On Thursday, August 29, the Valdai Club hosted a discussion panel featuring leading experts in the field of arms control, dedicated to the International Day Against Nuclear Tests.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) occupies a unique place among international conventions. Signed and ratified by almost every country in the world, but never entered into force, it is an important measure of trust between states. At the same time, the ratification delay – or direct rejection of the accord – by a number of countries indicates a deep mutual distrust between recognised nuclear powers and states striving to achieve this status.
The treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996. Over the next twenty-three years, it was signed by 184 states, 168 of which ratified it. However, to enter into force it is necessary that eight more countries ratify the treaty. According to Grigory Berdennikov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation (former Deputy Foreign Minister, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and to the International Organisations in Vienna), Russia insisted that the treaty enter into force not after reaching a simple arithmetic majority, but after its ratification by specific states. According to him, Russia did not want to be in a situation where it would commit itself not to conduct nuclear tests absent a comparable commitment from the United States.
Subsequent events revealed that these concerns were quite reasonable. The successive US administrations have repeatedly promised to ratify the treaty, but it was not possible to gain the required number of votes in the Senate. As for the current White House administration, it has no intention of ratifying the CTBT, but Washington is interested in establishing an international monitoring system, for which the United States will continue to pay in accordance with the contribution table. According to Anton Khlopkov, Director of the Centre for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), the ongoing discussions in the United States on lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons and removing its signature from the CTBT, as well as the decision to increase the readiness of the Nevada nuclear test site, create the impression that the United States wants more flexibility in nuclear capacity development. At the same time, the United States is also conducting a media campaign designed to convince the public that Russia has engaged in violations in this area, he added. Russia has consistently pointed to the groundlessness of such statements.
Berdennikov recalled that China has said it would ratify the treaty as soon as the United States does. Russia invited it to ratify the CTBT proactively, indicating that this would not impose additional obligations on Beijing, but would increase pressure on the United States to ratify it. However, the official position of Beijing remains unchanged. India, Pakistan and North Korea (which aspire to obtain nuclear power status) have not signed the agreement.
Despite this, without even entering into force, the CTBT plays an important role in building trust between states, said Vadim Smirnov, Director of the On-Site Inspection Division of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). The aforementioned international monitoring systems allow one to monitor the situation around the world. As the events surrounding the DPRK tests have showed, the system was able to record everything in a timely manner, he stressed.
One may wonder what will be the added value of the treaty after its ratification if it already provides the participating countries with effective monitoring tools. According to Smirnov, the verification regime of the agreement cannot be fully activated without its entry into force. Therefore, the CTBTO is constantly working to ensure that this happens as soon as possible.
