The security of Eurasia constitutes a core element for the stability of the international system. As power transition process continues rapidly in the 21st century, achieving long-term stability across Eurasia has become one of the most critical issues in international security. In April 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping first put forward the “Global Security Initiative (GSI),” which subsequently became a central pillar of Beijing’s foreign policy. Later, in July 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the “Eurasian Security Initiative”. As the two most influential powers on the Eurasian continent, the interaction between their respective security initiatives will profoundly shape the region’s future development. Meanwhile, as the international security architecture and strategic stability face systemic challenges, reaching a consensus in the security domain is also crucial for the stability of Sino-Russian bilateral strategic cooperation.
Security Initiatives: From Regional to Global
The main reason behind both China’s Global Security Initiative and Russia’s Eurasian Security Initiative lies in the fact that the world is currently undergoing “great changes unseen in a century”. The key to this transformation is a systemic adjustment in the power structure of the international system, where the rise of non-Western forces has become central to the ongoing transformation of the international order. In this context, the “global security deficit” has grown significantly in recent years. The emergence of bloc confrontation and the escalation of major-power competition have become defining features of international relations. Therefore, the “Global Security Initiative” aims to address the following issues:
First, the return of traditional security concerns. In recent years, alongside the rise of populism and deglobalisation, traditional security issues have increasingly become a focal point for nations worldwide. The Ukraine crisis has reshaped the geopolitical situation in Europe, while the Israel-Palestine conflict has heightened tensions in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the “politicisation” of high technology, the “weaponisation” of sanctions, and the “decoupling” of economic interdependence are compelling major powers to focus on traditional security as the core objective of their foreign policies. This has significantly increased tensions and diminished mutual trust between states.
Second, the emergence of the security dilemma. In traditional models of international relations, the security dilemma commonly exists between states due to the black-boxing of the process of decision-making and a lack of mutual trust. This security dilemma is highly likely to drive international relations in a zero-sum game, where the enhancement of one state’s security comes at the expense of another’s security. In security matters, this perceived zero-sum dynamic can make conflict and confrontation between states seem inevitable, which is widely regarded as the origin of alliances. However, the emergence of alliances often further worsens the security dilemma. This is why John Mearsheimer has emphasised that the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault—specifically the eastward expansion of NATO. The Global Security Initiative aims to mitigate the security dilemma inherent in power politics by promoting universal, equal, and sustainable security.
Third, the need for global security governance. In the 21st century, traditional and non-traditional security, as well as national and regional security, are interwoven, forming an indivisible whole. In this context, outdated security governance models based on small blocs can no longer meet the actual needs of Eurasia. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis has also demonstrated that a regional security governance model like NATO’s cannot deliver genuine security. Therefore, both China’s Global Security Initiative and Russia’s Eurasian Security Initiative aim to provide the region with a more reliable security solution. This would harmonise the needs for regional stability and national security, thereby fostering a more advanced model of security governance for Eurasia and indeed, the entire world.
Convergence Areas: From Eurasia to the World
The core national security concerns of both China and Russia are centred on the Eurasian continent. Moscow’s Eurasian Security Initiative advocates for a new framework of cooperative and indivisible security and development across Eurasia, signalling a fundamental shift in Russia’s security approach as it seeks to expand its security cooperation framework from the post-Soviet area to the entire Eurasian region. From this standpoint, all countries in Eurasia are potential participants in this initiative. Meanwhile, China’s Global Security Initiative calls for building a community with a shared future for mankind, thereby also advocating broader international participation in the process of building international security mechanisms. Consequently, interaction and cooperation in the following three areas can provide more practical pathways for aligning these two initiatives:
First, strengthening cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a pivotal force in maintaining security in Central Asia and across the broader Eurasian continent. At the same time, it also serves as a platform for effective security interaction between China and Russia. Therefore, further promoting the SCO’s role in addressing Eurasian security issues is crucial for aligning both countries’ security initiatives. With the expansion of SCO membership in 2024, China and Russia need to work closely to ensure that the enlarged organisation can reach a broad consensus on key issues and foster more proactive security collaboration among member states in order to solidify the SCO as the cornerstone of security and stability in Eurasia.
Second, jointly enhancing cooperation with the Global South. The rise of the Global South reflects the ongoing power transition within the international system. The competition among major powers for influence in the Global South is expected to intensify further. In recent years, both China and Russia have held bilateral summits with African states, and have made efforts to further leverage the role of Global South countries in their respective foreign policies. Thus, the two countries can actively collaborate on issues vital to the stability of the Global South, such as economic development, food security, supplying energy, and climate change. They can also jointly advocate for the interests of the Global South on international stages like the United Nations, encouraging more nations to join their respective security initiatives.
Third, increasing cooperation on non-traditional security. A prominent feature of global security in the 21st century is the increasing strength of non-traditional security elements. Climate change, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation are undoubtedly the most important in this area. China and Russia can break through the current predicament of traditional security governance and expand the international influence of their security initiatives by expanding cooperation with countries in the Global South on climate change, jointly strengthening international security governance in emerging technology fields such as artificial intelligence, preventing and managing potential security risks, and upholding the international order of outer space based on international law, opposing the weaponisation of outer space and the arms race.
Future Prospects: From Actors to Structure
The convergence of China’s Global Security Initiative and Russia's Eurasian Security Initiative must also account for the future development of the following three issues:
First, the transformation of traditional alliances. We cannot overlook the continued widespread influence of traditional security alliances based on military cooperation. The “NATO-isation” of the Indo-Pacific region is a typical case of this issue. Therefore, while building a new model of major-power relations, China and Russia should also cooperate to safeguard security in their surrounding regions. They can practice the core principles of their new security initiatives by deepening their interaction model of “non-alliance, non-confrontation, and not targeting any third party.”
Second, the influence of the United States. It must be recognised that the United States remains the most significant power in the international system. Countries worldwide, particularly in Europe, maintain complex and close ties with the United States. The Transatlantic Partnership will continue to significantly impact Eurasian security. Therefore, the implementation of new security initiatives still requires the careful consideration of the United States’ complex role while working to address its potential negative effects.
Third, the anarchical structure of international relations. Western international relations theory sees the absence of a world government as the fundamental condition shaping relations among states. Indeed, a lack of mutual trust continues to profoundly affect the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The ultimate goal of the Global Security Initiative and the Eurasian Security Initiative should be to mitigate the challenges presented by this anarchical environment by establishing a broader cooperative system. Success in this endeavour would constitute a fundamental contribution to the overall development of international relations.
