




The Future of NATO: Trade-Offs and Possible Scenarios

Igor Istomin, Irina Bolgova

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Summary

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization positions itself as the most successful military alliance in history and the most powerful political coalition of today. Nevertheless, the relations among its members have never been cloudless and its durability has been achieved through repeated revisions of organizational mandate. NATO's capacity to adapt is currently being put to the test once again, probably the most serious one since the reassessment of Alliance's mission after the end of the Cold War.

The objective of this report is to review various scenarios of the NATO development over the next decade. Considering the large number of parameters on which the probability of these scenarios depends, this assessment is aimed not so much at identifying the dominant trend in NATO evolution as at marking the key trade-offs, contradictions, and probable directions of transformations that define the limits of what is possible. The analysis produced the following main conclusions.

- Composition of American presence in Europe remains the principal driving force determining Alliance cohesion and activities. In this context, heated debates within Transatlantic community, which take place since the accession of Donald Trump to presidency in the United States reflect a new stage in the bargaining over the terms of cooperation and not of an approaching rupture.
- While some changes are inevitable, the established model of relations within NATO is likely to be preserved. It assumes exploitation of the American guarantees by European partners in exchange for political loyalty as well as limited military support. The latter is restricted geographically mainly to the areas adjacent to Europe, including the Middle East and North Africa. Attempts of the United States to transform NATO in a global security organization are impeded by the fact that other Alliance members are not prepared to share the burden with Washington.

- The value-related consensus based on liberal ideology remained the normative foundation of the Alliance throughout its history and played a useful role to mitigate latent disputes between its members. Yet, concerns regarding common values were often sidestepped in the face of strategic considerations. Recent apocalyptic expectations concerning disintegration of normative consensus seem exaggerated. Nonetheless, the Alliance is quite capable of remaining an operational organization even if the adherence to liberalism in its member states is weakened, especially if the United States preserves its active role.
- A considerable degree of uncertainty persists in assessing priorities in threat perception of NATO members. While some of its members focus more on challenges arising from rivalry between major powers, others fear primarily transnational spillovers of internal instability originating from failed and fragile states. Against this background, deterring Russia is likely to remain on the Alliance agenda for the foreseeable future. It is not, however, the unquestionable priority for a significant proportion of members. Therefore, while it will be hard to re-establish cooperation between Russia and NATO, Moscow could strive to reduce confrontation through lowering the profile of remaining tensions rather than through genuine rapprochement.
- The return of the elements of military balancing between Russia and NATO does not necessarily aggravate Moscow's strategic position significantly or create major armed threat. It remains secondary to other areas of rivalry between Russia and the West. Consolidated pressure by the United States and its allies on Moscow is primarily defined by attempts to wear out the political will by raising the socio-economic cost for Russia of retaining its current foreign policy. NATO's role in Western attempts to deter Russia remains primarily auxiliary, symbolic and distractive, rather than substantive and central.

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization positions itself as the most successful military alliance in history and the most powerful security actor in the current world. Nevertheless, relations among its members have never been cloudless and its durability has been achieved by repeated revisions of organizational mandate. NATO's capacity to adapt is currently being put to test once again, probably the most serious one since the reassessment of Alliance's mission after the end of the Cold War. Both external and internal conditions defining the state of Transatlantic community that remained relatively stable since the early 1990s are undergoing dramatic changes. On the one hand, fundamental shifts occur in the global system as a result of the rise of non-Western powers. On the other hand, the Transatlantic community itself is becoming increasingly heterogeneous.

These trends are supplemented by the shift of interstate rivalry to ever new areas (for example, cyberspace) coupled with the simultaneous introduction of innovative weapon systems (including automated combat systems, missile defence systems, hypersonic boost-glide weapons), which undermines traditional approaches to military balance. In parallel, a profound interconnection of the modern world makes sporadic spillovers of instability from territories with weak statehood to developed societies across national borders both more likely and more destructive.

As a result, NATO finds itself at a crossroads due to multiple and heterogeneous expectations concerning the direction of further transformation of the Alliance, revision of its mission and organizational structures. This transition is reflected in the recent adoption of a concept of 360-degree approach to security in the Alliance rhetoric. It underscores the need for analysis of its current state and prospects of institutional evolution. The aim of this report is to identify various variables and relevant scenarios of NATO evolution in the decade to come. Given the large number of parameters that affect probability of these scenarios, such assessment seeks not so much to determine the dominant trend in the Alliance's transformation as to classify the key trade-offs, contradictions, and likely directions within the limits of possible.

While preparing the current report the authors relied on the results of the roundtable discussion conducted by the Valdai Discussion Club in March 2018.

In building predictions of the Alliance's further evolution, they applied a method of scenario generation. Assessment of the likelihood of different scenarios is based on the results of a survey of experts (51 experts interviewed, see Supplements 1–3). At the same time, conclusions presented below reflect exclusively the position of the authors of the report who thus assume full responsibility for any inaccuracies of assessments together with mistaken forecasts.

I. NATO Institutional Mandate and Limits of Its Adaptability

In 1952, Nobel Prize Laureate Jan Tinbergen formulated the principle of successful macroeconomic policy whereby the number of goals set should equal the number of instruments for achieving them.¹ In other words, a separate political mechanism is needed to solve each task, while relying on mechanisms serving several functions at once leads either to suboptimum results with respect to all of them or to prioritization of one policy goal at the expense of others. The Tinbergen Rule is essentially a scholarly expression of the Russian proverb about chasing after several hares at the same time (English equivalent: Grasp all, lose all).

This obvious truism is at odds with the logic of the institutional survival of organizations described by the 'garbage can' model formulated by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen.² In accordance with the latter, the viability of an organization depends on its ability to create ever-new tasks that it can help solve and hence always be ready to diversify its activities. As scholars aptly put it, political institutions are solutions looking for problems to justify their own existence.

The preservation of NATO over a period of close to 70 years now, despite striking transformations in the strategic context, was assured by

¹ Tinbergen, J, 1952, 'On the Theory of Economic Policy', North-Holland Pub. Co.

² Cohen, MD, March, JG & Olsen, JP, 1972, 'A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice', *Administrative science quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 1-25.

its ability to justify its utility in carrying out a multitude of undertakings.³ At the same time, it exhibited institutional flexibility by focusing, at each specific point in time, on a limited range of priority areas. The significance of NATO as an instrument for achieving objectives set by its member states has evolved considerably, while pluralism of functions went hand in hand with the reduction of multi-tasking. Such diversity makes it difficult to fit the Alliance into any established classifications of international institutions. In effect, it carries features of three different types of organizations called upon to perform different functional roles. Below the diversity of the tasks facing the Alliance will be described, and the limits of its institutional adaptability will be determined.

1.1. Collective Defence and Deterrence as Traditional Missions

NATO is above all a military political alliance that ensures collective defence of all its members and deters external opponents. This role is enshrined in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, signed in 1949: ‘an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.’⁴

From its inception, NATO was an institution for collective containment of the Soviet Union in Europe. The significance of that function was downgraded after the end of the Cold War, although for a certain period of time, in the early 1990s, the preservation of the bloc was still considered to be a guarantee against the probability of the communist comeback in Moscow.⁵ In practical terms the North Atlantic Alliance stopped regarding Russia as a real adversary not only because cooperation was established with president Boris Yeltsin and his team but also due to the deterioration of Russia’s military potential together with the socio-economic problems it was facing.

³ NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay outlined the three main purposes for the Alliance: to ‘keep the Soviet Union out [of Europe], the Americans in, and the Germans down.’

⁴ ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’, 1949, Washington DC, April 4. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

⁵ On NATO’s evolution in the 1990s and its relations with Russia in this period see Asmus, RD, 2012, ‘Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era’, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

Interest in the use of NATO as an instrument of political balancing was revived in 2014, when relations between Russia and the West deteriorated over the conflict in Ukraine. Notably, the NATO 2016 Warsaw Summit stated that ‘deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance’s mission and purpose’.⁶ Such a turnaround was not accidental. Owing to its geographical position as well as the institutional features, NATO can perform major deterrence functions only with regard to one external power – Russia . The immediate environment of the Euro-Atlantic community simply does not have any other countries that could rival it in the military sphere.

Meanwhile, even in spite of the development of communications, geographical proximity remains a significant parameter in terms of ensuring national defence. Therefore, the Alliance cannot be expected to perform similar deterring role in relations with China or any other remote power.

The real value of military and political commitments under NATO has repeatedly been called into question, albeit never truly tested in practice. Henceforth, in the 2010s, amid growing concerns regarding potential confrontation with Russia, the readiness of the bloc to defend its Baltic members, should such contingency emerge, became a subject not only of expert discussions but of public ones as well.⁷ Absence of imminence in matters of collective security was reflected in rather reluctant NATO’s reaction to Turkey’s request in November 2015, when the latter claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces had violated its airspace.⁸

At the same time, a vast infrastructure has been created within the Alliance to ensure mutual guarantees. For the purpose of deterrence and collective defence, since the 1950s integrated military planning system as well as extensive training and standardization programs were developed, enabling high interoperability of the allies both on strategic and tactical level.


NATO can perform major deterrence functions only with regard to one external power – Russia

⁶ ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué’, 2016, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July, NATO. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

⁷ Simmons, K, Stokes, B & Poushter, J, 2015, ‘NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid’, Pew Research Center, June 10. Available from: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/>; Coyle, JJ, 2018, ‘Defending the Baltics is a conundrum’, The Hill, April 15. Available from: <http://thehill.com/opinion/international/382964-defending-the-baltics-is-a-conundrum>

⁸ Williams, H & Martin, D, 2015, ‘NATO Urges Calm after Turkey Shoots Down Russian Plane’, CBS News, January 24. Available from: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nato-urges-calm-after-turkey-shoots-down-russian-plane/>

THE DYNAMICS OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE, 1992–2018



Number of US military personnel in European member states, 2018

Country	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2018
Belgium	1900	800	1400	1367	1200	900
Bulgaria						300
Germany	123400	57740	73500	58894	50500	37450
Greece	850	420	310	352	380	400
Hungary						100
Iceland	3100	2480	1658			
Italy	12900	10580	11965	10216	7800	12050
Netherlands	2400	490	800	562	400	410
Norway		60	73	80		330
Poland						2950
Portugal	2610	1975	1020	865	700	200
Romania						1000
Spain	3900	2440	2030	1308	1480	3200
Turkey	3800	2430	1720	1650	1500	2700
UK	16950	10690	12317	10152	9300	8300

Only countries with more than 50 people of US personnel on their territory are presented.⁹

Source: IISS Military Balance.

⁹ The assessment of the number of US personnel is approximate, it does not include the number of personnel of the AFRICOM headquarters located in Germany, as well as numbers of the sea-based forces (the Mediterranean in particular). Mostly the number of personnel presented in the Table is that of the US European or the Atlantic (later, the Northern) Command.

While other members to the Alliance demonstrate ever rising levels of military integration, the key component of NATO's deterrence remains American military presence in the European region, including the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons. Since 2016, NATO's guarantees to Central and East European countries have been bolstered by the deployment on a rotation basis of four multinational battalion-size battlegroups of other bloc members, expansions of the network of military commands and storage facilities, build-up of troops enabling rapid reinforcement in case of emergence,¹⁰ and the deployment of an American Armoured Brigade Combat Team in Poland.

1.2. Security Community and Liberal Values

NATO positions itself not only as a traditional interstate alliance but also as a security community, which implies not only renunciation of the use of force between its members but the removal even of a threat of power politics from their relations.¹¹ The relevance of the organization's adherence to this role is defined by the rich history of conflicts between today's allies and by serious disparities of their material potentials.

For example, both during the Cold War and after its end, NATO was seen as a guarantor against the resurgence of German revisionism and the resumption of armed rivalry in Western Europe. The strength and recurrent nature of the fears were reflected in intense British and French reluctance towards reunification of Germany in 1990.¹² Major contradictions persist between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and delimitation of jurisdictions in the Aegean Sea.¹³ Discrepancies

¹⁰ 'Boosting NATO's Presence in the East and Southeast', 2018, NATO, March 2. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_136388.htm?

¹¹ On the logic of functioning of security communities see 'Security Communities', 1998, ed. by Adler, E & Barnett, M, Cambridge; N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.

¹² On the fears over returning to the traditional rivalry in Europe as a reason of NATO's preservation in the 1990s see Mearsheimer, JJ, 1990, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International security*, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 5-56; Duffield, JS, 1994, 'NATO's Functions after the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 109, no. 5, p. 763-787.

¹³ The latest collision between the coast guards of the two countries took place in 2018. Georgiopoulos, G & Maltezou, R, 2018, 'Greece Says Won't Tolerate Border Challenges after Turkish Collision', *Reuters*, February 15. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-turkey-tsipras/greece-says-wont-tolerate-border-challenges-after-turkish-collision-idUSKCN1FZ18B>

between political and ethnic borders in Central and Eastern Europe result in a tangle of contradictions between Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.¹⁴ Overall, the potential causes for conflicts remain numerous, but they remain tamed behind the veil of Transatlantic solidarity.

The security community functionally requires its participants to share certain values that dampen contradictions and steer their disputes into political and legal space rather than military competition. The normative principles of NATO were enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty at the dawn of the organization. Its preamble reads that the Parties 'are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.'¹⁵ Moreover, Article 2 states the commitment 'to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions.'¹⁶

A number of countries associated with the Western bloc in the context of bipolar confrontation were denied admission because they did not live up to the Alliance's values. For instance, Spain remained outside NATO until the collapse of the Franco's regime in spite of the treaty on military cooperation with the United States.¹⁷ Nevertheless, throughout the Cold War strategic considerations often gained the upper hand over ideological principles. A vivid example of this was Portugal, which emerged as one of the founders of NATO while maintaining the dictatorial regime of Antonio Salazar. Turkey, whose domestic politics was dominated by the army, joined NATO in 1952. Greece remained a member during the Regime of Colonels in 1967–1974.

The importance of ideological solidarity for NATO, if anything, increased in the 1990s up until the 2000s, even as the external enemy disappeared and pro-Western regimes were established in the Central and East European countries. The inclusion of these states in the Euro-Atlantic institutions was

¹⁴ 'Flag Wars', 2013, *The Economist*, February 21. Available from: <https://www.economist.com/eastern-approaches/2013/02/21/flag-wars>

¹⁵ 'The North Atlantic Treaty', 1949, Washington DC, April 4. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Edwards, J, 1992, 'Spain, Drumbeat and NATO: Incorporating Franco's Spain in Western Defence', in 'Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62', London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 159–172.

claimed to be an instrument for consolidating their liberal orientation.¹⁸ Another task was to prevent the risks arising from the weakness of their political institutions and their socio-economic problems (which could lead to the degradation of statehood or, on the contrary, the establishment of aggressive nationalist regimes).

The importance of ideological solidarity for NATO, if anything, increased in the 1990s up until the 2000s, even as the external enemy disappeared

The number of members of the security community almost doubled through the successive waves of expansion in 1999, 2004 and 2009, and the admission of Montenegro in 2017. NATO also sought to project its normative influence via such formats as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council since 1997), various types of partnerships and initiatives in enhanced cooperation, and Membership Action Plans. These envisaged various forms of assistance by Western countries in exchange for acceptance of the dominant liberal consensus.

1.3. Instrument for Projecting Power and Legitimization of Interference

Since the 1990s, NATO, in addition to its former tasks, has been claiming the status first of a regional and then – global security organization. These ambitions implied the performance of two interconnected functions: projecting power beyond allies' borders (out of area) and political legitimization of these military operations. Such tasks were not set for the Alliance during the Cold War, but they formed the main substance of its activities in the 2000s. Moreover, practical actions preceded their justification in conceptual documents.

NATO first carried out expeditionary operations during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. The bombing of Serbian positions played a significant role in ending the conflict on the terms suggested by the United States.¹⁹ This experience convinced not only Washington but also its allies that the military potential of the North Atlantic Alliance makes it a more effective instrument

¹⁸ Waterman, H, Zagorcheva, D & Reiter, D, 2002, 'Correspondence: NATO and Democracy', *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 3, p. 221–235.

¹⁹ See Daalder, IH, 2014, 'Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy', Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

NATO'S MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

Present operations and missions

1 Kosovo

Kosovo Force, KFOR (1999)
4,500 troops
(member-states and partners)

2 Somalia


Strategic airlift
for African Union's Mission
in Somalia, AMISOM (2007)

3 Afghanistan

Resolute Support
Mission (2015)
15,600 troops
(member-states and partners)

4 The Mediterranean Sea

Sea Guardian (2016)



Past Operations since 1991

1 Turkey

Anchor Guard
(10 August 1990 –
9 March 1991)
Southern Guard
(2 January –
9 March 1991)
Ace Guard
(3 January –
8 March 1991)

2 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Joint Endeavour
(20 December 1995 –
20 December 1996)
Deliberate Force
(30 August –
14 September 1995)

3 Serbia

Allied Force
(24 March –
10 June 1999)

4 USA

Eagle Assist
(9 October 2001 –
15 May 2002)

5 Macedonia

Essential Harvest
(27 August –
16 September 2001)
Amber Fox
(27 September 2001 –
16 December 2002)
Allied Harmony
(16 December 2002 –
31 March 2003)

6 The Mediterranean Sea

Active Endeavour
(26 October 2001 –
1 November 2016)

7 Afghanistan

NATO Command
of ISAF
(11 August 2003 –
31 December 2014)

8 Iraq

NATO Training
Mission
(2004 –
31 December 2011)

9 Libya

United Protector
(31 March 2011 –
31 October 2011)

10 Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Red Sea

Allied Provider (24 October – 12 December 2008)
Allied Protector (24 March – 17 August 2009)
Ocean Shield (17 August 2009 – 15 December 2016)

for crisis management than other international institutions (such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE). This paved the way for further intensification of NATO activities outside its traditional zone of responsibility.²⁰

During the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the Alliance played a more ambitious role not only as an instrument for implementing an internationally recognized mandate, but as an institution that decides matters of armed interference bypassing existing legal norms. NATO engaged in bombing Yugoslavia despite the lack of authorization from UN Security Council.²¹ The new functions of NATO were enshrined in organizational doctrine by 1999 with the adoption the new Strategic Concept. It envisaged 'the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations'.²² In effect, NATO reserved the right to carry out any types of expeditionary missions. Subsequently Alliance's orientation towards projecting power on a global scale was reaffirmed in the 2010 Strategic Concept.²³

However, despite hailing Yugoslavian case as a major success, NATO has not openly and directly challenged the UN Security Council authority since then. Moreover, in 2003 several allies blocked the use of the Alliance infrastructure to legitimize the American invasion in Iraq. Even in spite of the increased attention to legal justification of their missions, during the Libya conflict in 2011, NATO members took liberties with interpretation of Resolution 1973 on protecting civilians and creating no-fly zones. Instead of these limited measures, they, effectively, promoted a regime change in Libya.²⁴

²⁰ *Discussions on the future of NATO in the 1990s were taking place under the slogan 'out of area or out of business'. See Tuohy, W, 1993, 'NATO After the Cold War: It's 'Out of Area or Out of Business'', LA Times, August 13. Available from: http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-13/news/mn-23409_1_cold-war*

²¹ *Roberts, A, 1999, 'NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo', Survival, vol. 41, no. 3, p. 102-123.*

²² *'The Alliance's Strategic Concept', 1999, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., April 27. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en*

²³ *'Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', 2010, Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon', NATO, November 10. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=en*

²⁴ *'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973', 2011, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March, S/RES/1973 (2011). Available from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1973\(2011\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1973(2011)). On NATO's operation in Libya see Kuperman, AJ, 2013, 'A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign', *International Security*, vol. 38, no. 1, p. 105-136.*

However, NATO's most ambitious out of area operation involved its leading role in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) between 2003 and 2014. The mission was carried out under the UN Security Council mandate, thus in this case NATO did not seek to supplant its authority. However, it avoided presenting an official report on the progress and results of the operation and in fact acted without any international political control. The Afghanistan mission was the largest (involving more than 130,000 troops at its peak) and the longest (it lasted almost eleven and a half years) in NATO's history. It was also the most distant allied combat operation ever. In 2015 it was replaced by a much more limited Resolute Support Mission dealing mostly with training and not with kinetic activities, but essentially the Alliance remains involved in the same conflict just under another label.²⁵

The scaling down of military presence in Afghanistan in 2014, which coincided with worsening of Russian-Western relations, reflected NATO's diminishing ambitions as a global security provider. The United States had faced problems in mobilizing resources of allies for long-term expeditionary operations for a number of years. Its partners questioned the rationale of such actions together with their usefulness for the Western community.

Against the background of criticism of the American strategy by several European states in the 2000s, there emerged a sense that they were not interested in using armed force to achieve foreign policy goals. The strategic culture of these countries was claimed to be leaning more towards the use of diplomatic instruments and economic stimuli.²⁶ The practice of the 2010s (including the leading role of France and the UK in the Libyan campaign) overturns these propositions.

The difference between the United States and its allies is one of the scale of ambitions and accordingly the geography of the use of armed force, not in restrictions on the use of any specific instruments. The European states,

²⁵ 'NATO and Afghanistan', 2018, NATO, June 27. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm

²⁶ For the most popular presentation of this perception see Kagan, R, 2004, 'Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order', N.Y.: Vintage. Criticism of this perception by European scholars may be found in Börzel, TA & Risse, T, 2009, 'Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union's Approaches to Democracy Promotion in Comparative Perspective', in 'Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law', London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 34-60.

in projecting force, tend to limit their priorities to short and relatively small-scale missions in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and their former colonial possessions in Africa. NATO's infrastructure may be useful but is often an overkill when it comes to solving such tasks.

1.4. Limits of the Alliance's Institutional Flexibility

In spite of its high adaptability and the wide range of competences, NATO as any other organization has certain limits to its functional adaptiveness. Identifying these restrictions becomes as important for assessing the prospects of the Alliance transformation as revealing its potential.

First and foremost, since the creation of NATO American leadership remained its key structural characteristic. Quite illustratively, discussions over possible inclusion of Russia in the Alliance never developed beyond lip service, and were usually restricted by the assertions that it is too large and different to be incorporated. Reliance on the preponderance of the United States at every stage in the evolution of NATO means that it cannot acquire the capacity to serve as a major platform for coordination between various centres of power. From that point of view, the Alliance cannot claim to be able to accomplish tasks that are performed with varying degrees of success by the UN Security Council, G20, the OSCE, and BRICS. Ambitious propositions from the 1990s to transform NATO into a global security provider that would bring Russia, China, and other rising centres of power into its fold contradicted institutional identity of the organization.

Another limitation is that NATO's functions are linked with the issues of 'hard' security. The Alliance changed profile of its activities dramatically after the end of the Cold War. One such change was the prioritization of counterterrorist activities.²⁷ At the same time, combating terrorism in the case of the Alliance largely was performed in traditional forms of sharing intelligence information and joint military operations. Tackling

²⁷ Nelson, R, 2004, 'Refining NATO's Role in Combating Terrorism, NATO Review. Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/Interpreting-Istanbul/Refining-NATO-role-terrorism/EN/index.htm>

the social and ideological causes of radicalization as well as financial networks used by terrorist organizations did not quite correspond to the Alliance's established spectrum of activities. Moreover, despite intense securitization in the 1990s and 2000s of the challenges of socio-economic development and environmental protection (incorporated into the concept of 'human security'),²⁸ energy supplies, information and communication technologies, most of these new types of threats remained marginal for the NATO operations.

The only exception is represented by cybersecurity. On this instance active discussions were translated into institutionalized cooperation.²⁹ Yet, even in this field in the second half of the 2010s the Allies remained in the early stages of coordination (most of the progress achieved consisted in agreed terminology and joint threat assessment). Besides, starting from the late 2000s, cyberspace has been actively militarized contributing to the emergence of another dimension of 'hard' security.

In the longer term one cannot rule out broadening of the spectrum of NATO activities, due to securitization of new spheres of relations among states. Nevertheless, there is little chance in the foreseeable future that these matters will be detached from the political and military nucleus of the Alliance agenda. This conclusion received support from experts survey conducted for this report. The respondents were asked to range the importance of various tasks for the Alliance during the next decade on a scale from 0 to 3 (where 3 corresponds to tasks of existential significance and 0 – to a total irrelevance of something on the agenda of the Alliance).

²⁸ On shifting emphasis in the perception of challenges to security in this period see Paris, R, 2001, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', *International security*, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 87-102.

²⁹ In particular, in 2008, in Tallinn, a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was opened. The main interim result of its work was harmonization of terminology and systematization of data on international regulations in the sphere of cyber security. (See 'Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations', 2017, ed. by Schmitt, MN, Cambridge University Press).

Comparison of relevance of various tasks in the NATO institutional identity and identity in the next decade


Nº	Task	Relevance
1	Military and political containment/deterrence of Russia	2.63
2	Cybersecurity	2.63
3	Counterterrorism	2.21
4	Countering foreign propaganda and information warfare	2.15
5	Crisis response and conflict management	2.06
6	Promotion of liberal values	1.48
7	Energy security	1.42
8	Prevention of confrontation between the NATO members	1.38
9	Military and/or political containment/deterrence of a third country (except Russia)	1.31
10	Addressing natural disasters and emergency response	1.27
11	Accommodation of rising powers (through providing negotiating platform)	1.08
12	Coordination of international development assistance	0.71
13	Dealing with environmental challenges and climate change	0.66
14	Promoting economic cooperation	0.48

Respondents singled out the tasks that correspond to the traditional model of the Alliance as a political and military organization. They gave priority to deterring Russia as well as cybersecurity, which is also increasingly associated with interstate competition. Quite indicatively experts did not name any other countries that could act as NATO's adversaries except Russia. Apart from the abovementioned threats, foreign propaganda, countering which also made it to the top five priorities, could emanate from non-state actors, but

also from unfriendly states. At the same time, the tasks involving expeditionary operations (combating terrorism, settlement of local crises and post-conflict rehabilitation) were considered to be relatively less important than those associated with deterrence. The message these results convey is that NATO's ambitions to act as 'a global police force', albeit still present, are not expected to dominate in the Alliance's activities.

It is worth noting also the gap between the five most significant functions identified by experts and all the other mentioned in the questionnaire. The issues related to the preservation of the security community (preventing escalation of contradictions between members and spreading of values) received relatively low rates. Even less value was attached to the tasks that do not belong to the already established core mandate of the Alliance. Expert expectations show that the probability to diversify NATO activities through greater emphasis on economic or human security are low.

TYPES OF FUNCTIONS FOR NATO



Henceforth, its historical experience, structural features and institutional capabilities allow NATO to combine characteristics of three types of international institutions and to perform a number of diverse tasks. The recent years have not produced too many new grounds for principal institutional innovations. As a result, the Alliance transformation in the foreseeable future will be most likely focused on pursuing of already tried alternative goals from the set of tasks described above. The choice of priorities from amongst accessible functions would depend not only on the evolution of the external environment but on changes within the Transatlantic community itself, which leads to the next part of the report.

II. The Main Challenges in the Evolution of the Transatlantic Community

Although it has a developed bureaucratic structure, NATO remains first and foremost an instrument of its member states to achieve their preferred political outcomes. Therefore, the international political significance of the Alliance and the nature of its activities are derivatives of broader processes in the Transatlantic community. For assessing the future of NATO, identifying these trends could be even more consequential than analysis of the organization's institutional record.

Success of international associations primarily depends on the level of commitment of members to their obligations with regard to one another. International institutions often suffer from 'free riders' who seek to gain benefits from cooperation while shying away from the costs involved. This is not a new problem for NATO, but previously it was solved through bargaining between the United States and other Alliance members.

Moreover, as has been noted already, Transatlantic solidarity both during and after the Cold War was bolstered by the liberal normative consensus among Western countries. Doubts that this ideological pillar of NATO will survive

are among the drivers of current concerns regards the state of Transatlantic relations.

Finally, the success of the Alliance relies on the ability of its member states to agree on the list and relative significance of threats they face. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union this issue was less of a problem as the common adversary was well known. Under present-day conditions, differences in prioritization of threats become more pronounced.

In the sections that follow the current state and recent past of the Transatlantic community are discussed in the context of three dimensions identified above: commitment of states, normative dimension of their cooperation as well as levels of cohesion in threat perception. By analysing developments in these areas the authors seek to assess the possible variations in evolution of NATO.

2.1. The Balance of American Leadership and European (Ir)Responsibility

After the common threat to the Western community represented by the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO members faced trade-offs in formulation of their defence and security policies, which led to contradictory responses. Inconsistencies between the level of ambitions and readiness to retain the previous level of investment in a military domain characterized the approaches of both the United States and their European allies.

Washington, which claimed the role of the sole global superpower after the end of the Cold War, was set to preserve its leadership in the Euro-Atlantic community associated with this status. These ambitions ran counter to the desire to transfer greater responsibility for maintaining security in Europe to the local players. The latter was reflected in a gradual but steady scaling down of American military presence in the region and support of the initiatives strengthening NATO's European pillar.³⁰ At the same time, European states as they became less dependent on American security

³⁰ See, for example, Bailes, AJK, 1999, 'NATO's European Pillar: The European Security and Defense Identity', *Defense Analysis*, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 305–322.

safeguards, started to claim greater independence in international affairs.³¹ However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact diminished their willingness to incur military spending.³²

Military spending dynamics of NATO member states, 1995–2017

		1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
European NATO members	Million USD, current prices	92218	186189	184352	164349	250064	274592	235121	249741
	% GDP	3.1	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.63	1.42	1.46
The US	Million USD, current prices	258165	306170	278856	301697	503353	720423	641253	685957
	% GDP	6	4.6	3.3	3.4	4	4.81	3.56	3.57

Numerous attempts to strengthen military potential of the allies both under Washington's control and within autonomous European institutions, failed to reverse the general trend. The armed forces of the European members in the Alliance were no longer committed to waging an all-out war against a hostile bloc, nor did they acquire a capability to conduct expeditionary campaigns away from their borders. Multiple operations of 1990s and 2000s invariably demonstrated that European states were

³¹ *The willingness to accomplish that manifested in the initiating of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, as well as in the eagerness to raise the status of the Union to be accepted as a global actor. (See Bretherton, C & Vogler, J, 2005, 'The European Union as a Global Actor, Routledge).*

³² *According to experts' assessments, the gap in the military spendings between the US and the European allies is smaller than the difference in their military capabilities. (See Youst, DS, 2003, 'The US-European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDP', in 'Defending Europe. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy', ed. by Howorth, J & Keeler, JTS, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 81–106.*

unprepared to project power without American assistance.³³ Assessments of their material and technical conditions along with the level of training of the armed forces of major European states (Germany in particular) since the rise of tensions between Russia and the West revealed serious challenges even in the matters of territorial defence in the contingency of a conventional conflict.³⁴

Increased foreign policy ambitions of European states were not backed up by relevant capabilities. Awareness of that fact led them to advocate preservation of American military presence in Europe as well as concentration of NATO activities close to their borders.³⁵ This agenda ran contrary to the priorities of the United States, which sought to globalize the Alliance considering the shift in the focus of its strategy.³⁶

Not surprisingly, in the first half of the 2000s, Washington cared little about Transatlantic solidarity as opposition to its strategy emerged from partners, whose capabilities were in low regard in the United States. It was not until the mid-2000s that the United States was forced to reluctantly revise its attitude due to the high price of the interventionist policy that entangled it into the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. In spite of costs of coordination with European partners, NATO came to be appreciated as a mechanism for mobilizing additional external resources in support of the American global strategy.

The Alliance members, despite remaining differences over priorities, managed to achieve an equilibrium of commitment. Washington did not press the allies too hard to invest in out-of-area adventures and preserved some

³³ Not to mention the limited logistic, transport and intelligence capabilities of European states, indicative were the interruptions in the ammunition supplies during the Libyan operation. (See DeYoung, K & Jaffe, G, 2011, 'NATO Runs Short on Some Munitions in Libya', *The Washington Post*, April 15. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-libya/2011/04/15/AF307ELD_story.html?utm_term=.36723e52d2cd).

³⁴ 'Ramshackle Military at Odds with Global Aspirations', 2014, *Der Spiegel*, September 30. Available from: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ramshackle-army-at-odds-with-berlin-s-global-aspirations-a-994607.html>

³⁵ In particular, the ongoing decrease of the American involvement was highly negatively met in Germany, even despite the contradictions over the war in Iraq. (See Landler, M, 2004, 'Proposed U.S. Base Closings Send a Shiver Through a German Town', *The New York Times*, August 22. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/22/world/proposed-us-base-closings-send-a-shiver-through-a-german-town.html>; Hudson, A, 2012, 'German Angst as US Troops Bid "Auf Wiedersehen"', *Reuters*, January 27. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-us-military/german-angst-as-u-s-troops-bid-auf-wiedersehen-idUSTRE80Q1A620120127>

³⁶ Clarke, M, 2009, 'The Global NATO Debate', *Politique Étrangère*, no. 5, p. 57–67.

interest in Euro-Atlantic problems. In exchange, the European allies stopped experimenting with strategic autonomy lending political and limited military support to the American initiatives.

After the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict in 2014, a renewed emphasis on political deterrence spurred the expansion of American military infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe.³⁷ This build-up corresponded to the preferences of certain interest groups in the United States (in the first place, the US Army). It also resonates with the institutional inertia of the American foreign policy machine, which is sensitive to the issues of credibility of American guarantees in military domain.

Meanwhile, the current build-up in Europe diverts Washington's resources from the area which increasingly becomes central for its global strategy. While there is a growing conviction in the United States that in the foreseeable future China is the only candidate to become global peer-competitor to American might,³⁸ Russia is not perceived as an equal rival because of its limited demographic potential and a much smaller economy. Accordingly, from strategic perspective Washington would be interested in concentrating more of its instruments in the Asia-Pacific rather than in the Euro-Atlantic region as well as in larger investment of naval and air capabilities rather than in ground troops (due to the differences in the potential theatres of conflict).

Although China's economic growth in recent years has increasingly worried Europe, American regional allies do not cherish comparable tensions with Beijing. They are more committed to deriving benefits from cooperation with the rising economic giant than to deter China's ambitions in a faraway Asia-Pacific.³⁹


Differences over burden sharing within NATO gained momentum with the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. During his

³⁷ '2018 Budget Request for European Reassurance Initiative Grows to \$4.7 Billion', 2017, US Department of Defence, June 1. Available from: <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1199828/2018-budget-request-for-european-reassurance-initiative-grows-to-47-billion/>

³⁸ For reasoning on identifying China as the only potential rival to the US see Brooks, S & Wohlforth, W, 2016, 'America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century', Oxford University Press.

³⁹ On intensification of economic co-dependence of European states and China see Zhdanova, JD & Istomin, IA, 2017, 'Reaktsiia ES na ekonomicheskoe vozvyshenie KNR' [EU Reaction to China's Economic Rise], Vestnik MGIMO-University, no. 5 (56), p. 91–113.

NATO'S PARTNERSHIPS



election campaign the future American leader described Alliance as obsolete, and after he came to power continued to demand from European states to increase their military spending and readjust organization's priorities giving more weight to the fight against radical Jihadism.⁴⁰ The NATO 2017 Summit in Brussels conceded somewhat to the criticism by stepping up intelligence coordination on counterterrorism matters. The Alliance also officially joined the US-led coalition against ISIS⁴¹ (previously all member states joined it in their individual capacities).

From strategic perspective Washington would be interested in concentrating more of its instruments in the Asia-Pacific

Furthermore, European states recommitted themselves to gradually increase defence spending up to 2 per cent of GDP and the share of spending in purchasing armaments and military equipment to 20 per cent. Unlike with similar earlier assurances, now they are required to provide plans on proceeding towards this target by 2024.⁴² In 2017–2018 the Alliance continued to invest in developing of its capabilities by creating the regional Hub for the South in Naples with a focus on threats emanating from Middle East and North Africa as well as by inauguration of Readiness Initiative requiring member state to commit additionally 30 major naval assets, 30 battalions, and 30 air squadrons to be at one month readiness to deploy as part of NATO's possible deterrence and defence activities⁴³.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel after the 2017 Summit commented that 'the times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over.'⁴⁴ Concerns regarding the prospect of diminished

⁴⁰ See for example, Parker, A, 2016, 'Donald Trump Says NATO is 'Obsolete,' UN is 'Political Game'', *The New York Times*, April 2. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/04/02/donald-trump-tells-crowd-hed-be-fine-if-nato-broke-up/>; 'Remarks by President Trump at NATO Unveiling of the Article 5 and Berlin Wall Memorials – Brussels, Belgium', 2017, *The White House*, May 25. Available from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-nato-unveiling-article-5-berlin-wall-memorials-brussels-belgium/>

⁴¹ *The organization is banned in Russia.*

⁴² 'Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of NATO Heads of State and/or Government in Brussels', 2017, May 25. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_144098.htm

⁴³ *The initiative of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) was fixed in the of 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels. // 'Brussels Summit declaration' issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018.* Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm?selectedLocale=en

⁴⁴ 'Merkel: Europe 'can no longer rely on allies' after Trump and Brexit', 2017, *BBC*, May 28. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40078183>

initiatives on European defence integration, responses from experts point to inertia in terms of American and European reciprocal commitment to NATO. In fact, they do not see serious challenges to the existing formula of relations within the Transatlantic community which precludes exploitation of American military guarantees by European partners in exchange for their political loyalty.

2.2. Non-Liberal Populism: A Challenge to the Transatlantic Values?

The election of Donald Trump did not only add urgency to the bargaining over burden-sharing among allies but stimulated a discussion on the prospects of liberal values preserving their ideational hegemony. In the early 1990s, it was proclaimed to be the only legitimate normative foundation within global system to which there were no alternatives. Its victory over other models of political organization was hailed as ‘the end of history’.⁴⁷ The importance of the liberal consensus for NATO’s institutional identity was revealed not only in its enlargement policies (discussed above). It also determined the direction and ideological justification of the Alliance’s expeditionary activities. Protecting human rights and promotion of democratic institutions were proclaimed among the main tasks of NATO’s operations in Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Libya.

In the 2000s, the economic performance and growing political influence of the states that were not recognized as liberal by the Transatlantic community muted the euphoria over the liberal triumph.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the retreat of liberalism was seen as an external trend for the Euro-Atlantic community. It affected those states that did not possess consolidated democratic regimes and therefore faced risks of ‘authoritarian rollback’. The 2010s witnessed rising criticism of religious tolerance, freedom of movement, liberalization of international trade already in the United States and European countries. These grievances were accompanied by assault on traditional political and

⁴⁷ Fukuyama, F, 1989, ‘The End of History?’, *The National Interest*, no. 16, p. 3-18.

⁴⁸ Nathan, AJ, 2003, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 6-17; Gat, A, 2007, ‘The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 4, p. 59-69; Diamond, L, 2008, ‘The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State’, *Foreign Affairs*, p. 36-48.

intellectual elites as well as strengthening of parties and movements from the right side of political spectrum. These changes triggered discussions about the rise of non-liberal populism that represents an alternative to established Western social and political models.⁴⁹ From 2016 to 2018 parties and politicians associated with this populist wave scored spectacular victories in popular referenda and elections, while others, even though they lost, performed much better than in previous political cycles.

The rise of non-liberal movements represents not just a political fad, but has deep social causes. It arose from growing economic inequality and frustration within the middle class of the Western states regarding contracting social opportunities.⁵⁰ This discontent fuels resentment against migrants, religious and ethnic minorities, and successes of rising non-Western economies along with national elites. It threatens the fundamental values that consolidate NATO as an institution of Transatlantic community.

The collapse of the normative consensus creates three main challenges for the coherence of the Alliance. First, proponents of non-liberal populism after acquiring power can view other Western states as a source of threats to national sovereignty. This kind of behaviour is exemplified by Turkey, which accused the United States and other allies of backing anti-government protests and supporting of a military coup on its soil.⁵¹

Second, non-liberal populism often exploits long-simmering historical contradictions to mobilize public support and stay in power. For instance, Hungary under Viktor Orbán, by criticizing the plight of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries, produced concerns among NATO allies.⁵² Such

⁴⁹ Cox, M, 2018, 'Understanding the Global Rise of Populism', LSE, February 12. Available from: <https://medium.com/@lseideas/understanding-the-global-rise-of-populism-27305a1c5355>; Roth, K, 2017, 'The Dangerous Rise of Populism. Global Attacks on Human Rights Values', The Human Rights Watch. Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism>

⁵⁰ Gould, E & Hijzen, A, 2016, 'Growing Apart, Losing Trust? The Impact of Inequality on Social Capital', IMF Working Paper WP/16/176, August. Available from: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16176.pdf>

⁵¹ Arango, T & Yeginsu, C, 2016, 'Turks Can Agree on One Thing: U.S. Was Behind Failed Coup', The New York Times, August 2. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/europe/turkey-coup-erdogan-fethullah-gulen-united-states.html>; Withnal, A, 2016, 'Erdogan Blames 'Foreign Powers' for Coup and Says West Is Supporting Terrorism', The Independent, August 2. Available from: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-coup-latest-news-blames-us-west-terrorism-gulen-a7168271.html>

⁵² Orenstein, MA, Kreko, P & Juhasz, A, 2015, 'The Hungarian Putin?', The Foreign Affairs, February 8. Available from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2015-02-08/hungarian-putin>

policy weakens the unity of the Western states and in extreme form may lead to a resurgence of confrontation among them.

Third, the advocates of the liberal consensus may themselves choose to ostracise those states where their ideological opponents came to power. In this pursuit they could ex-communicate some states from common institutions. For example, the changes in the judiciary system initiated by the Polish government resulted in the European Union sanctions against Warsaw.⁵³ Even more indicative in regards to NATO became the decision of Germany to withdraw its troops from Turkey, as Ankara previously barred German parliamentarians from visiting them.⁵⁴

Thus, preservation of NATO in its current form could depend on whether non-liberal populism in the United States and European countries will continue to rise, or whether its successes in recent years turn out to be short-lived. Apart from that, the evolution of the Alliance will be influenced by the equilibrium of strategic and normative motives in determining its institutional identity. Even if the erosion of normative consensus continues, NATO could remain coherent and operational provided that practical benefits from cooperation outweigh ideological costs of partnering with states expressing contradictory values.

During the above-mentioned survey experts assessed both the likelihood of further rise of populist movements across the West and the role of normative issues in NATO's institutional identity (in both cases on a scale from 0 to 10). Experts remain fairly optimistic about preservation of liberal values as the normative core of Transatlantic community (6.22). Meanwhile, in comparison with other questions this issue produced a wider dispersion of assessments among respondents. This indicates significant differences within the expert community over the relative role of ideological and strategic motives for cooperation of the allies.

Meanwhile, experts do not share the widely expressed anxieties concerning growing populist trends in Western countries. According to their assessment (5.63), while nationalistic and anti-migrant feelings and protectionist

⁵³ 'Rule of Law: European Commission Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in Poland', 2017, European Commission, December 20. Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm

⁵⁴ Smale, A, 2017, 'Germany to Withdraw Forces From Incirlik Base in Turkey', *The New York Times*, June 7. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/europe/germany-turkey-air-base.html>

sentiments play major role in public debates and sometimes even achieve representation in politics, their role in government policies will remain limited.

Overall, respondents were fairly conservative when it came to the answers they gave. Despite major concerns and alarm in liberal circles, many respondents view NATO as an alliance that first and foremost upholds strategic interests of its member states. They also expect the currently dominant ideology to retain strong positions in the coming decade.

2.3. Challenges of Interstate Rivalry and Instability Spillover

The end of the Cold War marked not only transformation of global order but a sweeping revision of the notion of security. It was no longer associated with intensive rivalry among states. Instead, members of the Western community reemphasized risks emanating from transnational spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states.⁵⁵ New sources of threats included degradation of governance structures, ethnic and intercommunal conflicts as well as socioeconomic misery undermining national orders. In the current globalized environment, instability was transferred through such mechanisms as migration flows, diffusion of radical ideologies, terrorist groups, and organized crime. Also, the new paradigm for understanding of security issues highlighted the role of authoritarian regimes in relatively weak countries engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and various kinds of assistance to malign transnational actors. As a result, these rogue states were seen as key pillars in the communities of agents fostering instability.⁵⁶

The risks of spillover effects justified the rise of interventionist doctrines in Western countries, which condoned interference in the affairs of states with inefficient or shady political and social institutions. These sentiments reached their peak after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, when international terrorism was declared the primary enemy of the global

⁵⁵ For more information on the changes in the perception of the security concept in the West after the Cold War see Pouliot, V, 2010, *'International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy'*, Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁶ On the rogue states concept see O'Reilly, KP, 2007, *Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the "Rogue State" Concept by US Foreign Policy Elites*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 3, no. 4, p. 295–315.

community, and countries with weak statehood were seen as potential safe havens for extremist groups.⁵⁷

NATO was engaged quite actively in revision of approaches towards provision of international security. Interventionist doctrines established conceptual foundations of its activity since the mid-1990s. All the NATO expeditionary operations were justified by internal instability in the countries that became targets of military interventions. The record of these missions attested that a new concept of security called for a different combination of instruments than deterrence and defence against major powers. As a result, military doctrines, training exercises and procurement patterns of the Alliance members evolved towards prioritizing of instruments enabling coercion of weak actors remotely and later for conducting counterinsurgency operations.⁵⁸

The shift in NATO's activities towards renewed deterrence of Russia after 2014 marked return to the traditional interpretation of threats as a product of confrontation between states. In the American military planning, this turnaround occurred even earlier with the adoption of the Third Offset Strategy aimed at maintaining American qualitative military superiority over its potential rivals.⁵⁹

However, that change was neither complete nor irreversible. Even as late as between 2014 and 2016, along with building up forces to deter Russia the Alliance addressed a wide range of tasks including support for local security forces in Afghanistan against Taliban. The struggle against ISIS in Syria became a central topic at the 2017 Brussels Summit.⁶⁰

Thus, challenges associated with interstate rivalry and spillover of instability coexist in threat perception of NATO in dynamic balance. The contradictions on these matters between individual members becomes


⁵⁷ 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', 2002, The White House. Available from: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>

⁵⁸ This reorientation reflected in the growth of the popularity in the 1990s of the military revolution concept, and in the 2000s – of the counter-insurgency operations doctrine.

⁵⁹ Bartenev, VI, 2016, B. И. 'SShA v poiskakh novykh tekhnologicheskikh osnov voennogo prevoskhodstva: dilemmy «tret'ei strategii kompensatsii»' [The US Quest for New Technological Foundations of Military Superiority: Dilemmas of the Third Offset Strategy], *Vestnik MGIMO-University*, no. 3 (48), p. 30–42.

⁶⁰ 'Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of NATO Heads of State and/or Government in Brussels', 2017, May 25. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_144098.htm

THE DIVERSITY OF EVOLUTION SCENARIOS FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY



more of a challenge to the Transatlantic unity. This intensifies the bargaining within the Alliance over its strategic priorities, as well as distribution of resources between various types of capabilities and fields of cooperation. Discord among the Alliance members may weaken its potential to work out a concerted strategy as well as to act collectively.

Ambivalence in threat perception was also reflected in the expert survey. Its respondents were asked to assess relative importance for NATO of challenges associated with interstate rivalry and transnational spill-over of internal instability from failed and fragile states. The average grade of 5.76 (on a scale where 10 means prevalence of challenges arising from destabilization within states and 0 prevalence of risks originating from interstate rivalry) as well as the wide spread in individual responses indicate that traditional and new risks play roughly equal role in threat perception.

Analysis of the evolution of the Transatlantic community emphasizes five driving forces that are likely to determine the NATO's transformation in the foreseeable future:

1. The level of American involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters;
2. The level of military capabilities of European states (autonomous from the United States);
3. The role of normative cohesion relative to strategic calculations for the Transatlantic unity;
4. The distribution of influence between liberal mainstream and populist alternative in domestic politics of the Western states;
5. The comparative roles of interstate rivalry and spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states in threat perception of allies.

Developments in these five crucial areas constructs a plurality of strategic contexts in which NATO will find itself. Although the future of the Alliance is marked by high variability, the expert survey provided certain guidance for assessment of the possible probabilities of scenarios. Therefore, the final part of the report will assess the main characteristics of NATO in the most likely circumstances.

III. Scenarios for NATO Transformations

The operational mode of Alliance activities in the forthcoming years will continue to be defined by three key questions:

- Will it remain a consolidated association capable of acting collectively?
- Which activities will define the core of its mission?
- How broad will the geographical area of its activity be?

The analysis of the trends in the evolution of the Transatlantic community and the typology of the tasks NATO has performed in previous decades (both presented above) enables certain tentative projections concerning the future of the Alliance. Considering the large number of variables that influence its transformation, generalized scenarios of its development are hard to achieve. It therefore makes sense to consider the outlook concerning three questions regarding NATO operational mode separately. First, a general assessment will be given of the prospects of the preservation of the Alliance as an active and influential entity. Second, the authors will examine its potential to counter challenges arising from instability in the failed and fragile states and, third, the commitment of NATO to deterrence of Russia will be assessed. The degree of the Alliance's consolidation and areas of collective activity would depend on a combination of several driving forces described in the previous part of the report.

3.1. Will NATO remain a major institution of the Transatlantic community?

Analysis of the previous record of Alliance activities demonstrates that traditionally its survival hinged on the American leadership. During times when Washington's interest in institutionalized venue for coordination with European partners waned, the significance of NATO diminished as well. Apart from that, the unity of Western states was shored up by their continued and shared adherence to liberal values that form the ideological basis of cooperation.

Thus, maximum consolidation of the Alliance and its increased capacity for collective actions call for active engagement of the United States in European issues given a decreased margin of dominance of the liberal ideology in the Transatlantic community. NATO can also maintain high mobilization potential even when the value-related underpinnings of cooperation are weakened if European allies continue to be heavily dependent on American support due to their own limited capabilities. In such cases, NATO's ability to carry out joint operations may at least remain unimpaired and may even grow. The Alliance will continue to be the main institution of the Transatlantic unity that claims the leading role in European security order. Expert survey suggest a relatively high probability of the above-mentioned conditions of consolidation and operability coming together.

Evaluation of possibilities of NATO's institutional consolidation

The state of the Alliance	Conditions for scenarios (with the probability of conditions to be realized, %)	Probability of scenarios, %
Very high level of consolidation and operational capabilities	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); maintenance of the consensus over liberal values (0.27)	32
	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); low national potential of the European allies (0.56); retreat of ideology importance (0.37)	
Relatively high level of consolidation and operational capabilities	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); high national potential of the European allies (0.44); retreat of ideology importance (0,37)	34.1
	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); continuing rise of non-liberal forces (0.35)	
Loss of military-strategic functions with the political significance of the Alliance intact, including: shaping of a European military union	Low level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.34); maintenance of the consensus over liberal values (0.27)	9.2
	Low level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.34); high national potential of the European allies (0.44); maintenance of the consensus over liberal values (0.27)	4.0

Low level of consolidation and operational capabilities, including: resurgence of intra-European rivalry	All the other options in the proportion between the level of US involvement and perceptions of values by member states	24.7
	Low level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.34); high national potential of the European allies (0.44); weakening of the consensus over liberal values (0.35); perception of interstate rivalry as the main source of instability (0.42)	5.6

NATO may remain an effective organization even if only part of the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled. Given an active American engagement even the degradation of the liberal consensus would not necessarily weaken the Alliance (Washington has extensive experience of aligning with non-democratic regimes). The growing potential of the European members will prompt a revision of the terms of cooperation, but this process may play out within the existing organizational framework. Judging by estimations made by experts, the most probable is the second group of scenarios that envisage partial restructuring of interaction within the Transatlantic community and possibly even a slight decline of the institutional capabilities of the Alliance. However, despite these developments, it is likely to remain viable and operationally active.

Even if the American engagement in European affairs diminishes, NATO (or an association with similar membership) may survive as an institution for political coordination that maintains 'democratic peace' within the Western community. In this case, however, the military component of its activities will shrink, and it will have to look for new issues to fill its practical agenda.⁶¹ Nevertheless, given its ideological unity, such association may remain more efficient than the present-day OSCE where interaction is complicated by fundamental tensions among participants.

The degradation of the Alliance's strategic functions, in the event that the European states beef up their military potential, may revive the old utopia of creating a European military alliance. It may be formed either on the basis of the existing NATO staff infrastructure, within the EU or on a new institutional platform. Experts' responses assign low probability to such a prospect.

⁶¹ In this case the issues of information security may take its place, which the experts identified among the priority ones.

Finally, the last group of scenarios envisages a fundamental weakening of NATO's institutional capabilities and its deterioration without any adequate replacement, due to the diminishing American interest towards Europe as well as weakening of the liberal consensus across the West. These scenarios do not necessarily imply a formal dissolution of the Alliance – it might become marginalized or reduced to an organization with no significant political agenda and operational capacity.

A subvariant of this logic is the revival of military balancing between today's allies. A return to the traditional European politics (which led to the two World Wars in the 20th century) may occur if the resurfacing of mutual grievances as well as mobilization of aggressive nationalism accompany the strengthening of the armed forces of the region's countries.

A return to the 'Old Europe' does not appear to be a realistic prospect so far. Indeed, the experts survey demonstrated that marginalization or a breakup of the Western alliance is less likely than preservation of NATO as an effective military organization performing a wide range of political functions. At the same time, considerable uncertainty still remains as to the character of these tasks and the geographical aspects of its activities.

3.2. Will NATO be able to act as a 'global police force'?

The results of the survey presented in this report reveal a high degree of uncertainty in the order of the Alliance's priorities between the need to deter opposing states and to prevent transnational spillover of destabilization from unstable states and conflict-prone regions. It is hard at this point to assess which type of threats will be perceived by member states as more important in the forthcoming decade. At the same time, the prospect that NATO will concentrate on the challenges emanating from failed and fragile states will elevate the question of geographical localization of its activities. As was shown above, while in the 1990s NATO sought to assert itself as the leading regulator in the European security with much of operational activities restricted to Balkans, the 2000s witnessed globalization of its activities.

The bargaining between the Alliance's members over its regional focus may resume and even grow in the foreseeable future given, among other reasons, the possible degradation of the Western liberal consensus. For Washington, which pursues its global strategy, NATO could be of interest for mobilization of allied capabilities without strong geographical referencing. By contrast, the European states would like the Alliance to concentrate on their immediate neighbourhood, above all in the Mediterranean and parts of the Middle East and Africa from which the immediate challenges to their security originate.

In light of these differences, emerge three possible scenarios of positioning NATO as an international security provider:

1. Alliance projecting power on a global scale;
2. Association focused on the Middle East and North Africa;
3. European political organization incapable of projecting power beyond its borders.

In addition to the continued dependence of the European states on American leadership, NATO's geographical anchoring to the neighbouring regions could be softened by the rise of prominence of its normative pillars. Liberal ideology by definition claims to be universal with a messianic objective of fostering of individual rights all over the world. Therefore, the idea that a world that is truly safe for democracies is the one in which there are no non-democracies, still has a large support across the West.⁶²

Proceeding from expert assessments of the likelihood of continued American engagement in European matters, of the chances of the allies gaining military political autonomy and of the potential strength of liberal consensus NATO is unlikely to revert to the ambition of being a 'global policeman' in the near future. Under a more likely scenario, NATO and similar European security institutions, which could develop, will focus on attempts to restore order in the immediate proximity of the Alliance territory. Throughout the 2010s, this approach translated itself into operations in Libya and Syria as well as missions to combat piracy off the Somalian shores and the push to enlist NATO in attempts to restrict illegal migration to Europe.


⁶² See this logic demonstrated, for example, in McFaul, M, 2009, 'Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can', Rowman & Littlefield.

Evaluation of NATO's attempts to act as a regulator in the sphere of international security

The state of Transatlantic institutions	Conditions for scenarios (with the probability of conditions to be realized, %)	Probability of scenarios, %*
Alliance projecting power on a global scale	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); high national potential of the European allies (0.44); maintenance of the consensus over liberal values (0.27);	18.4+13.6
	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); low national potential of the European allies (0.56); maintenance of the consensus over liberal values (0.27) or retreat of ideology importance (0.37);	
Association focused on the Middle East and North Africa, including: A predominantly European association with a regional focus	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); high national potential of the European allies (0.44); fading out of the consensus over liberal values (0.35) or retreat of ideology importance (0.37);	28.1+16.2
	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); low national potential of the European allies (0.56); retreat of ideology importance (0.37);	
	Low level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.34); high national potential of the European allies (0.44) (if with the focus on interstate rivalry, then only in case of the maintenance of the consensus over liberal values)	8.5+1.7
European political organization incapable of projecting power	Low level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.34); low national potential of the European allies (0.56); (if with the focus on interstate rivalry, then only in case of the maintenance of the consensus over liberal values)	10.9+2.2

* In characterising the probability of conditions for scenarios, the first number reflects the multiplication result of the rate of the experts' assessments shown in the second column of the Table by the rate of the possibility that the Alliance members will remain focused predominantly on fighting challenges of the transnational flow of instability. The second number is the multiplication of the rate of the experts' assessments by the rate of the possibility that the Alliance member states are mostly focused on interstates deterrence.

NATO'S ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE EAST



Even in the (unlikely) case of potential build-up of more capable and autonomous European force, security goals of non-American allies will hardly go beyond the perimeter of their immediate neighbourhood. An exception is the private interests of the former colonial powers (France and the UK) in their previous and current dependencies, but in such cases, they often prefer to act themselves. As these specific interests are mostly irrelevant

to other European partners, they are unlikely to trigger more than token expressions of solidarity within the EU and NATO frameworks.

Notably, the significance of operations to project power to the territories with weak statehood may become more important even alongside revival of active competition between powers (in particular, in the context of worsening US relations with China, Russia, or other emerging centres of power). With the leading world players possessing huge nuclear weapons arsenals, strategic rivalry may increasingly take the form of destabilizing spaces adjacent to competitors and to influence cross-border movement of resources, people, and ideas.⁶³

3.3. How will NATO proceed with deterring Russia?

Relations between Russia and the West remained volatile throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Yet, it was not until the 2014 Ukrainian crisis that they developed into a full-scale political tension with elements of military balancing. A parallel increase of military activities of Russia and NATO near their common borders was one of the most notable manifestations of a change in attitudes and the aggravation of the confrontation.⁶⁴

Some part of the Russian expert community responded to that with accusations that deterrence of Moscow remained the central mission of the Alliance throughout the post-Cold War period all along. It is often blamed in creation of a buffer zone, which is aimed to cut Russia from its European partners. These claims reflect a post-factum revision of historical narrative, as throughout the post-Soviet period NATO activities (including its enlargement) were not necessarily representations of inherent hostility towards Moscow on the part of the West, but more often the product of short-sighted policies

⁶³ Kofman, M & Sushentsov, AA, 2016, 'Rano uspokoilis' [It Was Too Early to Calm Down], *Russia in Global Affairs*, no. 4.

⁶⁴ Frear, T, Kulesa, L & Kearns, I, 2014, 'Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014', *European Leadership Network Policy Brief*, November. Available from: <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dangerous-Brinkmanship.pdf>

and neglect of Russia's opinion.⁶⁵ Only by the mid-2010s the attitude drastically changed and deterrence indeed started to play significant role in Alliance calculations.

The results of the survey confirm that expert community expects deterrence of Russia to remain a major task for the Alliance throughout the forthcoming decade. Meanwhile, the intensity of military activity at present is way below then during the Cold War. Moreover, the doctrinal documents even of the countries that are the most vocal about the 'threat from the East' rate the probability of a direct clash very low. The gap between alarming rhetoric and practical restraint prompts the question about the prospects of consensus that emerged by the mid-2010s regarding Russia deterrence as the key mission for NATO.

The Alliance pressure on Russia to increase significantly three conditions should be in place: the United States remains actively engaged in European security matters, the allies increase their military commitment, and interstate rivalry becomes central to threat perception of NATO members. In that case Moscow will find it much harder to ensure its national security: already today the military spending of the Alliance members (even without the United States) is many times more than that of Russia.

At present, this preponderance is to a large extent compensated by ineffective spending of the European allies as well as by the diffusion of American capabilities among multiple regional theatres. Mobilization of the collective potential of the Western countries will force Russia to spend an ever bigger share of its limited resources to guarantee national defence. Such burden could become unsustainable in the long term. At the same time, judging from the expert survey as well as personal assessments of the authors of the report, it is unlikely that all the three conditions will be combined.

⁶⁵ *Even most intransigent Western opponents of NATO enlargement agree it is true. (See Mearsheimer, JJ, 2014, 'Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin', Foreign Affairs, vol. 93).*

Evaluation of the possibility of NATO's focus on deterrence

Type of policies of the Alliance	Conditions for scenarios (with the probability of conditions to be realized, %)	Probability of scenarios, %
Double deterrence	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); high national potential of the European allies (0.44); perception of interstate rivalry as the key threat (0.42)	12.4 (38.8 – if the deterrence of Russia as a major task for the Alliance is axiomatic)
US-led deterrence	High level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.66); low national potential of the European allies (0.56); perception of interstate rivalry as the key threat (0.42)	15.7 (49)
Eurocentric deterrence	Low level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.34); high national potential of the European allies (0.44); maintenance of the consensus over liberal values (0.28); perception of interstate rivalry as the key threat (0.42)	1.7 (5.3)
Deterrence imitation	Low level of US involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security matters (0.34); low national potential of the European allies (0.56); maintenance of the consensus over liberal values (0.28); perception of interstate rivalry as the key threat (0.42)	2.2 (6.9)
Deterrence of Russia ceases to be the key goal of the Alliance	Other combinations of the listed parameters	68

On the whole, it is rather likely but not certain that the current relatively relaxed regime of deterring Russia as the main thrust of NATO's policy in the coming decade (for which only part of the conditions indicated above would be sufficient) will be persist. The preservation of the American presence in Europe increases the chances of that scenario being actualized, but there is no full correlation between these two phenomena.⁶⁶

Considering the current level of tensions between Russia and the West as well as the defence capabilities of the two sides, the military component of deterrence will be in any case strictly secondary. For the most part the current confrontation takes the form of attempts to exhaust the political will of the other side by raising the socio-economic cost of preserving the established policy for it.

Intensification of military activities may contribute to such pressure causing the opponent to increase its defence spending, but it does not necessarily serve as a preparation for a genuine military conflict or even is expected to serve as credible instrument of forceful coercion. It remains to a greater degree an instrument of mutual signalling in the framework of the information warfare that accompanies political confrontation. In that sense existing military balance between Russia and NATO remains relatively acceptable to both sides (in some ways even comfortable for their defence ministries, which can thus advocate more funding by citing the continuation of the tensions).

Conclusion

Ever since the Alliance was formed, its image has been subject to many distortions and contradictions. Some of these myths originate from NATO itself as it claimed to deliver security and stability not only to its members but also globally. In reality though, it is above all an instrument for furthering various and sometimes competing interests of its participants in military and political domains. Their coordination is facilitated by normative consensus concerning

⁶⁶ *Apart from that, it is important to take into consideration the fact that in case of decreasing interest of Washington to the region, there appears a (slightly) likely possibility of exacerbating rivalry between the European allies. (See Table 3.1.).*

the basic values. This consensus does not prevent NATO, for all its rhetoric, from turning a blind eye to the non-liberal practices of individual member states and some external partners should it become wise from a strategic point of view.

The current confrontation takes the form of attempts to exhaust the political will of the other side

The enlargement of the bloc as well as internal processes in the member countries made NATO much more heterogeneous. As a result, the member states find it more difficult than before to agree upon concerted actions and to mobilize available resources. For a long time now, these disputes were obscured by the leading role of the United States that set the agenda for the organization but at the same time was prepared to shoulder the main burden of maintaining the security for its allies. The current debated among the NATO members represent another period of institutional bargaining regarding costs and directions of the Alliance activities.

The analysis that we conducted and expert opinions that we collected warrant that for all the sharp public rhetoric among members to the organization, basic parameters of established model of relations within the Alliance are highly likely to remain in place. In this case NATO will remain the central institution for Transatlantic coordination that also ensures the projection of the power to adjacent regions. Its real military potential will be ensured primarily by the United States while the European allies will continue to play auxiliary roles.

Such a course of development is not the worst scenario for Moscow. The Russian expert community often tends to exaggerate the significance of NATO attributing to it a degree of unity and efficiency it is not really capable of. Although deterring Moscow is likely to remain part of NATO's agenda, the real level of pressure will most probably be limited (substantially below the Cold War level to which the modern situation is often compared). The West relies more on other instruments in its rising tensions with Moscow. Russia may have greater concerns regarding continued out-of-area activities of the Alliance, which are perceived as a source of destabilization and an instrument of imposing American influence in the regions of its own interest.

Supplements

Supplement 1. Methodology of expert survey

The survey was conducted from May to June 2018. Questionnaires were emailed to experts who had published their studies on Euro-Atlantic security (the authors of this report tried to make the results geographically representative). In addition to this, the snowball method was used: the authors asked the experts that had already been interviewed to bring in more of their colleagues. All in all, more than 180 requests were sent out. As a result, 50 completed questionnaires were received.

The survey included experts from NATO member countries (61 per cent) and non-NATO countries (39 per cent). The sample included 28.5 per cent of the respondents with primary specialization on NATO and Euro-Atlantic security. For the rest, this topic remains one among several areas of concentration (such as, general international security matters, strategic analysis, Russia–West relations). The respondents represented various types of organizations: government agencies – 8 per cent, higher education institutions – 45 per cent, analytical centres – 41 per cent, other – 4 per cent.

The authors express gratefulness for participation in the survey, their valuable comments, and consent to appear in the list of respondents to the questionnaire the following experts:

1. **Roy Allison**, Director of the Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford University;
2. **Vladimir Batyuk**, Head of the Center for Political and Military Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences;
3. **Robert Berls**, Senior Advisor for Russia and Eurasia, Nuclear Threat Initiative (USA);
4. **Frederic Charillon**, Director of the École Militaire's Institute of Strategic Research, Ministry of Defence (France);
5. **Alessandro Colombo**, Professor of International Relations at the University of Milan; Head of Transatlantic Relations Programme, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI);
6. **Dmitry Danilov**, Head of Department of European security, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences;

7. **James Dobbins**, Senior Fellow, Distinguished Chair in Diplomacy and Security at the RAND Corporation;
8. **Thanos Dokos**, Director-General of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Greece);
9. **Arnaud Dubien**, Director of the L'Observatoire analytical centre (France);
10. **Muharrem Ekşi**, Vice-head of the Department of International Relations, Kirkareli University (Turkey);
11. **Sabine Fischer**, Head of Research Division 'Eastern Europe and Eurasia', German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP);
12. **Andrew Futter**, Director of Research for Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester (UK);
13. **James Goldgeier**, Professor of international relations at the School of International Service at American University in Washington;
14. **Thomas Gomart**, Director of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI);
15. **Thomas Graham**, Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc. (USA);
16. **Andrey Kortunov**, Director General, Russian International Affairs Council;
17. **Łukasz Kulesa**, Research Director, European Leadership Network (Poland);
18. **Christopher Miller**, Assistant Professor of International History, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (USA);
19. **Neziha Musaoglu**, Vice-rector, Kirkareli University (Turkey);
20. **Tatiana Parkhalina**, Deputy Director of the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION), Russian Academy of Sciences;
21. **Florin Pasatoiu**, Director of the Center on Foreign Policy and Security, University of Craiova (Romania);
22. **Vadim Pistrinchuk**, Vice-president of Moldova's Liberal Democratic Party;
23. **Nicu Popescu**, Director for Wider Europe program, European Council on Foreign Relations;
24. **Ivan Safranchuk**, Associate Professor, MGIMO-University;
25. **Pavel Sharikov**, Director of the Applied Research Center, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences;
26. **Angela Stent**, Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown University (USA);
27. **Paul Stronski**, Senior fellow in Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (USA);
28. **Ivan Timofeev**, Program Director of the Russian International Affairs Council;
29. **Dimitrios Triantaphyllou**, associate professor, Kadir Has University (Turkey);
30. **Philipp Trunov**, Research fellow, Institute for Scientific Information in the Social Sciences (INION), Russian Academy of Sciences;

- 31. Sergey Utkin**, Head of Strategic Assessment Section, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences;
- 32. William Wohlforth**, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College (USA)
- 33. Andrew Wolff**, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Dickinson College (USA);
- 34. Tatiana Yurieva**, Associate Professor, MGIMO-University;
- 35. Andrey Zagorsky**, Director of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences.

We would like to use this opportunity to express our gratefulness to the 16 experts who took part in the survey but preferred to remain anonymous.

Supplement 2. The results of the survey

Nº	Question	Average value	Median value*	Standard *
1.	Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 3* the significance of the following tasks for NATO's institutional identity and activities in the next 10 years: * 3 – vital; 2 – important; 1 – insignificant; 0 – not on the agenda			
	A. Counterterrorism	2.21		
	B. Military and/or political containment of Russia	2.63		
	C. Military and/or political containment of a third country (except Russia)	1.31		
	D. Coordination of international development assistance	0.71		
	E. Cybersecurity	2.63		
	F. Energy security	1.42		
	G. Prevention of confrontation between the NATO members	1.38		
	H. Countering foreign propaganda and information warfare	2.15		
	I. Promotion of liberal values	1.48		
	J. Addressing natural disasters and emergency response	1.27		
	K. Accommodation of rising powers (through providing negotiating platform)	1.08		
	L. Dealing with environmental challenges and climate change	0.66		
	M. Promoting economic cooperation	0.48		
	N. Crisis response and conflict management	2.06		

2.	Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 10 the level of the U.S. engagement in the Euro-Atlantic security in the forthcoming 10 years (10 – constant political and military involvement similar to the Cold War period; 0 – complete political and military withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe)	6.6	7	1.47
3.	Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 10 the potential of European Member-States of NATO to provide security for themselves and to project power in the forthcoming 10 years (10 – full capacity to ensure their own security and to engage in the full range of military operations in priority regions without the U.S. support; 0 – complete inability to provide for their security and to conduct expeditionary operations without the support of United States)	4.4	4	1.61
4.	Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 10 the importance of liberal democratic values in NATO's institutional identity in the next 10 years (10 – need for full compliance with liberal-democratic standards as a condition for acquiring and retaining membership in the Alliance; 0 – absence of any requirements for political institutions and practices of current and potential Member States)	6.22	7	1.92
5.	Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 10 the probability of strengthening or weakening of nationalistic, anti-immigrant and protectionist forces in the political institutions and public discourse of the NATO Member States in the next 10 years (10 – prevalence of anti-liberal populist forces in the governments of most alliance countries; 0 – complete elimination of nationalist, anti-immigrant and protectionist forces from political institutions and public debate)	5.60	6	1.49
6.	Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 10 the relative significance of risks arising from interstate rivalry in comparison with challenges emerging from internal destabilization within states (not necessarily belonging to the Euro-Atlantic) in the threat perception of the NATO Member-States in the forthcoming 10 years (10 – prevalence of challenges arising from destabilization within states; 0 – prevalence of risks originating from interstate rivalry)	5.76	6	2.05
7.	Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 3* the level of engagement of various branches of power and governmental departments of the member states in NATO activities in the next 10 years: * 3 – constant engagement; 2 – regular engagement; 1 – ad hoc on irregular basis engagement; 0 – not engaged (except for single occasions)			
	A. Departments dealing with environmental and social welfare issues	0.63		
	B. Departments dealing with economic issues	1.00		
	C. Foreign policy departments	2.77		
	D. Military forces	2.92		
	E. Parliaments	1.85		
	F. National leadership (chief executives)	2.58		
	G. Law enforcement agencies	1.50		
	H. Intelligence services	2.64		
	I. Judicial authorities	0.79		
	J. Central banks and other financial institutions	0.48		

In addition to the assessments provided above, some of the experts suggested more accurate formulations and other possible answers to the questions (in Questions 1 and 7 the Questionnaire provided for a possibility of additional possible answers). These comments may be found in the following Table.

№	Question	Comment
1.	<p>Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 3* the significance of the following tasks for NATO's institutional identity and activities in the next 10 years: * 3 – vital; 2 – important; 1 – insignificant; 0 – not on the agenda</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - need to add: NATO-EU political & military relations (ENG); - need to add: C: state-originating threats from M. East (Syria, Iran); ad. N: includes capacity-building in third countries (ENG); - need to add: enlargement: 'important' (ENG); - need to add: strategic communications and public diplomacy (RUS); - need to add: ensuring military presence of the West in new theatres (e.g. the Arctic) and spaces (e.g. the outer space) (RUS); - ensuring military technological preponderance (RUS); - continuous adaptation of NATO to the transforming security sphere, i.e. clarifying the hierarchy (not just the list) of threats, and subsequently – the policy on partnership/alliance/rivalry with the third countries (RUS); - migration questions (ENG)
5.	<p>Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 10 the probability of strengthening or weakening of nationalistic, anti-immigrant and protectionist forces in the political institutions and public discourse of the NATO Member States in the next 10 years</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - for there are significant differences in internal politics of the US and Europe, the question should be divided into two: 1. In European states 2. In the US (RUS);

6.	<p>Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 10 the relative significance of risks arising from interstate rivalry in comparison with challenges emerging from internal destabilization within states (not necessarily belonging to the Euro-Atlantic) in the threat perception of the NATO Member-States in the forthcoming 10 years</p>	<p>- the formulation of the question is inconvenient for an expert to give assessment: interstate rivalry and domestic problems are indicators of different incomparable sorts, different for different states, which is why it would be advisable to divide them from each other and identify their rate yourselves according to the survey results. Or, at least, divide the question into two parts – for Europe and for the US (RUS);</p>
7.	<p>Please, assess on the scale from 0 to 3* the level of engagement of various branches of power and governmental departments of the member states in NATO activities in the next 10 years</p>	<p>- depending of the structure of national media, the state-owned outlets of member states may be drawn to cover the Alliance's activities more closely or to develop close cooperation with the Alliance's press service. This is first and foremost important for East European NATO members (RUS);</p> <p>- the column 'military forces' should be divided into two: 1. Military Ministries – military-political management bodies; 2. National general staff – exclusively military bodies (RUS);</p> <p>- research organizations (that participate within the framework of official resolutions of national authorities in the whole spectre of scientific and scholar research, expertise, and technology projects) (RUS);</p> <p>- institutions for Economic Development in Third World Countries;</p> <p>- defense spending, basing infrastructure, exercises, nuclear posture and policy.</p>

Some of the experts, who used the English version of the questionnaire suggested in their answers for Question 1 that the term 'deterrence' would be preferable than 'containment'.

Supplement 3. Methodology of processing expert evaluations

The table below shows the calculations of the main prongs of the scenario tree based on the expert survey in the Part 3. The combination of key indicators served for scenarios of NATO development represented in the Part 3 (points 3.1., 3.2., 3.3.).

The scenario forecasts premised on 'the high degree of US involvement in Euro-Atlantic security matters' are based on summary indicators in clauses I and II of this table, 'the low national potential of the European allies' includes data in points II and IV, 'the high national potential of European allies' is calculated from the totality of data in points I and III.

The normative consensus in the context of the prospects of NATO development is an important variable in analysing the level of the Alliance's consolidation formulating the categories 'maintenance of the consensus over liberal values', 'the rise of non-liberal forces', and a lack of a coherent attitude to shared values as 'retreat of ideology importance' within the Alliance.

Considering the historical focus of NATO's activities, in assessing the prospects of the development of the Alliance's defence potential the threats emanating from interstate competition are seen through the prism of 'the perception of Russia as the key threat'.

Considering the specificities of the questions asked and the complexities of calculating expert assessments in the values of the variables analysed, the calculations presented here should not be seen as indicating the actual probability of certain scenarios coming true. At the same time, even allowing for deviations, they provide grounds for describing the prospects of variability in a comparative perspective, i.e. which of them are more or less likely and how big the gap is between the probabilities of individual scenarios.

I. The United States is engaged, Europe is autonomous	0.29	maintenance of the consensus over liberal values	0.27	Interstate rivalry	0.42	3.4%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	4.5%
		continuing rise of non-liberal forces	0.35	Interstate rivalry	0.42	4.3%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	5.8%
		retreat of ideology importance	0.37	Interstate rivalry	0.42	4.7%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	6.3%
II. The United States is engaged, Europe is dependent on external safeguard	0.37	maintenance of the consensus over liberal values	0.27	Interstate rivalry	0.42	4.3%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	5.8%
		continuing rise of non-liberal forces	0.35	Interstate rivalry	0.42	5.5%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	7.5%
		retreat of ideology importance	0.37	Interstate rivalry	0.42	5.9%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	8.1%

III. US involvement diminishes, Europe is autonomous	0.15	maintenance of the consensus over liberal values	0.27	Interstate rivalry	0.42	1.7%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	2.3%
		continuing rise of non-liberal forces	0.35	Interstate rivalry	0.42	2.2%
	0.19	retreat of ideology importance	0.37	spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	3.0%
				Interstate rivalry	0.42	2.4%
		spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	Interstate rivalry	0.42	3.2%
IV. US involvement diminishes, is dependent on external safeguard	0.19	maintenance of the consensus over liberal values	0.27	Interstate rivalry	0.42	2.2%
				spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	3.0%
		continuing rise of non-liberal forces	0.35	Interstate rivalry	0.42	2.8%
	0.37	retreat of ideology importance	0.37	spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	3.8%
				Interstate rivalry	0.42	3.1%
		spillover of internal instability from failed and fragile states	0.58	Interstate rivalry	0.42	4.1%

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