exports is declining only slowly. In 2022, up to 96% of Turkmen gas was directed to the Chinese market; by 2024, this figure had fallen to 87.6%.
The fifth feature of Turkmenistan’s current foreign policy can be described as a critical dependence on the stable development of the Caspian region. The country long awaited the settlement of relations among the Caspian littoral states, which would open a route for Turkmen gas to Turkey and onward to Europe. Although the division of the Caspian Sea’s water area and seabed was completed in 2018, and in 2021 Turkmenistan succeeded in resolving its long-standing dispute with Azerbaijan over ownership of the Serdar/Kyapaz offshore oil field, disagreements with other littoral states have prevented it from connecting to the Turkish gas hub. Only in early 2025 did Turkmenistan reach an agreement to supply gas to Turkey via Iran. By May, Turkmenistan had already entered the top five suppliers of natural gas to Turkey. In this context, the numerous initiatives put forward by Turkmenistan concerning economic cooperation among Caspian states or environmental conditions in the Caspian Sea are intended to ensure predictability and guarantee the stability of Turkmen gas supplies.
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Turkmenistan’s efforts to diversify the geography of its gas trade suggest that the country will continue attempting to offset the Chinese vector of economic cooperation through other directions. At the same time, the development of trade with Turkmenistan does not guarantee an expansion of cooperation in other areas. Therefore, despite the recent warming in relations between Russia and Turkmenistan, comprehensive progress is not to be expected. Ashgabat’s goodwill is tactical in nature, and disagreements over gas could at any moment lead the Turkmen side to curtail cooperation.
