




Russia and Africa: An Audit of Relations

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The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

ISBN 978-5-907318-88-5



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Introduction

The geopolitical landscape has changed beyond recognition in the time since the first Russia-Africa Summit was held in the autumn of 2019, laying the groundwork for an ambitious programme to expand Russia's cooperation with Africa.

In the run-up to that large meeting of heads of state in Sochi four years ago, the Valdai Club drafted a report as well.¹ Despite the ensuing overhaul of the international order, many of its theses still hold today. In particular, in the 2019 report, we noted that Russia did not compete with other external forces in the region, but brought extra "added value" to Africa in the form of projects. This is still true today, albeit adjusted for Russia's wholly different geopolitical circumstances. The actual global competition for Africa has become so fierce that it is impossible to ignore it. In addition, Russia's geopolitical opponents are much more aggressively trying to create obstacles to cooperation with Africa than before.

The second Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for late July 2023 should define the prospects for further cooperation between Russia and Africa. In light of ongoing developments, Russia needs a smart and competitive African strategy and a workable roadmap to implement it. This paper discusses ways to achieve this.

Chapter 1: Russia and Africa between summits: crossing the Rubicon

Russia's return to Africa was first discussed at official venues seven years ago, when the roundtable discussion titled "Russia-Africa: Expanding Frontiers" was first held at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. Since then, the Russian business community was advised to pay attention to the continent that boasts enormous reserves of natural resources and a growing population (1.2 billion then and 1.4 billion now) to which Russia has much to offer.

¹ Barabanov O., Balytnikov B., Yemelyanov A., Poletaev P., Sid I., Zaiser N. Report: Russia's Return to Africa: Strategy and Prospects, 24.10.2019. URL: <https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/report-russia-s-return-to-africa/>

The first Russia-Africa summit held in Sochi in October 2019 was a landmark event for Russia and Africa alike. Russia used the summit to officially declare its plans to build partner-like, long-term and mutually beneficial relations with African countries. It was decided to hold highest-level events once every three years.

For objective reasons, it was decided to postpone the second Russia-Africa Summit to 2023. The boost given to interaction with Africa at all levels in 2019 was not followed through in practice because of external factors, among other things, the impact of which can hardly be overestimated. However, it appears there's more to it than that.

Economic cooperation: expectations and reality

What has been done and what not? Where are we now? What did our African partners expect from us? What can we offer them?

Relying, since the days of the Soviet Union, on friendship and mutual assistance and tested by time and even the total absence of interest in interacting with the African continent over the past at least 15 or even 20 years, Russian-African relations needed a sweeping reset. The continent is growing at a breath-taking pace and is interested both in political and economic relations. Mindful of the past, the African countries are doing their best to diversify post-colonial and neo-colonial relations by expanding the gamut of external players, among which Russia has a special place. Russia and Africa have always trusted each other. A major sovereign power rich in energy and resources, Russia was an attractive partner for Africa which believed that once it fixes its domestic economy, it will turn to Africa and start investing in the projects that would build the "Africa of the future."

The 2019 summit was supposed to start a new era in Russia-Africa cooperation. The Africans were anticipating the investment to come to all sectors of the economy. But most Russian companies are still in the dark about how to build work with Africa. They are unaware of the entry points or the potential partners. They are not sure what the African countries really need, how to establish communication or to build financial models; how to ensure transaction compliance or to address differences in legislation

and legal regulations between our countries and the like. The 2019 Sochi summit adopted a joint declaration² consisting of 47 items, 20 of which are directly or indirectly related to cooperation in trade, economic, educational and humanitarian spheres. Each of these declared intentions was to be implemented in practice and filled with concrete projects such as meaningful and tangible increase in trade, a roadmap for joint projects in a variety of economic sectors with subsequent implementation of each phase, and wide-scale cooperation in creating joint projects to protect the environment.

If we were to conduct a detailed audit of Russian business in Africa over the past four years, we would see that the companies that have been operating there for at least 10 years are still active and enjoy relative success in Africa. But they have not become the engines or drivers behind the new wave, either. The projects that are being announced from time to time in the run-up to the second Russia-Africa Summit are nothing but random specks and half-hearted attempts to integrate into the current economic circumstances in an attempt to develop new markets.

With the pivot towards the South it announced, Russia now needs its own unparalleled mechanisms, as well as an all-purpose toolkit for building a Russia-Africa economic policy.

Goodwill dividends

There are extremely concrete processes out there that could be used as important footholds when accessing African markets. Continental Africa's free trade area, now in a state of infancy in terms of regulations and functioning, could serve as a good platform for joint economic projects given Russia's extensive experience in models of that kind. With the Africans' interests and goals in mind, Russia could provide substantial help in promoting a strategic approach to Africa's economic growth. Interaction with the continent cannot rely exclusively on individual projects. It is important to work closely with the central, continental and sub-regional pan-African organisations in order to expand the range of one-time cooperation and ensure a multilateral approach to exploring opportunities.

² See: Declaration of the First Russia–Africa Summit// Russia–Africa Summit. 24.10.2019. URL: <https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/declaration/>

Russia's advantage is that historically it has never had any insurmountable differences with any African country. Given the current geopolitical environment, the Russia-Africa relationship should be comprehensive. We need projects and tools that would secure significant goodwill advantages for us and help us identify niches to support Africa's development and establish Russia as a fully-fledged and capable partner.

The main problems facing Africa today include lack of food and energy security, lack of a ramified energy logistics system, an infrastructure and technology vacuum, and unabated population growth, which leads to an oversupply of workforce and a shortage of vacancies.

What kind of competences and experience could we equip ourselves with in order to make a breakthrough in Russia-Africa economic cooperation?

Russia is an experienced player on the global energy market with a proven track record in developing, building, operating and assessing energy facilities, such as TPPs, HPPs, NPPs and the like, and export and transport of energy. The implementation of energy programmes on vast territories and the construction of power grids, which are what Africa needs most, constitute Russia's competitive edge when it comes to choosing a partner. Africa can become a joint testing and development site for Russia's latest innovative technology in this and other sectors.

At this junction, African countries do not have sophisticated technological expertise of their own, but, as economies with dynamically expanding populations and capacities, are powerful consumers of the latest technological products. African governments have a stake in gaining access to innovative technology, developing IT and telecom infrastructure, as well as to knowledge-intensive technology. Now on a course of upgrading and developing these areas, Russia may become one of Africa's key partners, thanks in part to the reasonable cost of such products and services compared to the Western counterparts, and Africans' continuing trust in Russian-made products.

Africa focuses particularly on expanding domestic markets and related localisation of the manufacturing industries that are vital to the continent. The goal is not just to buy products, but to learn how to make them locally in order to improve and scale up continental capacity.

Healthcare, agriculture, and geological exploration warrant special attention. Programmes in these areas can only be implemented if the supply and transport corridors are revised in view of the new realities in a way that expands air travel with African countries and leads to comfortable and safe routes for moving goods from Russia to Africa and back. Trade with African partners must be significantly expanded.

In the wake of the unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia's financial and energy sectors, it needs to develop brand new financial tools for working with African countries, which would make cooperation possible regardless of the current political or economic situation.

Political foundation

African leaders show restraint when it comes to supporting or sharing the Russian leadership's views on foreign policy and foreign economic dialogue, but it is critical to expand the pivot towards Africa and support it with real actions. To begin with, it would be good to determine Russia's current interests in Africa and ways to harmonise them with our African partners' interests.

Today's tangled international context in which this interaction will develop is particularly important when designing a new Russian-African strategy. Economic and humanitarian cooperation with Africa should be worked out keeping in mind the entire range of constraints and issues facing Russia.

Russia's energetic promotion of the African agenda in BRICS

Africa has become an area of strategic interest for the rising poles of power in the world. The cooperation of BRICS countries both separately and in association with African countries is an important foreign policy area. At the time of its accession to the BRIC format, South Africa was seen as the main gateway to the continent. Upon joining BRICS in 2011, South Africa made the economic development of the country and the continent one of its priorities in the association. Given its active position in the

South African region and the African Union, the country has declared itself a representative of pan-African interests, whose activities will focus on drawing attention to the development problems plaguing all African countries. This, among other things, led to the emergence of the outreach format at the 2013 BRICS summit in South Africa, where representatives of the AU and African regional associations were invited. Today, South Africa represents the entire African continent in BRICS and acts as an agent of new global changes that African countries need badly.

Addressing security and peacekeeping matters on the continent is of particular importance. Destabilising factors and processes in North Africa and a number of Sahel region and sub-Saharan African countries are affecting the entire international community, adding even more negative dynamics to the global crisis. That is why the situation on the continent is in need of ongoing oversight and monitoring. Africa will undoubtedly need assistance. As an active BRICS member, modern Russia has enough capacity to establish dialogue and forge strategic relations with African countries.

Enlightenment as a key to developing ties between Russia and the African continent

The Russian public knows very little about Africa, and generally associates the continent with its rapidly growing population of 1.5 billion and, until recently, steadily growing GDP (before the COVID-19 pandemic) with extreme poverty, disease, complete lack of infrastructure and other negative characteristics. The result is indifference and often negative views on maintaining economic relations and the Russia-Africa strategic partnership. This represents an obstacle to Russian businesses, with the exception of major state corporations or the five global private investors who historically have extensive experience working on that continent.

Africans are also poorly informed about the Russian state's structure, social modernisation processes in our country, the most recent economic and political reforms and their relationship to the overall

international context. Access to objective information is woefully lacking in both directions.

Dialogue between civil societies can help remedy the situation. It can play a significant role in laying the foundations for a new public opinion based on unique cultural, historical and linguistic heritage. The key idea behind sustainable development is to improve well-being and to protect our planet. This goal can only be achieved via the synergy of interests of present and future generations. Society can act as a powerful regulator of all ongoing processes.

In 20 to 30 years, Africa will account for 60 percent of the global labour market's growth. Africa ranks first in terms of the number of young people. These people look openly at the world and are willing to work with partner countries. Now is a great time to introduce the youth of Russia and Africa.

Chapter 2: Russia's strengths and weaknesses in Africa. A dynamic SWOT analysis: From summit 2019 to summit 2023

The global changes that have taken place around the world in the four years between the Russia-Africa summits have brought about new challenges, threats and opportunities on the Russia-Africa track. Russia has changed as well. We will use SWOT analysis in order to outline its new place in the global competition for Africa.

SWOT analysis is a method for strategic planning and assessment of a situation. As a reminder, in SWOT **S** stands for Strengths, **W** Weaknesses, **O** Opportunities, and **T** Threats. In different circumstances, one and the same factor can be a threat or an opportunity.

S. Strengths

Russia's strengths in its relations with Africa are as follows:

1. The legacy of the Soviet era: the successful track record of the joint struggle for the decolonisation of the continent and the development of independent African states; the training of specialists at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University and other Soviet universities creates credibility that has survived even the long years of the hiatus in relations after the breakup of the Soviet Union. This factor of strength has remained a constant, but it can lose its potency in the absence of real action. So, in addition to declarations, good reputation, absence of a colonial past and memory of past achievements as a foundation for building Russian-African cooperation, Russia and Russian businesses need to think about what else we can do to gain an advantage over our opponents.

2. The motivational factor: Russia's explicit commitment to a large-scale expansion of cooperation with African states and leading African sub-regional organisations. This was noted during the 2019 summit. Back then, this commitment was largely formed by bilateral initiatives, meaning that motivation could be construed as an internal intention.

In 2023, though, the external factor has significantly increased, and, in addition to their own intentions to establish cooperation, Russia and Africa are pushed towards each other by external circumstances and threats.

3. Competitive competencies in the spheres that enjoy particular demand in Africa, such as the defence industry, defence and security, high technology, geological exploration, energy, including nuclear energy, equipment for the manufacturing industry and so on. The map of Russia's competencies for Africa includes 39 products grouped into seven competencies: medicine, subsoil use, digital state, education, transport infrastructure, energy, and agriculture.³ Russia's efforts to ensure the continent's food security are important for Africa as well.

³ Outcomes of the first Russia–Africa Summit and Economic Forum. Roscongress to continue working on the African track until the next Forum // Russia–Africa Summit. URL: <https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/summit-outcomes-2019/>

4. Similar approaches to traditional values. The African system of values is firmly based on the ideas of justice and solidarity, the desire to build an equitable system of international relations, as well as the absence of exploitation in any sense. At the 2019 summit, Russia declared its commitment to justice, which was welcomed by the African side. However, there is a potential problem here. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia embarked on the capitalist path of development. In the capitalist paradigm, profit is the main goal of business. Therefore, in order not to prevent Russia's strength becoming a weakness and a threat to Russia-Africa relations, and to avoid the disillusionment of our African partners, Russian business should pay special attention to this fact and follow social responsibility rules when working in Africa.

5. Mutually beneficial nature of relations. Africa needs Russia as a strategic partner and a constraining factor in the global balance of power; as a source of development in terms of supplying innovative technology, including digital and space technologies; as an opportunity to stop being a raw material appendage to the West and to develop its own value chains; as a source of security and stability in fighting terrorist threats and in internal crises and conflicts. Russia needs cooperation with Africa to resolve its economic issues that have arisen in the wake of the sanctions, as well as to advance plans to form alternative alliances within the framework of the common strategy to form a multipolar world.

W. Weaknesses

Weaknesses in Russian-African relations are as follows:

1. The loss of contact which began in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and lasted almost 30 years (Russia's withdrawal from Africa). These consequences have not been overcome in full, since, in Russia's absence, other players have taken the vacated niches. Russia's withdrawal from Africa has led to the closure of trade and cultural missions,⁴ Russian language centres and downsizing Russian embassies. There are just four remaining Russian trade missions in Africa, namely, in Morocco, Algeria,

⁴ Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 401 of 27 June 2005 "On the optimization of the system of trade missions of the Russian Federation in foreign states" liquidated 11 trade missions and offices of trade advisers to embassies in Africa. Currently, Russia's trade missions function in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa.

Egypt, and South Africa, though Russia plans to open more of them in Africa with the Western sanctions in place. In the sphere of culture and education, new Russian Houses opened in Sudan, Mali, Egypt, and Algeria in 2022, and preparations to open one are underway in Angola. The efforts to promote the Russian language in Africa have noticeably intensified: in the 2023-2024 academic year, the quota for African students at Russian universities more than doubled from 2,300 to 4,700 spots.⁵ A Centre for Open Education in Russian and Russian Language Studies will open in Benin in September.⁶ Perhaps not quickly enough, but the situation is improving.

2. Unlike its Western opponents, Russia is not doing enough at the conceptual level which is not only about forming a positive image of Russia in Africa and a positive image of Africa in Russia, but also about promoting mutually shared values.

3. As of this writing, Russian-African trade figures can be viewed as a weakness as well. However, according to the forecasts of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, they may double by 2030.⁷ Anywhere from 60 to 70 percent of Russian investment is directed to exploration and production of oil, gas, uranium, bauxite, diamonds, iron ore and other minerals.⁸ In order for Russia's African partners to realise their strategic interests and to make cooperation truly beneficial for Africa, downstream equipment supplies to Africa must be increased.

3. Weaknesses may also include the lack of PR strategy in the Russian-African relations, which is also bad for business. The dearth of positive information about Africa, the high political and commercial risks, and the importance of long money for investment projects have made Russian businesses cautious when it came to implementing long-term projects that require investment and establishing production processes, such as assembly or repair shops, on the ground. Russian media coverage is improving, but this is not enough.

⁵ Nefedova A. Heavenly Savannah: Rossotrudnichestvo opens new centers in Africa // Izvestia. 7.11.2022. URL: <https://iz.ru/1420557/alena-nefedova/savanna-nebesnairossotrudnichestvo-otkryvaet-novye-tcentry-v-afrike>

⁶ «Союз-Бенин»: студенты в Африке начнут активно изучать русский язык // РИА ФАН. 4.04.2023. URL: https://riafan.ru/24018668-_soyuz_benin_studentsi_v_afrike_nachnut_aktivno_izuchat_russkii_yazik

⁷ The Ministry of Economic Development said that Russia could double trade with African countries by 2030 // TASS. 20.03.2023. URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/17317795>

⁸ Ibid.

4. Effective Russian-African cooperation may be hampered by Russia's economic woes stemming from sanctions. However, with the political will and a well-designed strategy, this circumstance may transform into an engine for expanding relations.

O. Opportunities

Russian commitments and initiatives cover assistance to Africa in a variety of areas, each of which has enormous potential and represents an opportunity for developing successful cooperation. Let us go over to the most ambitious and promising areas:

- 1) combating terrorism and providing relief in natural disasters;
- 2) healthcare, in particular fighting epidemics;
- 3) education;
- 4) developing food security technology (including by way of free grain supplies to the African countries most in need regardless of the decisions made under the grain deal).

As was mentioned above in the Strengths part, Russia has many advantages when it comes to cooperation with Africa. During the first Russia-Africa summit, Africa was called a "continent of opportunity" and strengthening ties with African countries was named one of "Russia's foreign policy priorities." Systematic daily work is required for these opportunities to become a reality.

T. Threats

1. Escalation of the Ukraine crisis which may forcibly reallocate priorities and shift Russia's focus away from Africa.

2. Increased opposition to Russia's initiatives in Africa by its Western opponents, including all levels of hybrid warfare ranging from image and reputation to financial and economic challenges.

3. Our African partners' unmet expectations. The Africans are interested in long-term cooperation, resolving acute social issues, new jobs for the locals, developing manufacturing technologies and creating value

chains. Russian businesses (with the exception of major Russian companies) often prefer making quick money, even a one-off lucrative deal, rather than engage in long-term cooperation. Africa, which expects Russia to adhere to the principles of fairness outlined during the 2019 summit may be disappointed. Russian businesses' strong involvement in social programmes may offer a way out of this situation. This includes their stake in raising the living standards of Africans, helping them escape the capitalist scissors phenomenon where raw materials are exported at low prices and processed products are imported at high prices. Doing that will help Russian businesses avoid yet another threat of erasing differences in the way of doing business with former colonial powers.

4. Limited to no awareness and image policy aimed at forming Russia's positive image in Africa, especially now that the full power of the Western media machine is aimed at discrediting Russia and destroying its goodwill capital.

5. Possible "withdrawal" from Africa amid mounting external and internal hardships. It is important not to repeat the 1990s situation, when we almost stopped working with that continent when the going got tough for our country.

The takeaways of the above SWOT analysis are that the number of Russia's strengths and weaknesses on the African track, as well as opportunities and challenges, are approximately equal. This means that if there is the desire, the political will and an expertly developed cooperation strategy, the Russian-African track can hold much promise.

Chapter 3. The winning recipe for a successful Africa summit

Africa's continuing rise presents great opportunities for those ready to act, thus great powers have gone all in, proposing unique combinations of formats, instruments and other means to achieve their goals. These all make up their Africa cooperation strategies, most of which have either already been published or likely will be soon. Within this context, summits and high-level

conferences serve as vital launchpads to present these strategies, announce pilot projects and bring forward new initiatives with the continent.

Russia is no exception, with high expectations from the upcoming second Russia-Africa Summit in July 2023. With the 2019 Final Declaration outlining general principles for cooperation and serving its role at the beginning of the modern partnership, the second edition of the summit will need to produce takeaways that foresee a call to action for diverse target groups looking to work with Africa and also the mechanisms to do so.

The Big 7: Overview of the key Africa summits

Pilot summits all tend to revolve around defining the general rules of thumb for cooperation and setting intention. For example, the India-Africa Framework for Cooperation which was adopted during the first Indian summit in 2008 recognized “the need to give a new dimension to this cooperation” and laid out the 7 key pillars of the partnership (economic cooperation, political cooperation, science, technology, research and development, cooperation in social development and capacity building, tourism, infrastructure, energy and environment, media and communication⁹).

While summit formats with Africa are plentiful, not all were created equally, as can be seen in the infographics below. First, some maintain a clear head start in terms of their summit track record. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), for example, has been held every three years since 2000. The same can be said for the European Union – African Union Summit, which was also launched in 2000 and has been held 6 times since then. Japan’s format, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), goes even further back, having taken place 8 times since 1993 with varying gaps between the events. Others have been launched more recently, such as the India-Africa Forum Summit, which was launched in 2008, as well as the Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, which was launched in the same year. Against this background, the Russia-Africa Summit, which was first held in 2019, presents a new case for study.

⁹ India-Africa Framework for Cooperation 2008 // The Embassy of India in Addis Ababa. URL: <https://eoiaddisababa.gov.in/india-africa-framework-cooperation-2008/>

COMPARISON OF KEY CHARACTERISTICS AND TAKEAWAYS FROM 7 KEY AFRICA COOPERATION SUMMITS

- Number of participating African countries during the last summit
- Heads of state in attendance
- Number of summits held
- Pledged financing/ value of signed deals during the last summit, \$ bln
- Year of the first summit held
- Year of the most recent summit held
- Type and name of final document
- Tandem-document published with the declaration

The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit^I


- 49
- 45
- 2
- 55
- 2014
- 2022
- Vision Statement for the U.S.-Africa Partnership

The EU-AU Summit^{II}

- 40
- 40
- 6
- 168
- 2000
- 2022
- 6th EU-AU Summit: Joint Vision for 2030

The Russia-Africa Summit^{III}

- 54
- 45
- 1
- 12.5
- 2019
- 2019
- The Final Declaration of the Russia-Africa Summit



The Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit^{IV}

- 39
- 16
- 3
- N/A
- 2008
- 2021
- Africa-Türkiye Summit 2021 Declaration
- Africa-Türkiye Partnership Joint Action Plan 2022-2026

The India-Africa Forum Summit^V

- 41
- 41
- 3
- 10
- 2008
- 2015
- The Delhi Declaration
- Plan of Action

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation^{VI}

- 53
- 8
- 40
- 40
- 2000
- 2021
- The Dakar Declaration
- The Dakar Action Plan

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development^{VII}

- 48
- 20
- 8
- 30
- 1993
- 2022
- Tunis Declaration
- Tunis Plan of Actions

Data sources for infographics “Comparison of Key Characteristics and Takeaways From 7 Key Africa Cooperation Summits”

- I. U.S. – Africa Leaders Summit // U.S. Department of State. URL: <https://www.state.gov/africasummit/>
- II. European Union – African Union summit // Council of the European Union. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/>
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- IV. Third Africa – Turkey Partnership Summit “Enhanced Partnership for Common Development and Prosperity // African Union. URL: <https://au.int/en/newsevents/20211216/third-africa-turkey-partnership-summit-enhanced-partnership-common-development>
- V. India – Africa Forum Summit // Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India. URL: <https://mea.gov.in/india-africa-forum-summit-2015/>
- VI. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation // FOCAC. URL: <http://www.focac.org/eng/>
- VII. Tokyo International Conference on African Development // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. URL: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/index.html>



The Russia-Africa Summit

The 2019 Russia-Africa Summit ended with a Final Declaration that served as the partnership’s initial foundation.¹⁰ Considering that Russia does not currently have a general, umbrella Africa strategy like the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa or the EU Joint Africa-EU strategy, the Declaration seems to somewhat fulfil that role at this point. The document established the mechanisms of the Russia-Africa Summit and also touched on political, security, trade and economic, legal, scientific, technical, humanitarian, information and environmental cooperation.

¹⁰ See: Declaration of the First Russia–Africa Summit // First Russia–Africa Summit. 24.10.2019. URL: <https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/declaration/>

KEY RESULTS SINCE THE 2019 RUSSIA-AFRICA SUMMIT

Russia-Africa trade volume (annual)^I



Top-3 product groups exported to Africa in 2019 and 2021**




The number of African countries where Russian houses operate^{II}



Number of Russian trade chambers in Africa^{III}



* UN trade data for 2022 not yet available, therefore data for 2021 was used.
 ** Product groups changed place from 2019 to 2021, but all remained in the top-3.



Data sources for infographics**“Key Results Since the 2019****Russia-Africa Summit”:**

- I. The Ministry of Economic Development said that Russia could double trade with African countries by 2030 // TASS. 20.03.2023. URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/17317795>
- II. Russian Houses Around the World // Rossotrudnichestvo. URL: <https://rs.gov.ru/predstavitelstva-za-rubezhom/>
- III. The Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry plans to expand the network of trade missions in African countries // TASS. 5.03.2022. URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/13974745>
- IV. Almost 2,000 Africans enrolled in Russian universities in 2019 for state-funded places // TASS. 22.10.2019. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/7029476>
- V. Nefedova A. Heavenly Savannah: Rossotrudnichestvo opens new centers in Africa // Izvestia. 7.11.2022. URL: <https://iz.ru/1420557/alena-nefedova/savanna-nebesnaia-rossotrudnichestvo-otkryvaet-novyie-tcentry-v-afrike>

For example, the second clause of the document established that Russia and Africa were to “hold annual political consultations between Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and African States acting as the present, former and future Presidencies of the African Union in the period between Summits.”¹¹ The first of such meetings did indeed take place, held in 2020 via video conference between Minister Lavrov and the Troika of African Ministers.¹² One of the key topics of discussion was establishing effective cooperation mechanisms between the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum (the key body for “coordinating the development of the Russian-African relations,” as mentioned in clause 1 of the Declaration),¹³ foreign ministries of African countries and the secretariats of African regional integration structures to better prepare for the second Russia-Africa summit. Nonetheless, the 2000 meeting seems to have been the last, as can be presumed from a lack of further information regarding the troika format consultations during the following years.

Overall, we see mixed progress, with encouraging advancements, on the one hand, yet difficulty staying on track in terms of commitments that require regular, systematic action.

¹¹ See: Declaration of the First Russia–Africa Summit // First Russia–Africa Summit. 24.10.2019. URL: <https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/declaration/>

¹² О политических консультациях министров иностранных дел Российской Федерации и «тройки» Африканского союза-ЮАР, АРЕ, ДПК // МИД РФ. 07.08.2020. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/za/1436665/>

¹³ Declaration of the First Russia–Africa Summit // Russia-Africa Summit. URL: <https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/declaration/>

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

Established in 2000 as a means for enhancing partnership between China and all African states except Eswatini, Taiwan's last African ally and recipient of significant Taiwanese investment and donations, FOCAC is potentially the most elaborate, long-term and far-reaching institutionalized partnership format of any great power with the continent.¹⁴ The most recent, eighth FOCAC was held in Senegal in 2021 and was focused on the adoption of 4 key resolutions, particularly the Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024), the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, the Sino-African Declaration on Climate Change and the Declaration of the Eighth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC. During the event, China committed USD 40 bln worth of financing, which falls USD 20 bln short of the previous commitment in 2018. Although some might view this as a shift of priorities, it is just a drop in the ocean of China's overall financing to the continent. In addition, USD 1 bln worth of vaccines was pledged during the event.

Beijing has proved its credibility as a long-standing partner of modern Africa, and the Chinese summit approach is unique in that it provides a comprehensive economic-political-security-soft power nexus for all Chinese activities in Africa. This means that the FOCAC is ultimately an umbrella structure for all China-Africa state bilateral relationships, which provides for more structured, cohesive and effective cooperation with the continent.

The US–Africa Leaders Summit

Initially launched in 2014 yet later forgotten under the “America first” policy of President Trump, the US-Africa Leaders Summit returned in 2022 and was mainly aimed at resetting somewhat disregarded relations with the continent. A total of USD 55 bln worth of financial commitments were pledged, with a particular focus on the key priority areas of the AU's Agenda 2063. Earlier that year the US administration released its new Africa Strategy.

Notable is what seems like the calculated decision to avoid focusing on the usually expected trio of democracy, human rights, and governance in the summit agenda, instead giving priority to infrastructure projects

¹⁴ About FOCAC // FOCAC. URL: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltjj_3/ltjz/

and technological development, as well as issues related to food security. This might be explained by African leaders' pushback against patronizing attempts to interfere in local political affairs under the umbrella of democracy.

EU-AU Summit

In March 2022, 40 African leaders gathered in Brussels for the EU-AU Summit. A USD 168 bln investment package was presented,¹⁵ with a particular focus on energy, transport, digital infrastructure, health and education. This amount is significant within the context of the EU's total FDI volume in Africa, approximately USD 250 bln as of 2021. For context, the largest holders of foreign assets in Africa today are European,¹⁶ led by the UK (USD 65 bln) and France (USD 60 bln). Another unique feature of the summit was the decision to allocate USD 13 bln worth of SDRs from European to African countries, some of whom are grappling with liquidity issues. The event's final document did not foresee any further details on the allocation.

The format also foresees a "follow-up monitoring mechanism" designed to track commitments by holding periodical meetings between the AU and EU to review progress in implementing commitments. Considering the preconception that high-level summits rarely lead to actionable recommendations and real projects, the mechanism is a best practice to take note of.

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)

TICAD was first held in 1993, with the most recent conference, TICAD 8, taking place in Tunisia in 2022. The conference places particular focus on the promotion of Africa's sustainable development. There are several unique features of the event, the first being its ownership by several stakeholders. Notably and unlike most other summit formats, TICAD is co-organised by Japan, the African Union, UNDP, the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, and the World Bank.

¹⁵ 9 Months After Summit: European Union and African Union Commissions Take Stock of the Implementation of the February Summit Commitments // European Commission. 28.11.2022. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7247

¹⁶ Investment flows to Africa reached a record \$83 billion in 2021 // UNCTAD. 09.06.2022. URL: <https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-africa-reached-record-83-billion-2021>

The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS)

The IAFS, which was first held in 2008, was initially set to take place every 3 years and was the guiding platform for India-Africa relations. Nonetheless, the event was only held 3 times, the final taking place in 2015 and resulting in the Delhi Declaration.

As in the case of Japan, India places significant emphasis on Africa's autonomy and sovereignty. Documents published after the 2015 summit underlined that the "Delhi Declaration 2015 and India-Africa framework for Strategic Cooperation outlined a multi-faceted strategy for dovetailing the India growth story with Africa's Agenda 2063 to spur mutual resurgence".¹⁷ In addition, the narrative of the event and partnership also built upon similarities between the two, with the former South African president going on to say that "Afro-Indian solidarity has evolved from the eradication of colonialism and racial discrimination to become the embodiment of South-South Cooperation that is holistic and contains geopolitical, cultural, educational, technical and economic components".¹⁸ Later, in 2019, a mid-term review meeting of the Strategic Cooperation Framework of Africa-India Forum Summit III was held in New Delhi, where leaders took stock of progress made since the 2015 summit.

Also noteworthy, a year before, in 2018, Prime Minister Modi laid out the so-called "10 Guiding Principles for India-Africa engagement" during his visit to Uganda.¹⁹ Albeit not new, the principles served as a representation of India's priorities in Africa. This case could serve as an interesting best practice for Russia in terms of alternative documents to a classic strategy paper.

The Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit

The Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit was first held in 2008, 3 years after the country announced its "opening up to Africa" policy and declared 2005 the "Year of Africa". The first summit's final document, the Istanbul Declaration, included a follow-up mechanism, according to

¹⁷ India-Africa Forum Summit // Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India. URL: <http://mea.gov.in/india-africa-forum-summit-2015/>

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Prime Minister's address at Parliament of Uganda during his State Visit to Uganda // Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India. 25.07.2018. URL: <https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30152/Prime+Ministers+address+at+Parliament+of+Uganda+during+his+State+Visit+to+Ugand>

which both summits and ministerial review conferences are to take place every 3 years.

The third summit, in 2021, was held under the theme “Enhanced Partnership for Common Development and Prosperity” and focused on the long-term nature of the partnership. The summit took place against the backdrop of Istanbul’s growing influence on the continent. President Erdogan is one of the most active heads of state in terms of visits to Africa, with him making trips to 30 African countries over the past 15 years. Of particular focus for Turkey is East Africa, particularly war-torn Somalia, where Turkish companies are helping build back critical infrastructure after years of conflict.

Follow-up mechanisms, breakout groups and well-drafted declarations

The past summits confirm that it is crucial to focus on implementing effective practices to ensure that all parties find benefit from respective formats, avoid fallout during the gaps between events and make the summits useful to as wide a circle of beneficiaries as possible. This can be achieved via post-summit follow-up mechanisms, multi-level event formats that expand from the ministerial or leader level to include representatives of business, NGOs, youth, parliamentarians etc. Practical cases of how such mechanisms can be realized will be shared below.

While there seems to be a general consensus for what makes for a successful summit, several cases offer valuable best practices. Based on an assessment of the 7 above-mentioned formats, these can be classified into 3 groups:

- 1) foreseeing a pre-determined follow-up mechanism, within which activities between summits can be tracked and improved;
- 2) including diverse target groups in the summit architecture, such as youth, think tanks, media, business etc.;
- 3) ensuring final declarations are drafted in a way that foresees summit continuation and a call to action amongst relevant parties.

Follow-up mechanisms

While practically all Africa summits end in ambitious closing statements, a key challenge is avoiding empty words and encouraging accountability after the event once all parties have returned to business as usual. A useful summit feature in this regard are follow-up mechanisms.

In the case of China, the FOCAC follow-up mechanism was adopted in 2002, just 2 years after the Forum's launch and after ministerial consultations in Lusaka the year before. The name might seem misleading at first, since the mechanism does not focus solely on the follow-up process, but rather on the overall architecture of the forum which encourages efficiency and accountability in the pre- and post-forum stages.

The mechanism laid out three levels for interaction, the highest and central of which was the Ministerial Conference, convened every 3 years and essentially the principal event within the FOCAC (otherwise put, the "summit itself"). The second tier foresees Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), convened a year before Ministerial Conferences to address any pressing issues in the run-up to the big event. The third tier is comprised of meetings between African diplomats in China and the Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee. These are held at least biannually, during which the two sides communicate with each other on matters related to the Forum on behalf of their respective governments.

Other summits present more conventional follow-up mechanisms. For example, while the EU does not have a formalized follow-up format yet (although one is in the works and was actively discussed during the last summit in 2022), the European Union and African Union Commissions met in December of 2022, 9 months after the summit, to assess progress on plans made during the event.²⁰

In addition, the TICAD adopted its own three-tier follow-up mechanism during the 4th conference. The first tier is the Secretariat, established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (more precisely, the African Affairs Bureau), which carries out information gathering, analysis and public relations activities to assess progress. The second tier is the Joint Monitoring Committee of the TICAD process, made up of representatives from Japan, Africa and international organizations. The

²⁰ 9 months after Summit: European Union and African Union Commissions take stock of the implementation of the February Summit commitments // European Commission. 28.11.2022. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7247

Committee presents its annual Progress Report and gathers once a year for a joint meeting of its members. The third tier makes up the TICAD Follow-up meetings, which bring together representatives of Japan and African countries, the AU Commission and regional economic communities, as well as donor countries and international organizations. These are held yearly and set the backdrop to assess ongoing activities and provide recommendations to stay on track.²¹

Diverse target groups

The high-level nature of most summits allows for big statements and grand gestures yet fails to include a multitude of important groups instrumental in bolstering bilateral cooperation. In this regard, the majority of Africa summits foresee breakout groups, sub-events, working groups and meetings to cast a wider net in terms of involvement. While this looks different for every format, most involve youth, business and academia.

For example, several sub-forums have emerged under the auspices of the FOCAC and include formats on the topics of youth (the China-Africa Young Leaders Forum), healthcare (the Ministerial Forum on China-Africa Health Cooperation), media (the Forum on China-Africa Media Cooperation), development issues (China-Africa Poverty Reduction and Development Conference), legal issues (the FOCAC-Legal Forum) and think tanks (the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum), amongst others.

The same goes for the EU with its Ministerial meetings, Commission-to-Commission meetings, Inter-Parliamentary meetings, Youth Summit, Civil Society Forum, Local and Regional Government Forum, Business Forum, as well as expert dialogues such as the AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue, the High-Level Policy Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation, the Africa-EU Energy Partnership and Africa-EU Reference Group on Infrastructure.²² Unique to the EU are the Africa-Europe Foundation Strategy Groups which focus on health, digital, agriculture and sustainable food systems, sustainable energy and transport and connectivity. These take place outside of the framework of the summit itself and rather serve as advisory platforms to better inform decision-makers on EU-Africa matters.²³

²¹ TICAD Follow-up Mechanism // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/report2008_a1.pdf

²² Africa-EU Partnership // European Commission. URL: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/africa-eu-partnership_en.

²³ Ibid.

In terms of the US, the second day of their high-level summit was business-centric, with the US-Africa Business Forum (USABF) taking place. The event was focused on trade and investment, bolstering Africa's role in the global economy and scaling innovation and entrepreneurship to drive progress in key sectors.²⁴ An interesting addition to the event was the "Prosper Africa Deal Room", a space for negotiations and the announcement of new deals and partnerships between US and African businesses, investors, and government leaders.²⁵

While not strictly held under the auspices of the Africa-Turkey Summit, the Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum nonetheless comprises an important element of the Turkish summit architecture for Africa. The 2021 event, which took place several months before the high-level summit, was centred around President Erdogan's goal of doubling bilateral trade with the continent to reach USD 50 bln. Thus, the format foresaw panel discussions and bilateral meetings between representatives of the private and public sectors, with particular emphasis on exploring Africa's emerging opportunities in agriculture, healthcare and the AfCFTA.²⁶

Finally, the TICAD format included "official side-events", 13+ of which took place in the run-up to and during the 8th summit. This unique format covered topics ranging from climate change and technical cooperation to space exploration and agricultural innovation, involving co-organizing partner structures representing Japan, Africa and international organizations.²⁷

Final declarations

"Smart declarations" foresee several important features. First of all, it is good practice to include information on a set date and place for the next summit. As we saw in the case of India, such plans are not always upheld and may be adapted to react to a changing environment or plans. Nonetheless, such a practice encourages accountability, provides African

²⁴ Day 2: U.S.-Africa Business Forum // U.S. Department of State. URL: <https://www.state.gov/africasummit/u-s-africa-business-forum/>

²⁵ U.S. – Africa Leaders Summit Livestream // Prosper Africa. URL: <https://www.prosperafrica.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit-livestream/>

²⁶ Kedem S. Erdogan pledges to double bilateral trade at Turkey-Africa business forum // African Business. 19.10.2021. URL: <https://african.business/2021/10/trade-investment/erdogan-eyes-deals-at-turkey-africa-summit>

²⁷ TICAD 8 Side Events // TICAD. URL: <https://www.ticad8.tn/content/16/side-events>

states with a clear roadmap for further cooperation and helps keep the format on track.

Not all declarations need to be symbolic in nature, as can be seen, for example, in the common practice of adopting both a final declaration, as well as an action plan. An example is the Plan of Action adopted at the end of the second Indian summit, which provided KPIs and expected deliverables from the next couple of years between events. This included, for example, the exact number of PhD and Master's scholarships to be provided to African students per annum (25 and 50, respectively), the number of vocational training centres to be opened in Africa (10), as well as the exact worth of lines of credit to be provided to African countries and institutions over the following 5 years (USD 5.4 bln).²⁸ In comparison to the 2008 India-Africa Framework for Cooperation, the key document of the first summit, we see a more detailed approach and bolder stance in terms of locking down the activities for the next several years.

In the case of Turkey, each summit declaration included a clause to adopt joint implementation plans for the partnership in tandem with the declaration itself. For example, clause 20 of the 2014 Africa-Turkey Summit Declaration saw to “adopt the attached Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019 to further strengthen comprehensive cooperation between Africa and Turkey”.²⁹ Later, in 2021, the next summit's final declaration included a clause stating that “we have adopted the attached Africa-Turkey Partnership Joint Action Plan 2022-2026, which contains concrete actions to be implemented jointly by Turkey, the African Union and its Member States”.³⁰ Such a “tandem” approach provides space for both important symbolic, policy-guiding high-level statements in the declaration, but also equally (if not more) important action plans to provide efficient guidance and opportunities to act.

Rather famously, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa once wrote that “too many summits have happened with too little impact in the last few years”.³¹ Indeed, the abundance of events brings us to

²⁸ Plan of Action // The Embassy of India in Addis Ababa. URL: <https://eoiaddisababa.gov.in/plan-action/>

²⁹ 2014 Africa-Turkey Summit Declaration // African Union. URL: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37754-doc-2014_africa_-_turkey_declaration.pdf

³⁰ Third Africa-Turkey Partnership Summit // African Union. URL: https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/reports/41270-rp-E_Africa-Turkiye_Summit_2021_Declaration.pdf

³¹ Songwe V. Africa and Europe: A time for Action // Africa Renewal. 16.02.2022. URL: <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2022/africa-and-europe-time-action>

the important question of how productive of an endeavour these summits are. What is the ratio of mingling to deal-making? How represented are African development interests and home-grown solutions? Are we viewing the continent as a donor or partner? What value can we offer and, most importantly, how do we keep the promises made in public relevant behind closed doors?

Recommendations for a successful Russia-Africa Summit

For a successful event, we will need to think about how to follow up effectively without creating an overburden of formalities. This goes hand in hand with drafting a smart declaration, where we not only cement the next summit date but also propose a tandem action plan document and lay out the framework for periodical, multi-level meetings between summits. Here the experience of the FOCAC, TICAD and Turkish-Africa Summit prove important.

Also, as in the case of the TICAD, EU-AU Summit and the US-Africa Leaders Summit, Moscow might want to pay additional attention to supporting African-run development programmes and projects rather than creating its own. While the latter might be seen as imposing, the former might serve as important factual backup to one of the key elements of contemporary Russian foreign policy in Africa – respect for the freedom and sovereignty of African states.³² No less important are efforts to stick to schedule and honour agreements made.

In addition, it is also worth acknowledging good practices of the Russia-Africa Summit format, for example, the Economic and Humanitarian Forum that will be held along with the high-level summit and involve various target groups. A closer look at the programme architecture paints an inclusive picture, with a separate event for the media, the involvement of youth, a special meeting for university rectors and other niche formats within which value can be created for all.

While the Russia-Africa partnership cannot direct the wind, it can indeed learn to adjust its sails. The 2023 event will be a good chance to assess progress made, explore new ways to boost productivity between

³² Article by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov for the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, the Congolese Dispatch de Brazzaville, the Ugandan New Vision, as well as the Ethiopian Ethiopia Herald, July 22, 2022 // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 22.07.2022. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/vizity-ministra/1823250/?lang=en

events, establish new vectors for action in vastly different global conditions and build upon the solid foundation set in 2019.

Chapter 4. Africa's readiness to cooperate and Russia's country-specific priorities

Since Russia launched its special military operation, the level of geopolitical pressure from Western countries has increased dramatically. Many of the Global Majority countries, including Africa, are unable to ignore this when deciding on their future contacts with Russia. To determine the political country-specific priorities and individual African countries' readiness to develop cooperation with Russia in the current circumstances, Table 1 summarises the African countries' voting results on the seven resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly against Russia in 2022-2023.

Being mindful of the relative nature of the assessment criterion (a vote against Russia does not always mean saying no to practical cooperation), three groups of states can be identified among African countries.

The **first group** (19 states) includes countries that never voted for anti-Russian resolutions. These countries are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

The **second group** (11 states) includes countries that voted for one to three times out of seven resolutions. As a rule, these resolutions concerned territorial integrity (after four new constituent entities have become part of the Russian Federation) which is the most acute and painful issue for many African countries; humanitarian aspects of the crisis; and compliance with the UN Charter principles on the anniversary of the conflict. These countries are Angola, Botswana, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, South Sudan, and Togo. It's a sort of the middle of the list, which may be open to certain aspects of cooperation with Russia, but for which geopolitical constraints will matter.

TABLE 1. RESULTS OF VOTING OF AFRICAN STATES FOR UN GA RESOLUTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA
(abst. – abstained)

Country	ES-11/1	ES-11/2	ES-11/3	ES-11/4	ES-11/5	77/229	ES-11/6
Algeria	abst.	abst.	against	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
Angola	abst.	abst.	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	abst.
Benin	yes	yes	did not vote	yes	yes	abst.	yes
Botswana	yes	abst.	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Burkina Faso	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote
Burundi	abst.	abst.	against	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
Cameroon	did not vote	did not vote	abst.	did not vote	did not vote	abst.	did not vote
Cape Verde	yes	yes	abst.	yes	yes	yes	yes
Central African Republic	abst.	abst.	against	abst.	against	abst.	abst.
Chad	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Comoros	yes	did not vote	yes	yes	yes	did not vote	yes
Congo DR	yes	yes	yes	yes	did not vote	did not vote	yes
Congo R	abst.	abst.	against	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
Côte d'Ivoire	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	abst.	yes
Djibouti	yes	yes	did not vote	did not vote	yes	abst.	yes
Egypt	yes	yes	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Equatorial Guinea	abst.	abst.	did not vote	did not vote	abst.	did not vote	did not vote
Eritrea	against	against	against	abst.	against	against	against
Eswatini	did not vote	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	did not vote
Ethiopia	did not vote	abst.	against	abst.	against	against	abst.
Gabon	yes	yes	against	yes	abst.	abst.	abst.
Gambia	yes	yes	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Ghana	yes	yes	abst.	yes	yes	abst.	yes
Guinea	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
Guinea Bissau	did not vote	abst.	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	did not vote
Kenya	yes	yes	abst.	yes	yes	abst.	yes

Country	ES-11/1	ES-11/2	ES-11/3	ES-11/4	ES-11/5	77/229	ES-11/6
Lesotho	yes	yes	abst.	abst.	abst.	did not vote	yes
Liberia	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Libya	yes	yes	yes	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Madagascar	abst.	abst.	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Malawi	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Mali	abst.	abst.	against	abst.	against	against	against
Mauritania	yes	yes	did not vote	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Mauritius	yes	yes	yes	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Morocco	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	yes	did not vote	did not vote	yes
Mozambique	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
Namibia	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
Niger	yes	yes	abst.	yes	yes	abst.	yes
Nigeria	yes	yes	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Rwanda	yes	yes	did not vote	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Sao Tome and Principe	yes	yes	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	did not vote	yes
Senegal	abst.	yes	abst.	yes	did not vote	abst.	did not vote
Seychelles	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	did not vote	yes
Sierra Leone	yes	yes	yes	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Somalia	yes	did not vote	did not vote	yes	yes	yes	yes
South Africa	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
South Sudan	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	abst.	did not vote	yes
Sudan	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	against	abst.
Tanzania	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	did not vote	abst.	did not vote
Togo	did not vote	abst.	abst.	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.
Tunisia	yes	yes	abst.	yes	abst.	abst.	yes
Uganda	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.	abst.
Zambia	yes	yes	did not vote	yes	yes	abst.	yes
Zimbabwe	abst.	abst.	against	abst.	against	against	abst.

The **third group** (24 states) includes countries that voted in favour of four or more resolutions out of seven, including, as a rule, those that, in addition to general condemnation of Russia, also proposed specific measures, such as paying reparations or being excluded from the UN Human Rights Council. These countries include Chad, Liberia, and Malawi (they voted for all seven resolutions), as well as Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tunisia, and Zambia. Political constraints are most likely to be a factor in Russia's interaction with the above countries.

Of course, these UN General Assembly voting results should not be interpreted as an absolute verdict. The remarks of the President of Serbia, which also voted "yes" on a number of resolutions, are well known: that his country did so only under pressure from the West, but in fact is open to dialogue with Russia. Perhaps the same approach played a role in the voting of some African countries. However, one way or another, the results of these votes make it possible, **first**, to at least formally interpret a certain split and lack of unity among African countries in relation to Russia. **Second**, we can conclude that those 19 countries that have never voted "yes" are open to continuing the cooperation with Russia that they had originally sought to pursue. These countries can be seen as the "core" for the further promotion of Russia's dialogue with the countries of the continent.

Chapter 5. Russia-Africa cooperation in education

5.1. Universities as key to creating stable Russian-African relations

The younger generation in Africa have a greater potential to carry forward the aspirations of the continent but only if African countries can catch up with the global trend of making their societies knowledge-based. The place of knowledge in resolving contemporary and historical challenges ailing many developing countries cannot be underestimated. From dealing with the problem of diseases, to urban planning and addressing challenges of inadequate and inefficient housing, schools, food security, affordable energy and economic infrastructures, knowledge remains an important component of dealing with these challenges.

Russia provides a unique opportunity for students and researchers from the continent to tap on its experiences in emerging scientific and research trends such as artificial intelligence, engineering, nanotechnology, agriculture, nuclear energy, cyber security and foreign policy which are essential for growing a knowledge-based economy. Importantly, the recently imposed sanctions on Russia have given the country an opportunity to rethink and reinvent its economic and social policies to match the challenges that the sanctions have brought about. These lessons can be crucial for Africa which has struggled from unfavourable conditions of the dominant liberal economic system and institutions. Furthermore, while these ideas can best be exchanged in an academic environment, the transferable nature of knowledge means that once cooperation between institutions in Africa and Russia have begun, then there could be a shift from the politicized nature of relations to one that is capable of bringing on board new actors (academicians and researchers), ideas and strategies.

To achieve this goal, we can propose:

- 1) setting up a network of quality universities through which Africans and Russians can benchmark, collaborate and engage in joint research and projects.
- 2) enhancing mobility of students and researchers between Russia and the continent with the goal of promoting not only knowledge exchange but also culture and societal trends.
- 3) using a platform for technology and information transfer especially in the age of post-truth and fake news, custodians of knowledge and information out to be those within the intellectual spaces.
- 4) using education for promoting hi-tech driven economies which is a gap that continues to be elusive.

There have been tremendous efforts in Africa since the 1950s to promote higher education, but these efforts are still way behind the global trends. For example, according to the UNESCO science report of 2021, African higher education institutions constitute only 8.9% of the total of the world total of 18,772, a significantly low figure compared to 12% for the Caribbean and Latin America, 20.4% for North America, 21.9% for Europe and 37% for Asia. Even crucial for this discussion is the percentage of GDP allocated to higher education institutions in Africa (0.59%) which is roughly 1.01% of the global R&D expenditure. With the population of Africa growing to over 1.3 billion, it is surprising that the continent produces fewer research publications than Canada, a country with a population of 37.8 million.

Thus, shifting Russia-Africa relations to more scientific and academic engagement is not only likely to have a positive impact on the current status of higher education in the continent, but also offers a huge opportunity for the continent to rethink its development approach from the more dominant humanitarian and aid-based approach to a more proactive, solution-based approach. Student exchanges, staff exchange, joint research, creating academic consortiums, consultancies and joint project implementations are ways such relations can begin to grow.

5.2. Tasks and challenges of cooperation between Russia and Africa in the sphere of education

The development of partnerships in the field of higher education between the Russian Federation and African countries is facilitated by a powerful Soviet-era legacy: the USSR provided large-scale assistance to the young African states in the training of personnel. In many African states, national associations of graduates of Soviet and Russian universities have been created and are still actively operating.

A significant number of Soviet graduates now occupy important positions in both the public and private corporate sectors in African countries, as well as in the universities of these countries. Russian universities have preserved their methodological approach to most effectively organising the learning process for African students, taking into account the specificities of their languages and respective countries of origin. All this evidences the strengths of the Russian educational system in the already emerging global competition for African students.

The financial issue

This global competition puts forward new, additional requirements for the Russian educational system, since now African applicants have the opportunity to choose between different countries to study. First of all, this is, of course, a financial issue. Not all African students are ready to pay for their education on their own. The budgets of African universities also often do not have significant free funds in order to cover the academic mobility

of students and teachers at their own expense. At the same time, Russian universities, as during the early post-Soviet period, look at foreign students primarily from a commercial point of view as a necessary source of extra-budgetary funds. Largely for this financial reason, large-scale educational cooperation between Russia and African countries was sharply reduced in the early post-Soviet period.

Therefore, Russian state programmes to support African students are of key importance. Programmes that would specifically cover the cost of their education at Russian universities, as well as provide scholarships for African students sufficient for a decent standard of living in Russia, where many cities are among the most expensive to live, even by global standards. It should be noted that a lot is already being done to resolve this issue, both through Rossotrudnichestvo and other departments. The number of study quotas in Russia available to African students is constantly increasing. We must admit here that, compared with the same quotas allocated by Russia for students from post-Soviet countries, the quotas for Africa are small. For understandable geopolitical reasons, the post-Soviet states here are a priority for Russia's international educational cooperation. Obviously, this situation will continue in the medium term. But it is also clear that Africa's place in this scale of Russia's priorities also needs to be increased. Otherwise, amid the global competition, in conditions where, for example, China itself offers multimillion-dollar scholarship programmes for African students, Russia's role will remain limited.

The formats of education

Another, no less important issue is the formats of education that Russia can offer to African students. During the Soviet era, in many disciplines, primarily engineering and technical training, the young African states did not yet have their own educational facilities; by and large, this is becoming a thing of the past. This reflects the fact that Africa is increasingly beginning to comply with the general global trend, where the majority of students prefer to obtain a basic bachelor's degree at home, at their own universities, and go abroad primarily to receive a master's degree. As a result, the number of students going abroad for undergraduate studies is declining compared to those going for graduate studies, and is expected to continue to decrease. In this context, the global competition for African students is increasingly unfolding precisely in relation to master's programmes.

On the one hand, the decisions taken at the official level in Russia to abandon the Bologna system of higher education, as well as the statements made by the leaders of the educational sphere of Russia about possible plans in this regard of probable reduction of the number of master's programmes in Russian universities in the coming years and a massive transition to a one-stage "Soviet" system of five-year higher education, could limit Russia's opportunities in the medium term to attract both African and all other foreign students. In this case, Russia's ability to offer master's programmes that are attractive to foreign students could be reduced. **On the other hand**, it should be noted that, in our opinion, Russian universities as a whole have managed to maintain a high level of basic higher education since Soviet times, something that amid post-Soviet conditions was transformed into a bachelor's education.

Academic mobility

The next important aspect that determines international educational cooperation at the present stage is short-term academic mobility: semester, monthly and other internships for students and teachers in foreign partner universities. Previously, in the context of the Bologna system, such programmes were carried out by Russian universities with their previous partner universities in Europe, as well as in America, as a rule, on the financial principle of reciprocity, when each side paid the costs on its territory. In the case of many African universities, however, this scheme of equal distribution of costs for academic mobility is unlikely to work, because, as noted above, their budgets are small, and for objective economic reasons they do not have enough free resources. They often develop this cooperation with Western and Chinese universities on a grant basis. Therefore, for Russia, this issue of financial support for short-term academic mobility with African universities is becoming a key one.

Russia's global reorientation towards the World Majority countries has changed its priorities in the sphere of education. Regularly, certain Russian universities report on negotiations with African partners, on the signing of agreements on joint programmes and conferences. It is important that this trend does not die out on its own the day after the Russia-Africa summit, as unfortunately sometimes happens in our country. Even given the current financial, institutional and methodological constraints, Russia's opportunities to develop educational partnerships with Africa should be used as efficiently as possible.

Chapter 6. Case study: African migration to Russia

Migration from African countries to Russia is still insignificant in scale and its main channel is educational migration. In 2022, according to the official estimates of the Main Department of Migration Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, 38,885 Africans were legally staying in Russia: 1,338 of them had valid temporary residence permits, 1,994 had valid residence permits at the end of the reporting period, 319 had valid work permits, 874 had received citizenship, and 34,360 Africans studied in Russia (the largest contingents are from Egypt (15,668 people), Morocco (3,438 people), Nigeria (1,754 people), Algeria (1,458 people) and Zimbabwe (1,262 people).

Education-driven migration

According to official statistics, education migrants account for the bulk of African migrants to the Russian Federation, and their numbers are gradually growing.³³ They mainly come to Russia from North African countries.³⁴ In 2018-2022, according to the data of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the Interior Ministry³⁵ their share was anywhere from 60 to 70 percent of the total number of students from Africa in Russia (*see Table 2*).

Over the past five years, Egypt was the undisputed leader among North African countries in terms of the number of foreign students in Russia (40.59 percent on average in 2018-2022), followed by Morocco (12.83 percent) which is a distant second and then Algeria (6.74 percent), Tunisia (3.93 percent), Sudan (1.49 percent), Libya (0.38 percent), and Western Sahara (0.02 percent) which are lagging even farther behind.

³³ «Принципиально другая позиция»: замглавы Минобрнауки России Константин Могилевский о содействии развитию африканских государств // Минобрнауки. 14.02.2023. URL: <https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-centre/news/mezhdunarodnoe-sotrudnichestvo/64194/>

³⁴ Classification according to the UN (United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Statistics Division. Methodology. Standard country or area codes for statistical use (M49). Geographic Regions // URL: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>)

³⁵ Данные ГУВМ МВД России. Статистические сведения по миграционной ситуации. Сводка основных показателей деятельности по миграционной ситуации в Российской Федерации за январь-декабрь 2022 года // МВД РФ. 18.01.2023. URL: <https://мвд.рф/dejatelnost/statistics/migracionnaya>

TABLE 2. SHARES OF AFRICAN REGIONS AND INDIVIDUAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AFRICAN CITIZENS REGISTERED WITH THE AUTHORITIES* IN RUSSIA WITH THE PURPOSE OF ENTRY DESIGNATED AS “STUDIES,” IN 2018-2022, %

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Average percentages for 2018–2022	Rank by region
North African countries	57.17	63.60	69.20	70.63	69.29	65.98	
Algeria	8.12	8.30	7.39	3.54	6.37	6.74	3
Egypt	23.41	34.17	44.50	53.26	47.61	40.59	1
Western Sahara	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	7
Libya	0.39	0.37	0.62	0.26	0.24	0.38	6
Morocco	16.64	14.39	12.21	10.74	10.15	12.83	2
Sudan	1.68	1.44	1.41	1.04	1.90	1.49	5
Tunisia	6.84	4.92	3.08	1.79	3.02	3.93	4
Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa	42.83	36.40	30.80	29.37	30.71	34.02	
Angola	5.00	3.88	2.47	1.69	1.64	2.94	2
Ghana	3.00	2.23	1.59	1.60	1.45	1.98	5
Guinea	1.69	1.50	1.46	1.26	1.72	1.53	7

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Average percentages for 2018–2022	Rank by region
Zambia	1.60	1.16	0.92	1.01	1.08	1.15	10
Zimbabwe	1.53	1.03	0.88	0.76	0.97	1.04	11
Cameroon	2.77	2.80	3.20	2.56	2.80	2.83	3
Congo	3.13	2.62	1.74	2.33	2.05	2.37	4
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.71	1.19	1.05	1.22	1.02	1.24	9
Côte d'Ivoire	2.10	1.71	1.50	1.65	1.79	1.75	6
Nigeria	5.91	5.46	4.42	4.13	4.44	4.87	1
South Africa	1.55	1.52	1.44	1.05	0.78	1.27	8
Africa as a whole	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		

* In 2018–2020, the statistical forms of registration with the police authorities concerning the purpose of entry included foreign nationals who had been *initially* registered with the authorities. However, after changes, data on the *total* number of foreign nationals registered for the purpose of entry have been published since 2021. For better comparability, the dynamics include the proportions of African countries as they relate to the total number of African nationals registered with the Russian authorities where “studies” are designated as the purpose of entry.

Source: Data provided by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the Interior Ministry <https://мвд.рф/dejatelnost/statistics/migracionnaya>

Between 30 to 40 percent of all African migrants from Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa came to Russia to study in 2018–2022. Only 11 countries from Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa accounted for more than 1 percent of the total number of students from Africa, namely, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Nigeria led this group of countries in terms of the number of foreign students in Russia (4.87 percent on average in 2018-2022), followed by Angola (2.94 percent), Cameroon (2.83 percent), Congo (2.37 percent), Ghana (1.98 percent), Côte d'Ivoire (1.75 percent), Guinea (1.53 percent), South Africa (1.27 percent), DR Congo (1.24 percent), Zambia (1.15 percent) and Zimbabwe (1.04 percent).

In the 2022-2023 academic year, 2,300 publicly funded university spots were made available to African citizens. The leaders included Guinea (450 spots), Angola (300), Mali (290), Republic of Congo (250), Egypt (250), and Nigeria (250). The quota for free training for African students in Russian universities in the 2023-2024 academic year has been increased to 4,700 spots.³⁶ Education-driven migration to Russia is promoted by Rossotrudnichestvo offices that are operational in African countries.³⁷ Education-driven migration from Africa to Russia is gradually expanding,³⁸ but this process can and must be sped up.

The share of Africa's population under 15 years of age stood at 40 percent in 2021,³⁹ and according to the UN Population Division, more than half of Africa's population is under 25.5 years of age.⁴⁰ In 2019, there were about 250 million people of college age in Africa, and their number

³⁶ Квоту на обучение африканских студентов в РФ увеличили вдвое // Известия. 7.11.2022. URL: <https://iz.ru/1421585/2022-11-07/kvotu-na-obuchenie-afrikanskikh-studentov-v-rf-uvlichili-vdvoe>


³⁷ Nefedova A. Heavenly Savannah: Rossotrudnichestvo opens new centers in Africa // Izvestia. 7.11.2022. URL: <https://iz.ru/1420557/alena-nefedova/savanna-nebesnaiarossotrudnichestvo-otkryvaet-novye-tcentry-v-afrike>

³⁸ Шпак М. Россия – Африка: достижения и перспективы сотрудничества в сфере образования // РСМД. 5.04.2023. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/africa/rossiya-afrika-dostizheniya-i-perspektivy-sotrudnichestva-v-sfere-obrazovaniya/>

³⁹ Абрамова И.О. Народонаселение Африки в условиях трансформации мирового порядка // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2022. № 12. URL: <https://asaf-today.ru/s032150750023554-1-1/>

⁴⁰ Гаврилова Н. Г. Высшее образование в Африке: роль в устойчивом развитии континента // Столыпинский вестник. 2021. № 2. URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vysshee-obrazovanie-v-afrike-rol-v-ustoychivom-razvitii-kontinenta/pdf>

FIG 1. DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHO ADOPTED RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP IN 2018–2022, %



will rise to 321 million by 2030 and 840 million by 2050.⁴¹ The African Higher Education Summit was held in 2015. A long-term plan for promoting higher education in Africa was among its outcomes. According to the plan, by 2063, the number of people with higher education in Africa will have increased from the current 8 percent to 50 percent.⁴² In light of this, education migration from Africa will be given special importance, and Russia must not miss this window of opportunity.

Migration for permanent residency

Just like education-driven migration from Africa to Russia, permanent residency migration from Africa is divided into two unequal regional groups: a larger group of North African countries and a smaller group from Western, Central, Eastern and Southern African countries.

⁴¹ Гаврилова Н. Г. Высшее образование в Африке: роль в устойчивом развитии континента // Столыпинский вестник. 2021. № 2. URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vysshee-obrazovanie-v-afrike-rol-v-ustoychivom-razviti-kontinenta/pdf>.

⁴² Ibid.

TABLE 3: NUMBER OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM AFRICAN REGIONS AND INDIVIDUAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES, WITH REGARD TO WHOM A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO PROVIDE CITIZENSHIP OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (ADOPTING, RESTORING, RECOGNISING) IN RUSSIA, IN 2018–2022, PERSONS

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2018-2022	% of all African countries	Rank
North Africa	259	287	501	761	560	2368	68.38	Rank
Algeria	90	90	53	25	27	285	8.23	3
Egypt	296	414	294	186	164	1354	39.10	1
Western Sahara	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	7
Libya	8	10	5	3	2	28	0.81	6
Morocco	60	90	57	26	26	259	7.48	4
Sudan	25	35	18	8	9	95	2.74	5
Tunisia	81	122	74	39	31	347	10.02	2
Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa (Sub-Saharan Africa)	97	103	188	393	314	1095	31.62	Rank
Ghana	9	4	12	19	19	63	1.82	5
Cameroon	17	15	33	55	45	165	4.76	2

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2018-2022	% of all African countries	Rank
Congo	6	16	18	31	25	96	2.77	3
The Democratic Republic of the Congo	3	2	4	15	11	35	1.01	6
Côte d'Ivoire	4	8	17	26	18	73	2.11	4
Nigeria	36	23	49	128	101	337	9.73	1
Total for all African countries	356	390	689	1,154	874	3,463	100	

Source: Data provided by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the Interior Ministry <https://мвд.рф/деятельност/statistics/migracionnaya>

Over the past five years, Egypt remained the leader among North African countries in terms of the number of foreign nationals from African countries who adopted Russian citizenship (39.1 percent of all foreigners from African countries who adopted Russian citizenship in 2018-2022), followed by Tunisia (10 percent), Algeria (8.2 percent), Morocco (7.5 percent), Sudan (2.7 percent), and Libya (0.8 percent). Overall, North Africans accounted for 68 percent of all foreign nationals from Africa who adopted Russian citizenship in 2018-2022.

Foreign nationals from Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa accounted for about one-third of all Africans who adopted Russian citizenship in 2018-2022. More than 1 percent of the total number of individuals who obtained Russian citizenship in 2018-2022 from among the residents of Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa came from the following six countries: Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria.

Nigeria led the above countries in terms of the number of persons who adopted Russian citizenship (9.7 percent on average in 2018-2022) followed by Cameroon (4.8 percent), Congo (2.8 percent), Côte d'Ivoire (2.1 percent), Ghana (1.8 percent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1 percent). Angola, Guinea, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, which were previously on the list of the countries with over 1 percent of the total number of education-driven migrants to Russia from Africa on average in 2018–2022, did not make it to the list of Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa that had more than 1 percent of the total number of persons who obtained Russian citizenship in 2018-2022.

Forced migrants from Africa in Russia

Africa remains a crisis zone to this day. Each year 20 to 80 conflicts flare up worldwide, with 10 to 30 taking place on the African continent.⁴³ In 2020, there were 39 armed conflicts worldwide, including seven in the Middle East, including North Africa and 20 in Africa south of the Maghreb.

Armed conflicts generate massive refugee flows. African refugees totalling 7.4 million people accounted for 22 percent of the world's total refugees in 2020.⁴⁴

African refugee flows have so far left Russia unaffected and, in addition to the geographical factor (inconvenient mass relocation of African refugees to Russia), there is another reason for this: the migration policy of the Russian Federation does not yet see those who were forced to migrate from Africa as a category for settlement in Russia. According to official statistics,⁴⁵ only dozens of people receive refugee status in Russia every year, and there are almost no Africans among them. Therefore, for those forced migrants from Africa who could come to Russia, the prospects for acquiring citizenship through refugee status are very difficult, and information about this, quickly transmitted through migrant word of mouth, creates a reputation for Russia as a country that is inconvenient for refugees.

⁴³ Абрамова И.О. Африканская миграция: опыт системного анализа. М.: Ин-т Африки РАН, 2009. URL: https://www.inafran.ru/sites/default/files/page_file/abramova-afrikanskaya_migraciya.pdf

⁴⁴ Щербакова Е. Международная миграция по оценкам 2022 года // Демоскоп Weekly, № 973 – 974.31.01–13.02.2023. URL: <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2023/0973/barom06.php>

⁴⁵ УВКБ ООН в России. Статистические данные // УВКБ ООН в РФ. URL: <https://www.unhcr.org/ru/stats>

Attitude towards Africans in Russia

The attitude towards Africans in Russia has been wary for a long time, and this is partly a legacy of the Soviet era, when friendship with Africa was postulated, but the vast majority of Soviet citizens had never seen Africans in everyday life, perceived them as a curiosity and had no experience of real interaction with them. The proclaimed friendship with Africa remained a purely hypothetical concept for an ordinary citizen of the USSR. When real interaction did take place, in addition to quite natural curiosity, everyday xenophobia often became noticeable⁴⁶ and this situation has persisted to this day.⁴⁷

The building of “glass walls”⁴⁸ by the Russians themselves in relation to the Africans is unlikely to contribute to the desire of the latter to work and live in Russia.

The frosty attitude Russians have towards Africans is, among other things, due to their poor familiarity with the culture of the African continent, and their lack of comprehensive and periodic information about Africa in the Russian media.

Russia-Africa migration dialogue

In June 2022, the Russian-African Club was created, bringing together diplomats, public figures, politicians, businessmen, cultural figures, educators and scientists of Russia and African countries. The activities of the club are aimed at developing friendship and comprehensive ties between Russia and African countries, including work on the opening of the Museum of African Culture on the basis of the State Museum of Oriental Art in Moscow.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Гарб П. Иммигранты из США и Канады в СССР: опыт исследования социально-культурной и бытовой адаптации: автореферат дис. ... кандидата исторических наук: 07.00.07 / АН СССР. Ин-т этнографии им. Н. Н. Миклухо-Маклая. Москва, 1990. URL: <https://search.rsl.ru/ru/record/01000028526>

⁴⁷ Крылова Н. Л. «Смешанные браки» = Inter-marriages: Опыт межцивилизационного общения / Н.Л. Крылова, С.В. Прожогина. Москва : Ин-т Африки РАН, 2002. URL: <https://search.rsl.ru/ru/record/01000969822>

⁴⁸ Poletaev D. From Mistrust to Solidarity or More Mistrust? Russia's Migration Experience in the International Context // Valdai Paper №97. 28.12.2018. URL: <https://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/from-mistrust-to-solidarity/>

⁴⁹ Музей культур стран Африки. Сайт Российско-Африканского клуба. URL: <https://rusafroclub.ru/muzej-kultur-stran-afriki/>

In December 2022, Cairo hosted the Forum of Alumni of Soviet and Russian Universities from the Middle East and Africa,⁵⁰ organized by Rossotrudnichestvo and the Institute of Humanitarian Education and Testing. This gathering constitutes one of the important initial steps in building a system of work with former educational migrants to the USSR and Russia living in Africa.

Summary and prospects

Over the past five years, the number of citizens of African countries in the Russian Federation has remained almost unchanged. When compared with the 2019 estimate of up to 40,000 African migrants staying in Russia at that time, we can see that the numbers have remained about the same.⁵¹ Such resilience suggests that, despite its significant migration potential, with a total African population of about 1.4 billion people, Russia is not yet connected with African countries via a full-fledged migration network.

Labour migration amounts to several hundred, migration for permanent residence is also limited in scale; forced migration is almost non-existent. Education-driven migration has remained the largest migration flow from Africa to Russia in recent years.

Egypt and Morocco account for more than half of students coming to Russia from African countries which are the main donor countries in terms of education-driven migrants. Among North African countries in 2018-2022, Egypt leads both in terms of the number of education-driven migrants in Russia and the number of individuals adopting Russian citizenship. Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are the top three countries both in terms of the number of education-driven migrants and the number of individuals adopting Russian citizenship which is significantly below Egypt's numbers, but higher compared to the countries of Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. Sudan is the only exception in the group of Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa which, in terms of education-driven migrants

⁵⁰ В Каире открылся форум выпускников российских вузов // ТАСС. 17.12.2022. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/16622675>

⁵¹ Barabanov O., Balytnikov B., Yemelyanov A., Poletaev P., Sid I., Zaiser N. Report: Russia's Return to Africa: Strategy and Prospects, 24.10.2019. URL: <https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/report-russia-s-return-to-africa/>

and the number of individuals adopting Russian citizenship, is competing with the three runner-up North African countries. Russia's interaction with two Sub-Saharan African countries, Nigeria (Western Africa) and Cameroon (Central Africa) is particularly noticeable.

Migrants from Africa who have settled in Russia and received Russian citizenship are hardly noticeable and are not even represented in the political arena.

While we are only observing migration from Africa to Russia on a minimal scale, its countries are witnessing explosive growth. By 2035 the African population could reach 1.9 billion people, and in 2050 – 2.5 billion people.⁵² Because of the increasing competition for resources on this continent and growing risks of economic and political instability, forced migration flows from Africa to Russia may become a new component of the migration situation already in the medium term, and it is worthwhile to prepare for this in advance.

In this situation, we would like to draw attention to several key points.

First, the policy regarding the integration and adaptation of migrants in the Russian Federation needs modernisation. Measures may include increased funding, support for non-governmental organisations working towards the integration and adaptation of immigrants in the Russian Federation, the provision of training to journalists to cover Africa, and constructive cooperation with African communities in Russia.

Second, the intensification of work with African countries and the development of ties with them necessitates an understanding of the fact that this will entail an increase in the scale of economic, and later refugee migration from African countries to Russia, and after this an increase in the number of Russians of African descent and the number of mixed-descent Russians with some African ancestry. In this regard, countering xenophobia and migrant phobia will become an even more urgent and acute issue. In this case, Russian society, and not just the African migrants themselves, will also need to be prepared for the changing migration situation.

⁵² Основные демографические показатели по всем странам мира // Демоскоп-Weekly. URL: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/app/world2019_1.php

Third, as part of work with education-driven migrants, it would be useful to conduct comprehensive annual monitoring of the African students studying in Russia and African applicants planning to study in Russia based on polls conducted in Russia and African countries.

Chapter 7. Russafrica: the foundations of interaction

The results of the African vote at the UN to condemn Russia in the conflict with Ukraine as discussed earlier in this report caused confusion among most non-African UN members, especially in the West. No one would have thought this possible on the part of Africa, except those who are following with interest the slow but steady build-up of Russia's relationship with the continent.

These ultimately pro-Russian results do not only express Africa's distrust of the West. They affirm the continental will to get rid of its historical incapacity of emancipation, based on colonization and on which certain thesis on its dependence had ended up prospering. This dependence has generally found its most successful mode of expression in what is known as "Françafrique", a neologism that is supposed to reflect the cooperation between France and Africa that has been enshrined in the many summits between African heads of state and the French President. But since the irruption of the BRICS on the international scene, the mistrust of Africa finds its source among others, in the revelation that another path of cooperation, perhaps more fruitful and less condescending, is possible with other countries, especially Japan ("Japonafrique") but also China ("Chinafrica") or India ("Indiafrica"). Today, it must be recognized that a new neologism is imposed on the continent, namely "Russafrica".

Inspired by Kester Ken Klomegah's article "Russia eyes Africa to boost arms sales" in *The Guardian* on April 4, 2013⁵³, *Slate Afrique magazine* on the same day published an article entitled "La russafrrique c'est pour quand?"⁵⁴

⁵³ See: Russia eyes Africa to boost arms sales // *The Guardian*. 4.04.2013. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/04/arms-trade-africa>

⁵⁴ La Russafrrique, c'est pour quand? // *Slate Afrique*. 05.04.2013. URL: <https://www.slateafrique.com/143173/la-russafrrique-cest-pour-quand-arme-kalachnikov>

It seemed to be the first time that this word was used, in anticipation of a neologism that should serve to account for and do justice to a plural and dynamic but little-known cooperation. In order to understand this cooperation, we must question its foundations. There are many of them, but we will only briefly mention five: historical, economic, scientific and academic, political and security.

Historical foundations

The historical foundations of Russafrica are to be found as early as the Middle Ages, when Russian and African travellers met and interacted frequently on the paths of their respective Christian and Muslim piety. Then came the 16th century with the famous Alexander Pushkin whose great-grandfather was none other than Abraham Petrovitch Hannibal, Prince Kotoko in North Cameroon, freed and ennobled by Peter the Great. The Russian sailors and explorers then took over the discovery of the continent, before the entry into force of diplomatic relations, which were gradually established from the eighteenth century. The revolution of 1917 consolidated this historical construction thanks to the seduction operation that was set up around Africans studying in Russia. The 1922 Comintern Congress made the choice of accompanying Africa with an assumed option of defending anti-colonial and emancipation movements, which would later be affirmed with the independence struggles and, even closer to home, with an active participation in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

Political foundations

Russia has diplomatic relations with all 54 African countries, and has embassies in 49 of them. Much has been said about the 2019 Sochi Summit, forgetting the first Russian-African business forum organized in 2011 by the “special representative for cooperation with Africa,” a permanent position that reports directly to the presidency. Russia is developing a political and operational discourse based on principles that appeal to Africa: global democratization, independence and non-interference that rejects “Western-style conditionalities”, diplomatic presence in the countries but also within African regional organizations, permanent reminder of its absence in colonization and at the Berlin Conference, health support, strong media presence with *Russia Today* and *Sputnik*, but also protection of Africa in UN bodies through its right of veto.

Economic foundations

With the end of the Cold War, Russia has progressively moved from an ideological approach to a pragmatic economic approach, with the search for raw materials in mind, but above all the development of business in the continent. In this logic, it has called upon a myriad of sprawling state enterprises (Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosatom, Sukhoi, etc.) supported by two powerful financing organizations that accompany their conquest of the continent (Vnesheconombank and Eximbank), as well as gigantic private enterprises (Kaspersky, Rusal, Evraz, etc.) that participate in a form of economic diplomacy supported by dedicated banks (Sberbank, Gemcorp, etc.). At the same time, and in a spirit of equality, Russia favours solidarity contracts (which link trade, energy and security), barter contracts, joint venture contracts, etc., which have the virtue of removing any feeling of inferiority from the relationship. In the end, although the level of trade with Africa is still low, it is growing exponentially (400% between 2010 and 2018!).

Scientific and academic foundations

In addition to the huge Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which includes up to eleven departments (history, economics, strategy, anthropology, etc.), and the Russian House of African Studies (Rossotrudnichestvo Agency), there is the most famous actor of the educational Russafrica, namely the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University (RUDN University), which has trained more than 500,000 Africans since the 1970s, among whom are high-ranking officials and Heads of state (João Lourenço of Angola, the late Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, etc.). Even today, about 15,000 Africans are studying in Russia, of which 3,000 are on Russian government scholarships (only 1,175 in France in 2020). In 2021, Russia allocated 15,000 scholarships to international students, including Africans. For Africans with generally modest incomes, these scholarships make Russia extremely attractive and friendly. The resulting factory of African elites' places Russia at the centre of governance arrangements in several countries led by these graduates.

Security foundations

A distinction must be made here between military security and energy security. In terms of *military security*, in the 1970s, Russia had up to 40,000 military advisors in Africa. Russian security in Africa has two dimensions: public and private. The public dimension revolves around military cooperation (with practically the entire continent), significant multiform military aid, linked to education, training, the installation of military bases, the fight against terrorism, but also a flourishing arms trade (up to 30% of African imports according to the Rosebonexport Agency). The private dimension is operationalized by numerous private military companies that are involved in counter-insurgency and anti-Islamic activities, among other things. As far as *energy security* is concerned, Russia is one of the very few countries in the world to accompany Africa in its efforts to equip itself with civilian nuclear power plants or mini-power plants, in order to escape the diktat of hydroelectric power in the supply of electricity to the population. About fifteen African countries are currently involved in projects of this nature.

The five foundations thus mentioned highlight a singular relationship, on which few studies have finally dwelt, and which has allowed a solid friendship to be fortified in silence, all the sincerer because it is imbued with mutual respect and consideration.

Conclusion

In order for the Russafrica concept put forward in the previous chapter to achieve its full potential, Russia needs to keep confirming its commitment to pursuing the partnership with Africa through practical moves.

This call for a strategy – a clear and well-thought-out plan with actual projects, justified efficiency measures and verifiable results. A framework must be formulated at all levels, including the political, economic and humanitarian levels.

Our countries have the potential for a great mutually beneficial future. The Soviet Union played a decisive role in determining the vector of development of many African countries after the colonial system collapsed. We openly supported and helped African countries choose the path of self-determination and freedom of choice. Our country has provided ample help to young and growing African economies. Our relations still rely on friendship and trust.

The historical past must underlie today's renewed relations with Africa. Understanding the deep-running foundations of Russia-Africa cooperation, awareness of the problems facing Africans, and understanding the essence of their request for cooperation can constitute a serious competitive edge for Russia in the current geopolitical environment.

Modern Africa is thinking in long-term strategic terms. Agenda 2063, a document adopted in 2015 by the AU heads of state and government, which defines the development strategy and articulates Africa's main goals and objectives by the 100th anniversary of the continent's decolonisation is an example that proves this assertion. The priority areas and roadmaps outlined therein, including energy and infrastructure roadmaps, open up a lot of opportunities for Russia. In the future, it appears quite promising to better coordinate Russia's proposals concerning applied cooperation with Africa based on the mechanisms and formats developed by African countries themselves. This kind of Russian support for intra-African programmes will be more effective. At least African governments will be able to see the synergy between Russian assistance and their own goals and KPIs within the framework of Agenda 2063. After all, it is a kind of a development project with clearly articulated ideas about the image of the future where "Africa must be a strong, united, sustainable, peaceful and influential global player and a partner playing a meaningful role in international affairs."

At the second Russia-Africa Summit, Russia will have to discover a formula for modern mutually beneficial cooperation with Africa within the framework of this image of the future.

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