The transition of the Supreme Leader in Iran represents a crucial step for the political and religious system of the Islamic Republic, founded on the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. This figure, who combines spiritual authority and political power, guarantees the legitimacy of the state and the balance between internal forces, particularly between the Revolutionary Guards and the regular army, Lorenzo Maria Pacini writes. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
Khamenei’s successor will profoundly influence foreign policy, internal cohesion, and relations with Shiite countries and regional allies. While an unstable change could alter the geopolitical balance of the entire Islamic world and encourage the intervention of rival powers such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, it could also motivate the emergence of a new Islamic alliance.
The foundation of Iranian Shiite authority lies in the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, according to which a person who possesses specific attributes sits at the top of the power structure. According to Islamic theology, supreme leadership of the system should be entrusted to a Maʿṣūm – a term that strictly designates a figure immune from sin and error, namely the Prophet Muhammad or one of the twelve infallible Imams. This ideal configuration is not always achievable. Even in historical periods when a Maʿṣūm is present, he can only govern the territory in which he is physically located, appointing delegates to administer other regions.
The legitimacy of the Wilayat al-Faqīh is based on logical reasoning and can be reinforced through the legal argumentation of Imamite doctrine. According to this doctrine, God entrusted the leadership of the ummah to the Prophet Muhammad and then to the twelve infallible Imams. During the occultation of the last Imam, divine laws remain binding and the need for political authority remains, making it necessary for a figure to temporarily assume these functions.
The Supreme Leader has many functions. As the highest figure in the hierarchy, he is first and foremost a religious and ideological leader, designated as a role model according to Shiite doctrine, and represents continuity with the 1979 Islamic Revolution, thus having the duty to preserve its meaning. He is also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, including the regular army, the Revolutionary Guards, and the security and intelligence forces. He exercises continuous supervision over state bodies, being able to arbitrate in the event of conflict. He can remove the President of the Republic with the vote of the Supreme Court and Parliament. It’s clear that such a figure has a decisive influence on the political dimension of Iran.
The first mechanism provided for in the event of the Guide’s absence is his temporary replacement by a committee composed of the President of the Republic, the Head of the Judiciary, and a jurist member of the Council of Guardians, appointed by the Council for the Discernment of the Higher Interest of the System (Article 111). A clear distinction should be made between the Council of Guardians, a body with functions similar to those of a constitutional court, responsible for ensuring that laws comply with the Constitution and Sharia law (Article 94), and the Council for Discernment, which acts as the supreme arbitral body in the event of a conflict between Parliament and the Council of Guardians (Article 112).
A second possibility provides for the intervention of the Supreme National Security Council, established with the task of ensuring the internal security and sovereignty of the country. This body has the prerogative to deliberate even in the absence of an official publication of its decisions, provided that they are ratified by the Supreme Leader (Article 176), even retrospectively.
A third possibility provides for the proclamation of a state of emergency and the provisional establishment of a military-led government. The decisions taken by this executive must subsequently be transformed into law by Parliament within a specified time limit, in accordance with procedures similar to those for emergency decrees in other legal systems (Article 79) and, in any case, the opinion of the Supreme Leader shall be sought at a later stage.
It should also be noted that the Supreme Leader himself is chosen by an Assembly of Experts whose members are elected by universal suffrage. This Assembly is not composed exclusively of religious figures, but also of legal experts, civil servants, military personnel, and intellectuals (Article 107).
Geopolitically, the advent of a new Supreme Leader, Khamenei’s successor, will primarily affect the balance of Iranian foreign policy, which stems from domestic policy. During his regency, Khamenei strengthened continuity with Khomeini, consolidating power through an alliance with the Revolutionary Guards and refining the regular army, balancing its power with theirs. This suggests a desire to guarantee internal order via military polarisation, projecting Iran as a leader in the Islamic world. A less authoritative leader could weaken internal cohesion and generate tensions.
There are various political movements: the reformists, the party of President Masoud Pezeshkian, includes names like Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, who promote moderate reforms, openness to Western models, and a less protective foreign policy; real opponents criticise authoritarian control and Revolutionary Guard influence, such as Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi of the Green Movement. Quietists, mainly in Qom, favour an apolitical clergy; Qom is Shiite Islam’s educational centre. Centrists, led by President Masoud Pezeshkian, oppose IRGC military power, adopting pragmatic domestic and foreign policies. All groups have favourites among the Ayatollahs.
Under Pezeshkian, Iran began opening to the West, generating tensions with Khamenei and a rift between the government and the Supreme Leader. This could favour a moderate or centrist successor, marking a new phase and possible revision of alliances, particularly with the Resistance Axis and Russia. Given Iran’s constitutional structure, a redistribution of the Leader’s powers is unlikely without reform, conflicting with revolutionary principles.
Given the complexity of Iran’s constitutional structure, it is unlikely that the powers of the Supreme Leader will be redistributed to other state bodies, as this would require constitutional reform and would conflict with the principles of the Revolution and the balance of the political system.
Iran is one of the main centres of influence in Western Asia, both for the Axis of Resistance and in relations with Russia and the Caucasus. A weakening of the Leader could encourage interference from external actors such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States, altering the regional balance and forcing other countries to review their alliances, with destabilising effects in South Asia as well.
In Islamic countries, especially those that are Shiite or have large Shiite minorities (Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen), a change could undermine Tehran’s support, the legitimacy of allied forces, and the stability of the geopolitical axis built over the past decades. On an ideological level, the transition would affect the interpretation of the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine, the theological-political pillar of the Iranian system.
In a smooth and peaceful transition scenario, the Assembly of Experts will meet quickly and designate the new leader, but this requires stability and alignment among key institutions. In this case, it is likely that a conservative candidate would continue the foreign policy of the current leader. Currently, however, the scenario is partially incomplete, because the government is not perfectly aligned with the Supreme Leader. This leads us to a second, more critical scenario, in which rivalries could create a dispute, pitting the Assembly of Experts, which have a more moderate orientation, against the Revolutionary Guards, who favour a stronger candidate. It cannot be ruled out – although it is highly unlikely – that this could lead to a revision of the Wilayat al-Faqih system or a series of derogations. This would then necessarily lead to a reform of the system, which at this stage in history would favour Western interference and destabilisation of the country. In a third scenario, a power vacuum could persist. This would happen in the event of excessive internal tensions or the appointment of a figure who is not sufficiently authoritative. The Constitution provides for the possibility of a temporary collegial solution, which would open a period of negotiations between the clergy, the military, and politicians. This is perhaps the most risky scenario, which would certainly involve significant pressure. On the international front, this option would be disastrous if it led to the outbreak of a regional or international war, because the absence of the Supreme Leader would mean the fragility of the entire Islamic Revolution, risking the structural collapse of the nation.
The outlook is not entirely bleak: the transition could also favour the emergence of an Islamic pole, such as a global Islamic alliance, which would serve as a political and ideological entity for Islamic civilization. This would be a reaction to Western pressure, but also a multipolar expression of a demographically and culturally relevant model of civilisation, which could acquire a powerful voice even in those countries where the Islamic presence – Shiite and non-Shiite – has strengthened in recent decades.
The entire Iranian state structure is therefore configured as a form of doctrinal transition, inspired by religion but structurally more complex and hybrid than is often believed. This is one of the main sources of strength of the Islamic Republic: the metaphysical order that underpins it constitutes the foundation and guarantee of its stability. This is an aspect that should not be underestimated.
