Without external control and dominant external forces, new regional problems and lines of confrontation will appear. On the other hand, without American involvement in regional affairs, some long-standing crises will no longer be fuelled from outside, and their dynamics will no longer be vital for the countries of the region. Therefore, old contradictions may soften, and countries will look for new ground for cooperation. For Russia, this is a chance to strengthen its influence and expand its circle of partners, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Andrey Sushentsov.
The Ukrainian crisis was the culmination of the crumbling of the international order that the West had built since the end of the Cold War. The international significance of this crisis is emphasised by the fact that it is Ukraine that has become both a tool in the struggle against the growing influence of Russia, and at the same time a battlefield between Russia and the West. Despite being the largest regional crisis in Russia’s modern history, it hasn’t absorbed absolutely all of the country’s foreign policy resources, so Russian foreign policy continues to develop in many other areas. In this context, the Middle East is one of the strategic constants for Moscow, and it will remain on Russia’s foreign policy agenda regardless of what happens in other regions. Russia’s interest in the Middle East and the countries of the region remains high: the country associates considerable expectations of economic cooperation with the Middle East, given the new international conditions.
However, we cannot say that the international situation in the Middle East is completely favourable for Moscow’s foreign policy goals. The countries of the region are waiting to find out who will prevail in the conflict in Ukraine, as this will significantly affect the balance of political power: in particular, it will depend on whether the “unipolar moment” continues or whether the contours of polycentricity are really outlined. In addition, the Ukrainian crisis directly affects the affairs of the Middle East in the field of politics and economics.
First, in the political sphere, the United States is actively putting pressure on all its partners, forcing them to take an unequivocal position on the crisis and provide military assistance to Ukraine with arms supplies. This pressure does not always have the intended effect: the countries of the region seek to develop an independent way to determine their trajectory and often stop delegating to the United States the development of their own position on international crises.
The economic impacts which are most significantly felt are the disruption of transport links, the instability of energy markets, the disruption of production chains, and the consequences for the food security of the countries of the region. This once again emphasizes the global nature of the Ukrainian crisis, which, although localized in Europe, has consequences for the Middle East.
The region remains one of the most important centres of concentration of Russia’s efforts to pivot to the East. Moscow sees this as a strengthening of its strategic autonomy and a way to maintain its foreign policy initiative in a changing world. The crisis of the unipolar order in Europe shows Russia’s policy towards the countries of the East and South in a new light — for Moscow, these areas are now becoming major nodes of foreign policy activity. Moreover, Russian-Western economic relations are now largely mediated by the countries of the East — the Arab states, Turkey, and the countries of Central Asia.
Even outside the context of relations with the West, the deepening of Russian relations with the states of the Middle East and North Africa, as one of the fastest growing, dynamic regions in the world, has acquired absolutely independent significance. Russian strategic planning has in mind the fact that over the next twenty years, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Egypt will increase their economic weight, pushing the Western countries to the background in terms of growth rates. Additionally, the on-going regional processes cannot but concern Russia, which is connected with the region by a significant number of cultural, ethnic, economic and political ties. Russia has historically been one of the most important actors in the region and will continue to be so in the future.
In recent years, the region has seen a decline in US participation in the regional affairs and the emancipation of the largest countries that proclaim large-scale strategic development programmes and major defence initiatives. This is leading to the formation of a polycentric system in the region, where no external power will play a dominant role. This provision is new for the region.
We should not forget that polycentricity carries with it enormous risks, especially for a region like the Middle East. On the one hand, without external control and dominant external forces, new regional problems and lines of confrontation will appear. On the other hand, without American involvement in regional affairs, some long-standing crises will no longer be fuelled from outside, and their dynamics will no longer be vital for the countries of the region. Therefore, old contradictions may soften, and countries will look for new ground for cooperation. For Russia, this is a chance to strengthen its influence and expand its circle of partners.
