NATO and the SCO represent two opposing concepts of ensuring international security: through control over the internal politics of the states included in the system, and through intensive diplomatic dialogue between them. We cannot now say with certainty which of these concepts may become the most generally accepted in the future. However, so far, the current trends in the political development of the world speak in favour of the second, writes Timofei Bordachev. This article is the first part of reflections on the future of international cooperation.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, unlike NATO, is not underscored by decades of tradition or any fundamental philosophy. It did not grow out of the experience of several centuries of interaction between states with relatively similar internal orders and a similar view of the world. Moreover, at first glance, the SCO member countries have little need for cooperation among themselves as a way of strengthening their foreign policy positions at a broader international level.
They are not states for which it is vital to present a united front on important international issues simply because their common interests in relation to the rest of humanity require it. The West, as we know, has always needed this, since its position in the world has been quite isolated and predatory. Predators unite in packs and coordinate their actions much better than the rest of the animal kingdom; states are no exception.
The SCO emerged in 2001 for two fundamental reasons. First, crisis phenomena are gradually growing within the framework of the international order that arose after the Cold War. NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia illustrated that the United States and its allies have failed to live up to the expectations placed on them by the wider international community. Force has fully returned to world politics, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies only confirmed that they cannot be considered universal guarantors of all-encompassing development and security. Impressed by these processes, China, Russia and the four Central Asian states created a new platform for active diplomatic dialogue among themselves, the most important task of which was to do what the West was unable to do: to strengthen international stability at the regional level and, particularly, resolve potential problems in relations between states.
Second, the reason for the creation, development and strengthening of the SCO was the increased understanding by its states that security in Central Eurasia is their own business and no one else can be responsible for it. In the first half of the 2000s, it was already obvious that the crisis of the “unipolar” international order could lead to increased instability in the most important regions of the planet. In Eurasia, radical religious movements of a cross-border nature became sources of instability. Thus, the countries of Central Eurasia were faced with the task of coordinating their actions to repel these threats in conditions where the capabilities of the wider international community were increasingly limited by the selfish behaviour of the United States and Europe, characterised by their inability to play the role of stabilizers outside their borders.