Deputy Director for Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. Member of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Previous positions: International correspondent for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2002-2004); Coordinator of the Russia-U.S. program of the Institute of Foreign and Defense Policy (2003-2004).
Research interests: Regulation and manageability in the international system and in U.S. foreign policy, U.S. global strategy, Russian-U.S. relations; problems of European and Atlantic security, Russia’s foreign policy, relations between Russia and the European Union.
Selected Publications: Co-authored over 150 analytical papers for government agencies concerning the internal development of the European Union and relations between Russia and the European Union; Main contributor of monthly analytical reviews on Russia-EU relations. Co-authored a number of books, including: “Where and How Russia Can Benefit from the Global Economic Crisis”(Moscow, GU-VShE, 2009), “Russia and the World: A New Era” (Moscow, 2008), “Global Politics” (Moscow, 2008),“The World Around Russia: 2017” (Moscow, 2007), “An Asian Polygon”(Moscow, 2007).
American exceptionalism is the chief source of friction in U.S. relations with the likes of Russia and China, as well as other non-Western centers of power, as well as the reason for the profound re-thinking of U.S. foreign policy. Again, it all comes down to exceptionalism. As long as that remains a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy philosophy, relations with global centers of power that do not recognize U.S. leadership or the universality of its values will remain gridlocked.
The objective need for Russia-US cooperation in countering international terrorism is still present and is even growing. The global terrorist threat will increase in the next few years, especially along the Russian borders. The overwhelming majority of experts agree that the civil war will escalate in Afghanistan after the reduction of the international troop contingent in 2014.
The idea that Russia and the United States should work together to combat international terrorism is not new, and has already become a banality. But experience confirms time and time again that this cooperation is a must. The latest striking evidence of this has been provided by acts of terror in Boston and Makhachkala last spring.
In several years from now the US-Russia relations might find themselves in a situation where the positive cooperative agenda will shrink or marginalize, while the negative one will grow both in size and importance, and Russia could again color the US as a major threat to its military and political security.
Criticism by Congress of Russia on human rights issues will increase. This dependence is not very important for it (even the House Democrats almost unanimously supported the bill banning the acquisition of Russian helicopters by the Pentagon, although the White House is resolutely against the ban, which points to objective U.S. interests in such transactions). Congress and the Republicans in particular will invariably turn up the heat as the November elections draw closer.
With all its domestic political liberalism and abundance of foreign policy liberals, the Obama administration is pursuing the most realistic and least ideology-driven foreign policy in U.S. history since the end of the Cold War. It was Washington's refusal to pursue an overly ideological foreign policy that has made the reset policy between the U.S. and Russia possible.
No fundamental changes in the Russian-American dialogue on human rights have occurred since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidential office in Russia. Putin's comeback has not changed the dominant realistic approach to the foreign policy pursued by the Obama administration, which still seeks not to make relations with Russia dependent on its democratization.