Iranian Force Building in Syria and Threat to Israel

Iranian intervention in Syria was not charity and Iran plans to benefit from the risks and losses it took. What does it hope to get? For now the financial dividends are limited but Syria does offer geostrategic opportunities to increase pressure on one of Tehran's major regional foes - Israel. 

One need not read secret intelligence reports to uncover Iranian intentions.  Just days ago Gen. Qassem Suleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force said: "Our revenge for Moughniyeh's assassination won't be shooting a missile or killing an (Israeli) official but the destruction of Israel." 

For many years the only existential threat that Israel faced was the prospect that the radical regime calling for its destruction from Teheran would acquire nuclear weapons.  With the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, that threat appeared to have been delayed from materializing for at least a decade.  However, it now seems that the Assad regime's momentum in the civil war could allow for Iran to develop a conventional strategic threat that, if realized, could turn existential.  

The conventional threat that Iran is building in Syria is bound to develop into a conflict between Jerusalem and Teheran. Iran is determined to move forward and Israel is determined to stop it.  Because this danger could take an existential turn down the line, as it could serve as a protective deterrent in support of Iran's nuclear program, Israel may revert to the Begin Doctrine which calls for pre-emptive action to prevent states calling for Israel's destruction from gaining the ability to pose a critical threat. By continuing with its program to build advanced military infrastructure to threaten Israel in Syria, Iran appears to have underestimated Israeli determination to prevent the expansion of the Iranian threat there - and the price for continuing to operate under this mistaken notion will cost much to many. 

Iranian force building in Syria may take a variety of different and overlapping forms but will probably be modeled after three different examples of success, the “Hezbollah model”, the “Popular Mobilization Units of Iraq model”, and the “North Korea threat on Seoul model,” which represent three different types of threats to Israel:  

●         Geographic: Based on the Hezbollah model, Iranians will seek to build a non-Iranian proxy terror force ideologically affiliated with the regime in Tehran that has geographic access to Israel’s northern front and can intensify pressure through terror with Iranian support. 

●         Quantitative: In replicating its success in Iraq in arming, training, and indoctrinating locally focused militias, Iran can expand its influence over the broader population and recruit tens of thousands to its ranks.  As in the case of Iraq militias, these forces can then be moved to different fronts according to Iran's needs. 

●         Quality: The North Korean component of the Iranian strategy against Israel is one that seeks to augment its proxy forces’ conventional capabilities by supplying advanced weaponry such as precision missiles against Israel to the point that they serve as a deterrent and allow Teheran to act with impunity.  This threat may seem strategic but could eventually converge with existential dangers: The Iranian nuclear deal is in a precarious state and even if it does survive for the next thirteen years Iran may seek to use its proxies in the Levant to take the military option for halting its nuclear program off the table, much like Pyongyang has done by taking Seoul hostage. 

From the Israeli perspective, it is advantageous to deal with these problems when they are in their infancy rather than ignoring them and meeting a more advanced and developed enemy in the next decade.  Because of the serious nature of the threat, Israel will probably risk taking serious actions that put secondary considerations at risk – and this was strongly implied in the clashes on February 10th. 

Although the Israeli-Iranian tensions have been calmed for now, Saturday’s escalation is part of an ongoing struggle in which two countries have fundamentally opposed objectives, and so similar incidents will likely recur sporadically with the potential to spiral into a full-scale war. Due to the nature of the threats it faces, Israel cannot and should not relent on the redlines it has drawn – geographic, quantitative, and qualitative - in Syria.  Therefore, both allies of Israel and those with interests in preserving the Assad regime should warn Iran against provocative steps that risk igniting a wider conflict and could have destabilizing effects in Syria and beyond.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.