Asia and Eurasia
Beyond the Vanishing Poles: The Pitfalls of Traditional Approaches to Understanding in International Politics
© Sputnik/Pavel Lyvov
Discussions about the coming multipolarity have become so universal that only American intellectuals, who remain faithful to the idea of complete US domination over the rest of the world, do not participate in them. The role of those who are looking for compromise solutions is assigned to their closest satellites in Europe, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
The discussion about “polarity” of the international order has been dominant for several decades in the academic science of international relations, expert statements and, of course, statements by political figures. It is equally popular both among those who seek to preserve the unjust international order of the past and those who call for its change for the sake of a better, more just global order. For the past 30 years, a significant part of the attention of the reading audience has been concentrated around the question of which system – bipolar, unipolar or multipolar – exists at the moment, and, more importantly, would be the most suitable from the point of view of international security to solve the problems of survival facing individual states. In other words, the discussion on this topic is so active that one may involuntarily suspect that the problem is somewhat factitious.
In all discussions, the question of the number of “poles” is the centre of attention, and is considered decisive in providing a more comprehensive description of the balance of power in the global arena. The reason for this general obsession is that the use of this theoretical category makes it possible to simplify, as much as possible, the extremely complex picture of international reality, making it understandable not only for politicians, but also for ordinary people. In addition, the concept of a “pole” is quite easy to operationalise as a way to indicate the status of a state in the world hierarchy, if we recognize that it still exists. Numerous colleagues use the term “pole” to indicate that a power has a certain set of components of its power potential. We really like to talk about “poles” precisely because we choose simple and seemingly reliable analytical solutions. Whether they are always correct remains, however, in question.
The discussion about “polarity” of the international order has been dominant for several decades in the academic science of international relations, expert statements and, of course, statements by political figures. It is equally popular both among those who seek to preserve the unjust international order of the past and those who call for its change for the sake of a better, more just global order. For the past 30 years, a significant part of the attention of the reading audience has been concentrated around the question of which system – bipolar, unipolar or multipolar – exists at the moment, and, more importantly, would be the most suitable from the point of view of international security to solve the problems of survival facing individual states. In other words, the discussion on this topic is so active that one may involuntarily suspect that the problem is somewhat factitious.
In all discussions, the question of the number of “poles” is the centre of attention, and is considered decisive in providing a more comprehensive description of the balance of power in the global arena. The reason for this general obsession is that the use of this theoretical category makes it possible to simplify, as much as possible, the extremely complex picture of international reality, making it understandable not only for politicians, but also for ordinary people. In addition, the concept of a “pole” is quite easy to operationalise as a way to indicate the status of a state in the world hierarchy, if we recognize that it still exists. Numerous colleagues use the term “pole” to indicate that a power has a certain set of components of its power potential. We really like to talk about “poles” precisely because we choose simple and seemingly reliable analytical solutions. Whether they are always correct remains, however, in question.
The basis of the modern international order is the procedure created by the countries of the West, and the central idea underlying this procedure is the immanent injustice of international politics. Even after Russia succeeds in Ukraine, it would be somewhat naive to expect our adversaries to change their views on the world, since it is tantamount to demanding a change in their philosophy of life, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
Opinions
There is no doubt that the true significance of what we now call multipolarity is extremely wide, and this allows us to neglect some methodological roughness for the sake of a good cause. In the same way, there is an absolute evil that the order we know as unipolar carries within itself.
However, while leaving our leaders and the general public their unconditional right to use convenient categories, we must recognize that the “polar” discussion itself is a product of our insufficient willingness to expand the analytical framework beyond categories that arose in a completely different historical era, having, among other things, a very speculative nature.
Now this can become a problem precisely because the discussion about the “poles” constantly takes the academic community away from studying the reality of world politics, forcing it to concentrate on a plot that has little to do with the changes that shape international life.
To begin with, it is necessary to recall that the whole story with the “poles” arises within the framework of rather abstract approaches to the analysis of world politics, first outlined in 1957 by professor Morton Kaplan. The desire for maximum systematisation of our reasoning about the nature of such a phenomenon as international politics has become a distinctive feature of the second half of the last century. This era, in principle, was the most stable in terms of the distribution of power capabilities between the leading states. The end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War era inevitably pushed the academic community, and then politicians, to conceptually fix a relatively stable distribution of forces in the new conditions. Until the early 1980s none of the parties to the global conflict had the ability to conduct active offensive operations and, in fact, both the USA and Europe, as well as the USSR became powers with a permanent status, concerned with maintaining their position in the world and only through the expansion of influence. This did not, of course, cancel the bitter struggle between them at the regional level – in Asia, Africa or Latin America. However, in the main theatre of world politics – in Europe – the main battles were temporarily over. In fact, the European standstill is precisely the reason why the Cold War is considered a stable era. This is fair, since now Europe retains the ability to be the main “powder keg” of the whole world.
Since the end of the Cold War, the idea that the international system is based on “polarity” has received a new impetus. The undeniable advantage of the West in relation to all other participants in international politics has made relevant the hypothesis that the world should acquire a unipolar structure, where the only “pole” is the United States, which has the greatest overall capabilities and influence. At the same time, even at the time, there were active discussions that questioned this assumption. First, countries that perceived the new order as limiting their interests and capabilities began to promote the idea of multipolarity. Already in 1997, President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin signed a joint declaration on a multipolar world. Let us note that in this case, the “polar” discussion is present exclusively in political terms, and not as an attempt to substantiate such a world order at the intellectual level.
Second, there was an active debate about what, in fact, allows us to talk about the acquisition of polar characteristics by one or another power. This discussion unfolded with the active support of Europe, whose leaders hoped, until the late 2000s, to consolidate their association in order to rank among the leading participants in international life, equal in strength to the United States, China or Russia. In fact, it was Europe, its politicians and observers, that made the greatest contribution to the expansion of interpretations of what allows us to talk about a participant in international life as an independent pole. This gave them a little. Already by the early 2010s the EU’s position had begun weaken, and its dependence on the United States in security matters is now increasing.
Now discussions about the coming multipolarity have become so universal that only American intellectuals, who remain faithful to the idea of complete US domination over the rest of the world, do not participate in them. The role of those who are looking for compromise solutions is assigned to their closest satellites in Europe. They talk about the onset of a “new bipolarity” based on a comparison of the combined capabilities of China and the United States. At the same time, those who actively talk specifically about the coming of a multipolar world, and this is not only Moscow and Beijing, but also many other states of the World Majority, imply a greater democratisation of international politics; the disappearance of dictatorship as such from it. Although, strictly speaking, the theory that world politics is locked to “poles” in its academic version does not imply any democracy. Here, we can only talk about the physical number of relatively autonomous countries-dictators, which extend their dominance over significant groups of medium-sized and small states. Of course, such interpretation does not in any way correspond to what the leaders of Russia or China have in mind when they convince us of the advent of a multipolar world.
To begin with, it is necessary to recall that the whole story with the “poles” arises within the framework of rather abstract approaches to the analysis of world politics, first outlined in 1957 by professor Morton Kaplan. The desire for maximum systematisation of our reasoning about the nature of such a phenomenon as international politics has become a distinctive feature of the second half of the last century. This era, in principle, was the most stable in terms of the distribution of power capabilities between the leading states. The end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War era inevitably pushed the academic community, and then politicians, to conceptually fix a relatively stable distribution of forces in the new conditions. Until the early 1980s none of the parties to the global conflict had the ability to conduct active offensive operations and, in fact, both the USA and Europe, as well as the USSR became powers with a permanent status, concerned with maintaining their position in the world and only through the expansion of influence. This did not, of course, cancel the bitter struggle between them at the regional level – in Asia, Africa or Latin America. However, in the main theatre of world politics – in Europe – the main battles were temporarily over. In fact, the European standstill is precisely the reason why the Cold War is considered a stable era. This is fair, since now Europe retains the ability to be the main “powder keg” of the whole world.
Since the end of the Cold War, the idea that the international system is based on “polarity” has received a new impetus. The undeniable advantage of the West in relation to all other participants in international politics has made relevant the hypothesis that the world should acquire a unipolar structure, where the only “pole” is the United States, which has the greatest overall capabilities and influence. At the same time, even at the time, there were active discussions that questioned this assumption. First, countries that perceived the new order as limiting their interests and capabilities began to promote the idea of multipolarity. Already in 1997, President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin signed a joint declaration on a multipolar world. Let us note that in this case, the “polar” discussion is present exclusively in political terms, and not as an attempt to substantiate such a world order at the intellectual level.
Second, there was an active debate about what, in fact, allows us to talk about the acquisition of polar characteristics by one or another power. This discussion unfolded with the active support of Europe, whose leaders hoped, until the late 2000s, to consolidate their association in order to rank among the leading participants in international life, equal in strength to the United States, China or Russia. In fact, it was Europe, its politicians and observers, that made the greatest contribution to the expansion of interpretations of what allows us to talk about a participant in international life as an independent pole. This gave them a little. Already by the early 2010s the EU’s position had begun weaken, and its dependence on the United States in security matters is now increasing.
Now discussions about the coming multipolarity have become so universal that only American intellectuals, who remain faithful to the idea of complete US domination over the rest of the world, do not participate in them. The role of those who are looking for compromise solutions is assigned to their closest satellites in Europe. They talk about the onset of a “new bipolarity” based on a comparison of the combined capabilities of China and the United States. At the same time, those who actively talk specifically about the coming of a multipolar world, and this is not only Moscow and Beijing, but also many other states of the World Majority, imply a greater democratisation of international politics; the disappearance of dictatorship as such from it. Although, strictly speaking, the theory that world politics is locked to “poles” in its academic version does not imply any democracy. Here, we can only talk about the physical number of relatively autonomous countries-dictators, which extend their dominance over significant groups of medium-sized and small states. Of course, such interpretation does not in any way correspond to what the leaders of Russia or China have in mind when they convince us of the advent of a multipolar world.
Each political scientist becomes a soldier of his country, and the space for relatively impartial analysis disappears – even those who claim to be impartial inevitably finds themselves within the framework of an interpretation that serves the interests of one of the warring parties, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
Opinions
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
