The migration of Russian citizens to the European Union in the mid-2020s has ceased to be an exclusively socio-economic process and has acquired a distinctly political and strategic dimension. The movement of people has become a channel for the redistribution of human capital, technological expertise, and political loyalties, influencing labour markets, demographic dynamics, and security debates within EU Member States. In this context, Russian migration is emerging as an autonomous element in the transformation of relations between Russia and Europe, writes Beatrice Bineva, Master in Political Science at the Higher School of Economics. The author is a participant of the Valdai—The New Generation project.
The impulse for this transformation arose from changes in the international environment after 2022. Amid a sharp deterioration in relations and institutional rupture, migration lost its neutral character and increasingly became embedded within the security architecture. For European political elites, Russian migration is quite a sensitive issue, combining humanitarian considerations, economic interests, and elements of strategic competition with a state officially designated as a source of threats. Even in the absence of objective risks posed by migrants themselves, the issue inevitably becomes politicised.
According to data from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), in 2022 EU Member States issued more than 94,000 first-time residence permits to Russian citizens—the highest figure since the late 2000s. In 2023 this number rose to 116,142—indicating not a one-off surge, but the consolidation of a stable migration channel. The increase in residence permits for Russian citizens has occurred against the backdrop of overall growth in migration to the EU: in 2023 more than 3.7 million first-time residence permits were issued to third-country nationals. European data records Russian migration primarily through administrative decisions of host states. These figures reflect institutionally confirmed long-term migration, rather than temporary movement.
An additional source is provided by Frontex data recording crossings of the EU’s external borders. Since early 2022, approximately one million entries by Russian citizens have been registered, although a significant proportion of these crossings were short-term and did not result in subsequent settlement through residence permits.
Official Russian data employs a fundamentally different methodology. Rosstat and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation publish data on net migration gain in Russia, primarily relating to citizens of CIS countries. Systematic data on the emigration of Russian citizens to the European Union are not published by Russian authorities. Emigration is recorded fragmentarily, based on voluntary declaration procedures, and does not allow for reconstruction of either the scale of the outflow or its socio-professional structure.
The professional composition of Russian migration after 2022 is reconstructed on the basis of survey and expert data (Outrush, Russian sociological studies). These indicate that the new wave of emigration is distinctly professional in character. By various estimates, around 40–45 per cent of Russian emigrants are employed in IT, engineering, and related technological sectors; a further 20 per cent are engaged in science, education, culture, media, and the creative industries.
The distribution of grounds for the issuance of residence permits shows that Russian migrants fit within the broader EU migration framework. The principal motives for obtaining a residence permit are employment (approximately 34 per cent of cases), family reunification (around 26.4 per cent), education (roughly 14.3 per cent), and other grounds, including humanitarian statuses (about 25.6 per cent). This indicates a high level of professional mobility among Russian migrants.
The growth in residence permits signals a profound transformation of Russian migration—from temporary movements towards a sustained reorientation to long-term residence in EU Member States. This renders the Russian migration wave one of the key factors shaping Europe’s demographic and social dynamics after 2022.
This character of Russian migration fundamentally distinguishes it from traditional flows originating in regions affected by humanitarian crises. The issue concerns not low-skilled labour, but mobile specialists capable of rapid integration into host economies. For the EU, this represents partial compensation for demographic ageing and labour shortages, particularly in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states.
However, despite evident economic and demographic benefits, migration from Russia is viewed by the European Union primarily through a security lens. This dimension has become dominant since 2022, as strategic confrontation between Russia and the EU has extended beyond diplomatic and military logic into spheres of civilian mobility, information flows, and cross-border connections. European security services identify several risks: the potential infiltration of personnel affiliated with Russian state structures, possible activity of “pro-Russian” networks, the use of diasporas for political influence, and cybersecurity threats. These risks explain the tightening of visa policy, the requirement for multi-layered vetting of applicants, and closer coordination among EU Member States.
At the same time, a strategic paradox characterises migration: notwithstanding perceived risks, it delivers advantages to the EU that would be undesirable for Russia in the long term. Thus, managed Russian migration becomes a subtle instrument of political balancing, strengthening the EU in strategic competition with Russia.
Notably, Russian migration remains a comparatively low-conflict issue within much of the EU. Unlike flows from Africa or the Middle East, it does not generate large-scale public anxieties, is seldom actively instrumentalised by far-right parties, and rarely becomes a source of social tension. Russian migrants generally exert limited pressure on social infrastructure, and their profile is perceived as less politically sensitive.
However, this assessment applies primarily to Western and Northern Europe. The eastern flank—namely the Baltic states, Poland, and Bulgaria—demonstrates a different perception. Here, historical, cultural, and political factors render Russian migration a sensitive issue closely linked to national security considerations.
Bulgaria provides a particularly illustrative case. As one of the EU’s external borders, a state in a strategically vulnerable position, and a country with a complex history of relations with Russia, it perceives migration processes not through the logic of economics or demographics, but through the prism of security.
First, Bulgaria forms part of the EU and NATO’s eastern “security belt”. This implies that the entire system of mobility control in the region must operate as a unified filter preventing transit risks, including potential hybrid threats. Bulgaria integrates visa policy towards Russian citizens into a broader strategy of deterrence and border reinforcement, a tendency especially visible following the reform of the Schengen area.
Secondly, at the level of domestic politics, Sofia now devotes increased attention to Russian presence in the country. Bulgaria is undergoing profound political transformations, and debates concerning Russia, the EU, NATO, and security play a central role. In this context, migration becomes a symbol of political identity: a firm line towards Russian citizens is interpreted as confirmation of loyalty to the Euro-Atlantic line.
Thirdly, Bulgaria is part of a region where Russian cultural influence has historically been significant and where public opinion is often polarised. This creates a specific context in which migration from Russia is not merely a matter of administrative regulation and security, but also a catalyst for the characteristic intra-political divide seen in many former socialist states—whether to align with or oppose Russia.
Thus, the EU’s eastern flank both reinforces and complicates the European migration architecture. Here, migration from Russia is perceived not as a demographic opportunity, but as an element of strategic competition, a potential instrument of interference, and a factor capable of altering the balance of power.
Measures adopted by the European Union to restrict the visa regime for Russian citizens after 2022 led to a sharp reduction in the number of visas issued and produced a fundamental change in the structure of travel from Russia to the EU. The suspension of the Visa Facilitation Agreement in 2022 resulted in the application of the general rules of the Visa Code, entailing higher fees, more extensive documentation requirements, longer processing times, and increased scrutiny of each applicant.
The most significant structural change, introduced at the end of 2025, was the effective prohibition on issuing multiple-entry visas to Russian citizens. In practice, this means that Russian nationals must now generally apply for a new visa for each separate trip to the EU. The stated objective is to ensure “frequent and thorough screening of applicants” in order to reduce potential security risks associated with the “weaponisation of migration” and hybrid threats. This considerably complicates travel for businesspersons, frequent tourists, and individuals with family ties.
It should also be noted that EU policy is not fully uniform. Countries traditionally attractive to Russian tourism within the Schengen area, even after the events of 2022, have been guided by their own needs and interests in deciding whether to issue visas to Russian citizens. Italy, France, and Spain remain the principal issuers of multiple-entry visas, whereas the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Finland apply significantly stricter measures, including near-complete restrictions on entry. This asymmetry creates differing “access points” to the Schengen zone.
The visa restrictions introduced by the European Union in respect of Russian citizens—including the suspension of the Visa Facilitation Agreement in 2022 and the tightening of rules on multiple-entry visas from 2025—have prompted serious debate regarding their compatibility with both the Schengen Visa Code and broader democratic principles, particularly in relation to non-discrimination and individual assessment.
The decision to abolish multiple-entry Schengen visas for the majority of Russian citizens is political in nature and arguably violates the fundamental requirement of an individualised approach, depriving most citizens of the opportunity to demonstrate their “good faith” and “reliability” for the purpose of obtaining a multiple-entry visa. A core democratic principle holds that restrictions or penalties should target specific individuals responsible for wrongdoing. The imposition of restrictions on all citizens of a country, irrespective of their personal position regarding—in this case—the conflict in Ukraine, violates the principle prohibiting collective responsibility. Furthermore, such restrictions complicate or render impossible the maintenance of freedom of movement, human contact, and cultural exchange, which democratic societies seek to promote.
Accordingly, the EU’s steps to tighten the visa regime are criticised for their political character, insofar as they appear to conflict with principles of non-discrimination and individual assessment. The success or failure of migration measures will depend on whether Member States are able to act coherently and to uphold their own democratic standards amid rising political tensions.
