While the government was busy safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity and its international position, Russians adopted many Western concepts, such as the ideology of consumption. The government’s inability to meet their new economic and political needs may generate many problems and challenges that Putin will have to face.
The main international event that unfolded during the first 100 days of Vladimir Putin’s third term in office was the crisis in Syria. From Moscow’s perspective, Russian diplomats have shown firmness in holding their ground; the West prefers to refer to this same quality as obstinacy, especially with regard to approving sanctions against Syria and the possible change of regime there. Vladimir Putin’s and Russian diplomats’ efforts were focused on avoiding the Libyan scenario in Syria. In Moscow’s view, if it hadn’t been for a well-coordinated effort of Russia and China, that scenario would have stood a good chance in Syria.
The second political trend that marked Putin’s first 100 days was a drastic cooling in relations between Russia and the West. This was manifested in Putin’s refusal to attend the G8 summit and the NATO summit in Chicago. In fact he declined for a range of reasons, one of them being a lack of any positive expectations from the events. As Putin refused to go to the United States, US President Barack Obama declined the invitation to attend the APEC Leaders’ Week in Vladivostok, which is largely viewed as a key foreign policy event in Russia this year.
The chill in Russia-West relations also manifested itself in the recent statements by Gunther Oettinger, European Commissioner for Energy, who compared Russia’s energy policy with that of the Soviet Union and even likened Russia’s pipelines to a new Red Army, with energy being its weapon.
But it was the Pussy Riot punk band case that became the most high profile and obvious indication that the tone of relations has changed, as a simple misdemeanor started to be discussed at a global political level, with the international media monitoring its progress and musing if Russia is sliding toward dictatorship.
The third important aspect of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy is the continued lack of agreement with Ukraine, both in general and on specific issues, in particular natural gas. The latter is growing into a major problem because the Eurasian Union project won’t work unless some agreement is reached with Ukraine. Without Ukraine, the Eurasian Union will be a weak regional alliance or, worse still, boil down to empty statements on paper. Russia is interested in Ukraine joining the Eurasian Union, which would add momentum to the reintegration of post-Soviet states. Putin must be well aware of this, but this issue keeps being postponed. Instead, Russia reached an agreement with Italy on the South Stream pipeline project, that country being a major importer of Russian gas and the key partner in building the pipeline.
Putin’s domestic policy in the first 100 days was marked by more crackdowns on the opposition. Laws were tightened and more bans introduced, causing irritation in both Russia and the West. On the whole, the protest potential keeps growing despite all odds, especially in big cities, threatening to split society.
Relaxing the political party registration requirements was the most notable reform initiated by former President Dmitry Medvedev and implemented by Putin; as a result, more political parties will run in the next elections in addition to the well-known ones.
At the same time, Medvedev’s liberal reform-based program has been largely wound up. Medvedev’s government actually shows a far lower profile than that Putin’s government did; in turn, Putin has concentrated most of the “controls” at the Kremlin as well as a multitude of presidential councils on various issues.
The very future of the tandem has become uncertain, because all the key decisions have been taken by the president, not the tandem. Medvedev is gradually losing his status of the second most powerful politician in Russia, although he has preserved some influence in a range of areas. Still, the situation is getting close to 2007, when there were two potential successors to Putin’s post, Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov. Ivanov, who was recently appointed Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office, has already regained his former administrative weight and political clout.
If we compare the past 100 days with the initial periods of Putin’s previous two terms as president, we can see that things are different this time around. The change was brought about by objective factors, with the development of Russian society being the most notable of them. It has become more Europeanized, but not in the usual sense of supporting liberal values. (Admittedly, there is a limited group of those who do). But in general, Russians have become more demanding when it comes to European-style comforts and social and economic standards.
This proves a great challenge for the Russian government, which is forced to explain to the electorate that the economy is not recovering as fast as they would like and European standards and the quality of life are unlikely to be reached any time soon. This may provoke a conflict; Putin’s aim is to preserve stability but the very notion of stability has changed from 12 years ago. The threat of a war in the North Caucasus is no longer there. Vladimir Putin has also successfully dealt with the threat of terrorism – something Russians seem to be quick to forget.
However, while the government was busy safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity and its international position, Russians adopted many Western concepts, such as the ideology of consumption. The government’s inability to meet their new economic and political needs may generate many problems and challenges that Putin will have to face.
There is one more difference, compared to his previous two terms as president. Russia’s economic modernization can be delayed no longer. If there is no change in the next six years – the economy still skidding and corruption still preventing it from structural change – Russia will never attain its aim of ranking with the top ten global economies.
Russia’s international position has also changed. The saddest thing is that Russia and the West have apparently lost the opportunity of building a “common European home,” and the best they can do is agree on some terms of coexistence on the European continent. In the worst-case scenario, they will become engaged in more conflicts, including ideological ones – something that seemed entirely impossible only a few years ago. Russia and the West are back to the type of relations that existed in the 19th century, when Russia was neither a friend of the West, nor its enemy. Tensions and disagreements are mounting, at times provoking harsh rivalry instead of building a common European home and a common economic space. This is a lamentable prospect but that’s life and it cannot be changed.