The Valdai International Discussion Club has been studying global alternatives to the traditional neoliberal mainstream and the influence on transformations in the world. Initially we focused on various non-Western movements (Chinese, Turkish, Arab, Latin American, BRICS related, and others). We later added an examination of the non-system left and right forces within Western societies (EU and US) and their increasingly perceptible electoral popularity.
In this context, the Valdai International Discussion Club put forward, at the turn of 2016, a new concept titled Global Revolt and described these trends as a “revolutionary situation” in the world. All these issues were addressed in its annual report. Its Plenary Meeting on October 27, 2016, focused on the same general subject, which was discussed by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and the former presidents of Finland, Austria, and South Africa.
In 2017 Valdai analysts studied the two opposite, if often intersecting, processes, which we named the “global right-wing revolt” and the “global left-wing revolt.” Their task was to consider the ideology and socioeconomic basis of trends leading to the left-wing and right-wing turn from the neoliberal mainstream, rather than politics alone. In September 2017, Valdai released a report dedicated to the ideology of Trumpism and an analysis of the global rightist revolt. The report on the left-wing revolt will be published shortly.
The economic crisis (its first wave struck in 2008−2009) led to a surge of civic discontent with the existing situation in politics and the economy both in Europe and America. Typologically similar protest movements emerged in different countries, which urged stopping the further alienation of elites from society, curtailment of the public sector (and the welfare state), and the emasculation of democratic norms. Taken together, these movements can be described as progressist or left-progressist. For the first time in recent history, they have attracted a broad band of the population (unlike the narrow sectarian anti-globalist movement seen previously). The reason for this is clearly the worsening economic situation. So, it is not an exaggeration to say that the crisis has ruined the hitherto serene consumer society in the West and thereby paradoxically transformed the present generation of consumers into citizens.
The civic protest has called into existence new political forces whose program initially was of an amorphous and negativist nature and in fact emphasized the anarchic protest “against all” (for example, the Five Star Movement in Italy). But in many cases, these protest movements rapidly developed a clear left-leaning ideology and bias (SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, etc.). They were distinguished by sharply radical rhetoric and revulsion for traditional social democratic parties. As a result, SYRIZA came to power in Greece, while other similar parties gained a large share of the vote.
However, SYRIZA soon disappointed many supporters of the left-turn course. Its leaders could easily combine radical rhetoric with opportunism in politics and actually refrained from reversing the neoliberal course. This has led to an outflow of voters from the left-turn parties in other countries and we can say that the left-wing revolt had proven unviable and was quickly absorbed by the old neoliberal mainstream.
Nevertheless, civic discontent with neoliberalism has not dissolved completely. In 2016, it came to be used by the non-system right-wing (or right-wing populist, if you will) forces, which have achieved much greater success than their counterparts on the left. This process culminated in Brexit and a Trump victory in the United States.
However, the right-wing revolt in its pure form also proved short-lived, since during his twelve months in office President Trump has mostly failed to accomplish anything as radical as he promised in his campaign. As a consequence, Trumpism as a right-wing protest ideology appears to many as much of an illusion as the left progressist protest ideology of recent years.
Despite all this, the demand for a left turn is still vibrant in Western society, as is evidenced by the 2017 presidential election in France and parliamentary elections in the UK. They have reinforced the position of two political leaders – Jeremy Corbyn and Jean-Luc Melenchon – who are now the West’s big left-wing hope. While Corbyn’s election as the Labor leader in 2015 was not taken seriously by many, the June 2017 vote gave Labor in parliament a powerful shot in the arm and his ‘For Many, Not the Few’ program has added some very serious matters to the agenda like renationalizing public goods and guaranteeing free access thereto. This express left-wing course (cleansed of any left liberal Third Ways from the Blair era) shows that the left’s new wave has a clear and radical program.
On the other hand, the socioeconomic situation in the West has led to the transformation of a Marx- and Lenin-type “classic” proletariat that has nothing to lose but its chains to a stratum/class of small owners/consumers working for hire. This in turn triggered an evolution of the traditional left social democratic parties leading to incorporation into the neoliberal semantic field, the alienation of the left intellectual discourse from real political practice, Third Way, etc.
When the crisis turned these consumers into citizens for the first time, the protest was at first anarchic, negativist and often naïve. But it turned out that these small proprietors working for hire did have something to lose in a radical transformation (houses, apartments, cars, mortgages, bank accounts, etc.). Even the smallest hint of a bank crisis in Greece or Cyprus (and now the possibility of economic issues during Catalonia’s secession) resulted in this stratum’s protest potential losing momentum. They proved unprepared for belt tightening for the sake of dismantling the neoliberal system. But the smoldering discontent is still there.
Among other things, this has led to a situation where this social stratum was simultaneously ready to accept both left- and right-wing ideas. The left agenda is expressed in insistence on expanding access to public goods (Corbyn). The right agenda includes protection of the national labor market (from immigrants) and the consumer market (from transnational corporations), to which Europe adds the requirement to protect it from Brussels’ diktat and Euroscepticism. As a result, the political expectations of this broad stratum of small owners/consumers working for hire make a right/left synthesis necessary. Thus, the right-wing revolt and the left-wing revolt may merge in their minds.
We can see this in recent political events. The Valdai Club’s report on Trumpism identified many essentially leftist ideas that Trump used in his campaign. In this respect, they overlapped with the Sanders program. We saw the same in France, where at first the Popular Front snatched many left slogans and then Melenchon reciprocated by taking theirs. In this connection, it is not by chance that Melenchon was accused of populism and of accepting the right agenda by the traditional French left liberal intellectuals entrenched in their university and media ivory towers. However, Trump’s absolute success and the relative success of Melenchon (against the background of a landslide decline in Macron’s ratings) indicate that the right/left synthesis of ideas is what meets the aspirations of this social stratum of small owners/consumers.
At the same time, there is in the West a stratum of a Marxist-type classic proletariat that has nothing to lose except its chains. I am referring to immigrant labor. And it is here that we see a vacuum and a practically unoccupied niche of political representation. Neither the traditional social democrats, nor the new left progressist movements are eager to defend the interests of immigrants (although it is there that we see a scope for classic left-wing politics). Moreover, many left-wing parties, both old and new, express what is more akin to a right-wing protective agenda in this matter, thus reaffirming the right/left synthesis of expectations shared by their nuclear electorate. Among other things, this vacuum of representation signals the lack of alternatives for the real integration of immigrants into host societies and is a sign that predicts their radicalization. With increasingly more migrants issued residence permits (as a rule, giving their owners the right to vote in local elections) and later granted full citizenship, the alienation from them by left-wing parties risks the stability of the entire political system.
In general, this warrants the conclusion that the West retains the potential for a left and right turn (and the synthesis of the two). 2017 has shown that many leaders and programs that express these ideas enjoy voter support and that the civic discontent with neoliberal mainstream is still smoldering.
