First of all, the insurance against this is the unique military superiority of the "nuclear club" over all others. But no less important is the general focus on own development goals, which requires fairly selfish behaviour in the framework of international politics.
The most striking example is India: the exact model of a revisionist power opportunistically seeking to take advantage of the Sino-US conflict. If at an earlier stage of its recent history India pursued a policy of an independent centre of power and was perceived as such, as one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, now its foreign policy positions are a component of the struggle between Washington and Beijing. It’s difficult to explain such a transformation by merely citing the colossal fortitude of these centres of power - during the Cold War, the USSR and the USA were no less great, comparatively, in their capabilities. But this did not prevent India from pursuing its own strategy in its foreign policy decisions, rather than merely one that was derivative of the conflicting strategies of other great powers. It is possible that the reason stems from the rather nationalistic internal course of the Indian government. A state whose development is based on nationalism, by definition, cannot act as an independent centre to which small and medium powers are attracted. In this regard, it is difficult to find a fundamental difference between India and the much smaller Indonesia, which is at the same time the largest country in ASEAN. The official policy of this country, like that of India, is focused on not making a choice between the United States and China. In the same way, it does not pursue completely independent goals, based on a unique vision of its own role in world affairs.
Within the framework of international politics, where the main process is the struggle between Beijing and Washington, Indonesia's foreign policy for a long time still will be an opportunistic use of the resources of both conflicting opponents. This makes the policy of Indonesia, like that of the ASEAN group, fairly predictable amid the new international conditions.
Russia, for all its colossal importance for international security, is also in no hurry to put forward an original concept of international order.
This is largely due to its experience throughout the 20th century, when Russia, like the United States, was one of two centres of power competing in a game where the fate of all humanity was at stake. This policy was extremely costly and even severely weakened Russia's ability o defend its own basic values and interests. In part, it led to the collapse of the USSR, which was no longer able to ensure the survival and development of the Russian state itself.
And it is not surprising that now in the Russian discussion there is an idea, sometimes dominant, that the country should just get rid of the excessive geostrategic burden.
Moreover, Moscow's military capabilities are sufficient to ensure its own security without relying on allies and the direct physical control of its perimeter. However, Russia's presence among the 5 most important powers in international politics, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and its strong relationship with China mean that opportunism, while seemingly universal among all nations, is absent from Russian foreign policy.
The United States also ended a period of revolutionary behaviour, the most striking manifestation of which after the end of the Cold War was its attempt to ‘export’ democracy, even using military means. The election of Donald Trump as President a few years ago under the slogan "America First" marked the decisive rejection of revolutionary foreign policy by American society. It is unlikely that the Democratic administration will be able to return to the footing of 1991-2008 politics, which nearly led to the collapse of American global power.