Valdai Club

Russian-Chinese relations in the last 20 years are a story of slow but steady progress. Both Moscow and Beijing have made multiple attempts to radically accelerate this progress, generally ending in failure. That being said, neither the breakdown of individual projects, nor the short-term rapprochement between Russia and the United States after September 11, nor the economic crises of 2009 and 2014 could stop the development of bilateral relations.

The current model of Russia–Vietnam relations can be described as transitional, moving from the exclusive partnership of the 1980s to the next meaningful phase. Today, bilateral relations are dominated by the traditional spheres and vectors inherited from the Cold War period.

Modern international relations have entered a period of global change unprecedented in the postwar history. The processes unleashed by the changed role of China and India are making an important contribution to the burgeoning “Eurasian phenomenon,” or the surge in international trade and expectations for the traditionally peripheral landlocked regions of Central Eurasia.

The recent official opening of the Chinese military base in Djibouti should be seen in the context of the Chinese naval presence expansion in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and the coming change of China’s role in global and regional security.

Before it began, Xi Jinping’s July 3–4 visit to Russia was described by the Russian side as a milestone event In Russian-Chinese relations. It was accompanied by the signing of a number of policy papers regarding principles of further international cooperation and plans for developing bilateral relations. At the same time, from the point of view of practical economic results, it is more of a routine annual top-level visit, rather successful, but not accompanied by grand achievements.

It is common knowledge that Chinese businesses are unwilling to invest in the Russian economy. Last year, in fact, China invested over $170 billion in different countries but Russia seems to have missed it all. The notorious absence of Chinese investments is reason enough for drawing global conclusions regarding the Russian investment climate and the Far Eastern development strategy. This may also invite a pessimistic assessment of the outcome of the “pivot to the East” and the “connectivity” policy.

The US is unable to prevent crumbling North Korea from inflicting unacceptable damage on South Korea and Japan, America’s closest allies. The US has yet to find a way to fight mobile intermediate-range missile launchers, which form the core of the Korean People's Army’s striking force. Military history is ridden with examples when catastrophes resulted from the blind faith of the attacker that the enemy is like Colossus with feet of clay that would collapse after the first blow. By the way, this was the case with the Korean War in the 1950s.

By launching cruise missiles against the Syrian Air Force base, the United States pursued three political goals: to demonstrate its superior power, to try to intimidate China and to end suspicions that Russia can influence President Trump, Valdai Club expert Vasily Kashin believes.

The gradual Russian-Chinese rapprochement that began in the 1990s and continues today has not changed in essence. The Ukrainian crisis and the escalation in tension in the South China Sea have only served to accelerate the process somewhat.

The strategic partnership with China began in 1996 (just in time when this form of bilateral cooperation first became available), and it was considered by the leaders of Russia and China as a geopolitical rather than economic project.