Conflict-Prone: The Norm for Russian-US relations?
Center for the National Interest (Nixon Center)

Conflict-prone is a characterization that readily comes to mind to describe relations between Russia and the United States. The controversy arises from the two countries’ varying assessments of the results of the Cold War, from their incompatible approaches to what the world order should be after it ended, from their geopolitical rivalry in the post-Soviet republics and in Europe and from America having an excessive anti-Russian lobby with no pro-Russian one.

On April 20, program director of the Valdai Club Dmitry Suslov delivered a lecture on Russian-US relations for teachers, students and graduates of Washington Hamilton College. The lecture was attended by about 40 people, including former US ambassador to Israel and Egypt Edward Walker.

Suslov gave an overall assessment of post-Cold War relations between Russia and the United States and analyzed the main reasons why the parties have failed to build stable non-confrontational relations over that period. “Conflict-prone” routinely describes Russian-US relations. The controversy arises from the two countries’ varying assessments of the results of the Cold War, from their incompatible approaches to what the world order should be after it ended and what place Russia and the United States should occupy in it, from their geopolitical rivalry in the post-Soviet republics and in Europe and also clashes in the Middle East, from the objective differences in their national interests, from the absence of economic interdependence between Russia and the United States and from America having an excessive anti-Russian lobby with no pro-Russian one.

In 2014, relations between Russia and the US moved from the state of “neither friend, nor foe” into a state of systemic confrontation, or a new cold war with rather obvious symptoms, the lecturer pointed out: each of the parties perceives the other’s actions in Ukraine as threats to their security and the world order models they promote; they see each other's respective policies as systematically anti-Russian and systematically anti-American, and believe that the other’s “inherent nature” is the reason why they pursue a hostile and destabilizing policy.

Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential elections gave rise to hopes for overcoming the confrontation and returning the relations to a selective cooperation and rivalry model, Suslov noted. These hopes were associated with realistic preconditions that existed in late 2016–early 2017, including Trump's intention to substantially de-ideologize US foreign policy, to abandon the policy of regime change and reduce the emphasis on the proliferation of democracy, as well as in the new president’s “America First” rhetoric, which many understood as his administration’s intention to narrow the geographical and functional scope of American interests and concentrate on promoting national interests in a narrow egoistic sense. Moscow also noted Trump's consistent statements about wanting to “get along” with Russia and build cooperation, for example, on combating international terrorism.

Of course, many of the aspects of the foreign policy approach of Trump and his team initially aroused concern in Moscow. Suslov mentioned their philosophical commitment to a policy of unilateral actions, their neglect of international law and institutions, their way of approaching international relations from a position of strength and starting dialogue by intimidating their partner. But the overall balance of the positive and negative aspects of the new administration’s foreign policy still inspired hope for an improvement in relations and was in any case more attractive from the Russian point of view than the approach of Hillary Clinton, Trump's rival in the 2016 election, who was rather expected to step up ideological pressure, the policy of regime change, the support for the current authorities in Ukraine and to generally increase the Russian-US confrontation and the danger of a direct military clash between Russia and the United States in Syria.

However, according to Suslov, three months since Trump's inauguration, the situation has changed dramatically, primarily as a result of the campaign that began in the US to harass the new president, to weaken him and delegitimize him with the help of the so-called “Russian trump card.” This stripped the new administration of the chance to change the policy towards Russia toward a more constructive line. In addition, the traditional republican conservative establishment is gaining strength rapidly within the Trump administration, primarily concerning the military, so the US foreign policy in most areas has returned to its usual rut. In other words, the part of the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach Russia would see as positive has shrunk significantly, while the negative component moved to the top.

The final watershed was the US military attack on Syria in early April 2017, immediately after the use of chemical weapons there, something Washington immediately blamed on Damascus. According to Suslov, the US political and diplomatic pressure on Russia on the eve of and during US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Moscow, and their military moves and rhetoric towards North Korea are evidence of the new administration’s intention to deal with international situations and their counterparts from a position of strength and to extract concessions out of them through blackmail.

However, as Suslov noted, this does not mean that Russia and the United States are doomed to continue or even exacerbate confrontation, and no positive changes in their relations are possible. According to him, the situation is extremely dangerous and fraught with further escalation, but it is not a stalemate. The main positive component of the new administration’s foreign policy philosophy – abandonment of the policy of regime change and a lesser degree of ideologizing foreign policy as a whole – is still visibly present. Unlike previous administrations, the current government has never said it sees the nature of Russia’s political regime as a problem. According to Suslov, even Washington's rhetoric about Bashar Assad having to go is not a sign of a US return to the policy of regime change in Syria, but evidence of the Trump administration's desire to achieve a symbolic and high-profile foreign policy victory, which at least can be changed by Russia's rhetoric about the Syrian president. Also, as he pointed out, the Trump administration does not seek to strengthen Ukraine's support and the policy of containing Russia in all the post-Soviet states.

In this connection, Suslov pointed out the need to build limited Russian-American cooperation through “small steps,” where this cooperation is necessary for the sake of the two countries’ important national interests and does not require prior concessions from either Moscow or Washington. He also highlighted the need to restore a normal working dialogue between Russia and the United States and to strengthen confidence and transparency measures so as not to slide into a situation where Russian or US moves against each other are determined by confrontational logic rather than by their real interests.

 

Edward Walker