For quite a long time now, an opinion has been forming in scientific, expert and political circles about the increasing importance of a certain range of countries, which goes by different names: “developing”, “the Global South”, and “the rest”. The term “Global Majority” introduced in the first year of the Special Military Operation (SVO) by Russian experts seems to be quite suitable, writes Ivan Safranchuk for the 21st Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club.
The number of countries in the American hegemonic bloc can be estimated at approximately 50-55. Russia is not building a full-fledged hegemonic bloc: the number of states on whose open and full support it can count is small (for example, during the SVO, 4-5 states voted in solidarity with Russia in the UN General Assembly). As international interaction has shown in the last two years against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis, about 2/3 of the world's states are inclined to a position that is not fully in solidarity with the conflicting great powers. It has become commonplace to point out that the global majority is heterogeneous and diverse, differing in motives and actions. However, this heterogeneous mass has a certain weight in world affairs, and precisely as a whole. The big powers have formed an awareness that they need to reckon with the global majority and learn to work with it. There are significant differences in how Russia and the United States pursue this interaction.
The United States is trying to gain the support of the global majority through assertive agitation in its favour. Sometimes this produces results. For example, in March 2022, the US was able to push for the adoption of two anti-Russian UN General Assembly resolutions with an unpleasant "account" for Russia. However, although they sometimes succumb to American pressure, its style and methods also irritate the countries of the global majority.
The countries of the global majority perceive American theses about order in two ways. On the one hand, there is a widespread opinion that the Americans abuse their “privileges” as a hegemonic guarantor. However, there is also receptivity to American arguments about the negative consequences of destroying the “rules-based order.” This leads to the fact that the countries of the global majority can support criticism of the Americans, sometimes even enthusiastically, but are far from inclined to support practical anti-American actions. We can say that all this together creates a situation in which the Americans cannot completely lose the global majority (there is receptivity to their basic arguments in favour of “order”), but cannot win it either (since mistrust of the practice of American actions is high). Robert Keohane, a classic American neoliberal political scientist, said that his type of liberalism is liberalism based on fear: without “order” and its guarantors, things would be much worse. This way of thinking now dominates among Western politicians. In contacts with the world majority, Americans try to gain their support not so much by promising a “bright future” thanks to their leadership, but by intimidating with the negative consequences of destroying the “rule-based order.”
Russia does not put pressure on the countries of the global majority. If the Americans need support, then Russia at the present stage can interpret the neutrality of the global majority countries to its advantage. The Russian approach is perceived positively by the majority countries. Russian theses about US abuses on the world stage, the injustice and illegitimacy of its “rules-based order” are also perceived positively in the majority countries. However, as far as one can judge, there are expectations in Russia that the global majority countries will confirm the widespread theses about the growth of their self-awareness and sovereignty with their actions. This also creates a mood that there is no need to put pressure; the majority is moving in the right direction, and will gradually raise its voice.
Despite all the differences between the American and Russian approaches (which are of great importance for the current diplomatic struggle), they also have something in common. Both approaches expect subjectivity from the majority. The Americans want the majority to immediately demonstrate its support. Russia, however, is betting on the notion that the world majority is not yet ready to fully express its position, including due to pressure from the West (often actually blackmail), but in the future it will become more active.
The relative passivity of the world majority at present can be explained in different ways. Excessive activity in a revisionist key is associated with possible losses for small and medium-sized countries. Such ideas predetermine cautious behaviour.
Taking into account the above, we can state that the global majority acts as a part of the international environment: it is another factor of international relations rather than a full-fledged subject. The global majority is able to form and express an opinion on the actions of others, which turns out to be quite significant in the international information environment. At the same time, the general direction of the opinion of the global majority can be characterised as limiting. In other words, the global majority quite effectively forms a collective "no" to overly assertive actions on the world stage, and does not join in supporting and promoting anyone's actions. Now the global majority is a global "damper".
It is also worth noting that the global majority does not have structured mechanisms of interaction within itself, it does not have leaders, its opinion is formed quite quickly and spontaneously. Figuratively, we can say that the global majority is similar to a natural phenomenon that cannot be ignored (since it sets the environment and conditions for successful actions), rather than a subject with whom one can consciously interact.
The stake on awakening the subjectivity of the global majority, which both Russia and the United States are making, albeit in different forms, may not yield the expected results. Attempts to push the global majority in the right direction (assertively, as the United States does, or more delicately, as Russia prefers), to adjust it to one's position, may prove to be of little use. Rather, through diplomatic art and tactics, one should adjust one's position in such a way that the opinion of the global majority is definitely not a "headwind" for it, but, if possible, a "tailwind".
Let us emphasise that the limited subjectivity of the global majority may not be its temporary, but an immanent characteristic. In the future, middle-level powers, ready for more decisive actions on the world stage, will emerge from among the countries of the global majority. However, if some player moves to conduct more decisive and independent sovereign policy, it will most likely distance itself from the global majority.
