Elites and Society: Lessons of the NATO Summit in Warsaw

Following the end of the Cold War, the failsafe performance of Western institutions of democracy became the conventional wisdom. It was believed for a quarter century that these institutions ensured the optimal model of cooperation between the elite and society.

They supposedly made the elite responsible and accountable to society and ensured there would be feedback. Large social protests were considered peripheral – typical of the unstable South of Europe or the post-communist East, which could be taught the rules of government over time. Democratic values were also traditionally linked with security issues. NATO positioned itself as an alliance of democratic nations. However, the dialogue between elites and society has been revealed to have shortcomings of late, and this is bound to affect international security.

Several simultaneous events overshadowed the NATO summit in Warsaw. The referendum in Britain caused serious concern among NATO leaders. This issue had to be urgently added to the agenda although formally Brexit had nothing to do with NATO. Another series of terrorist attacks in Europe made terrorism a daily threat in Europe. This was clear even before the summit but the new acts of terror showed that the threat was growing and words alone would not stop it. Finally, Ankara’s NATO partners strongly criticized the attempted military coup in Turkey and the subsequent response by the Turkish government, thereby damaging the alliance’s reputation, to put it mildly.

Meanwhile, judging by the Warsaw summit’s final communiqué, NATO’s key goal is to deter Russia. It devotes significant space to instability in the Middle East but judging by the character of the proposed decisions the alliance considers the Russian threat an obvious priority. The communiqué clearly states what specifically NATO finds lacking in Russia’s conduct and what actions have been or will be taken to deter it. There is essentially no issue on which Russia is viewed as a potential partner. In fact, quite the opposite – Russia’s role as the “spoiler” is repeated ad nauseum. For example, Russia is strongly criticized for its support of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad Government, which NATO regards as essentially no better than ISIS.

The narrative about the terrorist threat is telling. The final communiqué discussed it at length, although it offered few concrete measures compared to suggestions on deterring Russia. In fact, the plan advocates just a few measures – supporting the global coalition (but without direct involvement in it), continuing the mission in Afghanistan (also fairly limited), partnership with Jordan, Egypt and some other countries in the region, intelligence sharing and joint patrolling of sea borders.

The bottom line is that the communiqué reflects serious imbalance in how these two threats are perceived and the recommendations for action. In the case of Russia there are many words and many actions whereas in the case of terrorism there are many words and few actions.

Meanwhile, the reality is the reverse. Indeed, the Ukrainian crisis came as a serious shock to the European security system. A major conflict erupted in the center of Europe. It is no less of a problem for Russia than NATO. The failure of Moscow, Washington and Brussels to prevent or settle the conflict at the early stages shows how divided they are. Mutual military deterrence will only aggravate rather than overcome the tensions.

Meanwhile the threat of radical Islamism is growing every day. Importantly, its character is fundamentally different from that of a traditional interstate conflict. It is permeating the fabric of society both in the West and Russia. The power of this threat lies in its ideas, the willingness of people in Europe to sacrifice their lives for it. These ideas are reinforced by a powerful network organization with which NATO cannot cope because it is designed for something else. NATO’s major deterrence – nuclear and conventional forces and missile defense – is completely useless against terrorist ideology and networks. The alliance is helpless against them without fundamental structural changes.

What does this have to do with the dialogue between elites and society? It is directly related. The alliance exists owing to taxpayer money. One of the results of the Warsaw summit was the stated intention to increase military spending. Judging by everything, the lion’s share will be spent to deter Russia even though the actual physical danger to people is coming from a completely different direction. Thus, the elites and society find themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. The elites take resources from society but do not protect it consistently against urgent threats, instead spending them to chase phantoms. Moreover, this phantom struggle may have serious consequences. Russia-NATO mutual deterrence is fraught with escalation and conflict, which neither side needs and which will only strengthen radicals throughout the world.

The problem is that this disconnect between the elites and society is turning into a trend in the developed world. Those who voted for Brexit by no means opposed Britain’s European future. Rather it was a vote against their own elite and its focus on global issues and abstract concepts that have little to do with the lives of ordinary people. The British political system should be given credit for making this referendum possible. The big question is what conclusions bureaucrats in London and Brussels will make and how such conflicts will be accommodated in other EU countries.

The political crisis in Turkey also revealed serious internal contradictions, albeit of a different character. Turkey is where NATO meets the Middle East. It is a critically important country for the alliance but surprisingly the summit’s final communiqué devoted little attention to it. The attempted coup after the summit did serious damage to NATO, unlike the imagined Russian threat. The coup put NATO on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, Turkey is too important to seriously discuss kicking it out of NATO. Unlike many other members, Turkey is a real supplier of security rather than merely a consumer. Turkey has one of the largest and best-trained armies in Europe and the Middle East and a vital geographical location. It is important for Brussels both for deterring Russia and countering threats from the Middle East. That said, by ignoring the coup and the response measures, NATO is seriously undermining the consistency of its ideology. It is no longer obvious that the alliance is a community of democracies in which rule of law and human rights reign supreme. Obviously, the societies of NATO countries are bound to notice this inconsistency.

Quantifying the gap between society’s expectations and the elite’s actions is a task for sociological studies. For the time being, we can only speak about such a gap as a hypothesis. However, if it proves right, NATO will have to overhaul itself eventually. The European security system requires a flexible institution designed to collectively counter threats of a new type – internal conflicts, acts of terror and, most important, the spread of radical Islamic doctrines (in cyber space as well).

Russia should be an inalienable part of this security system and one of the architects of the new institutions of Europe’s collective defense. We have to admit that Russia’s perception of threats mirrors NATO’s. We are also preparing for yesterday’s war, even though we are also a target for terrorists of all stripes. The immediate task for both sides is to avoid senseless escalation. Otherwise, dialogue between elites and society may collapse completely, with imminent domestic repercussions.

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.