Valdai Club

For 25 years after the Cold War, many major players were “free floaters” steering clear of rivalry with the West and alternative coalitions. This trend was disrupted by the crisis in relations between Russia and the West. Time will tell whether this trend will cause further changes in the world order or will prove to be a blip. But Russia has already made a first move, while all others still have time for decision-making. What will this decision-making mean for Russia?

After the Cold War, the political and expert communities shared a firm belief that the system of international relations was in a state of transition. To this day, many books and debates begin with statements to the effect that this transition is not yet over. Moreover, we hear increasingly loud voices saying that the rules of the game have been eroded and reduced to chaos and that international processes are no longer amenable to governance. The same can be heard in Russia as well.

A unique situation has indeed taken shape over the last quarter century, one that is qualitatively different from that of the preceding two centuries (until the late 1980s), when international relations had a rather clear structure based on stable coalitions. These were subject to frequent reshuffling, with each crisis or major conflict testing their durability. But the coalitions were rapidly reformed to reflect changing national interests and balance of power. In other words, the system quickly regained equilibrium.

In practical terms, this meant that each international player had to choose between allies and rivals and clearly define its interests. International relations remained in a state of anarchy and membership in coalitions was an effective means of survival in this “war of all against all.”

A totally different picture emerged from the collapse of the bipolar world order. On the one hand, there was a huge US-centered alliance. I am referring to NATO and the system of bilateral arrangements with a number of Asian countries. The Americans attempted to cement the favorable outcome of the Cold War for US interests by preserving and strengthening the institutions they had done so much to create.

On the other hand, however, many important and fast growing players sought to avoid alternative coalitions or putting forward an alternative conception of the world and international relations. China, India, Brazil, and Russia (until a certain point in time) were against taking resolute steps, positioning themselves as supporters of a multi-polar world and multi-vector policies. In fact, this signified that they wished to cooperate with everyone, while retaining wide latitude to maneuver. This strategy proved quite successful against the backdrop of economic globalization, making it possible to concentrate resources, develop, and at the same time avoid sensitive issues and costly rivalries. They were also satisfied that the US, though posing as the center of the unipolar world, was not encroaching on their interests or did so to a limited extent. America’s unilateral moves evoked criticism but generally were swallowed. The European Union, which avoided assuming an independent security role, found a nice niche in the system as well.

A unique situation has taken shape, where several major players at once are allowed a free hand. But how long will this state of affairs last? Free floaters tend to acquire political influence and become more ambitious in their foreign policy. Moreover, their conflict-free model is under increased pressure.

The conflict between Russia and the West is the first serious signal. Russia has clearly made its choice, openly challenging the post-bipolar world. We can long debate the reasons behind the 2014 crisis [in Ukraine] and the subsequent split. The West was excessively arrogant and carried away by its projects in the post-Soviet space. Russia was excessively intolerant of these plans. The European security system was out of balance. Russia had accumulated sufficient resources. Political leaders have ambitions. And finally there were local antagonisms in Ukraine that triggered the crisis.

But there is another and much more important issue. Is the conflict between Russia and the West the beginning of a general process that shapes new and reforms old coalitions? If so, each player will have to take sides and face tough choices. Or is this fluctuation just a historical aberration, an irregularity that does not portend any tectonic shifts?

Judging by all appearances, Moscow shares the former point of view, proceeding from the assumption that US policy is destabilizing as is. This invites the use of a countervailing strategy based on preemption. The implicitly realist logic behind the fight for a place under the sun is ascribed to other major players. This means that sooner or later they will start a game of their own.

But it cannot be ruled out that this assessment is a mistake. If the post-bipolar world proves stable, Russia will be marginalized and unable to make a comeback without considerable political concessions. Ultimately this stability will be determined by major world players’ consistency in strategic decision-making and in addressing some long overdue dilemmas. It is the totality of these decisions that will influence the pendulum’s vacillations. The dilemmas are as follows.

The China dilemma means the need to choose between joining the US-centric system and attempting to evolve its own regional and later global projects. Thus far this choice is at the level of economy and trade. Up till now, China has avoided politicizing it. But the issue is gradually becoming political. The US-led TPP trade pact has marginalized China even though it is the key trade partner for almost all current TPP members. Problems are cropping up on the political level. Regional players are concerned with China’s growing power and activity in the World Ocean. In turn, this generates dilemmas for America’s allies in the region. Should they rely on US security guarantees or build up their own forces? This is clearly seen in Japan’s policy as it gradually departs from its former security principles.

Of course, the China dilemma creates a strategic dilemma for the United States itself. What is to be done with China? Should it be perceived as a strategic challenge? If so, the capacity to contain China, both militarily and economically, should be built up. But if carried too far, the US is likely to sustain huge economic losses. Paradoxically, the world hegemon is seriously constrained as it plans its China policy. The unequivocal pro or con choice is fraught with huge risks. Either the US wakes up too late to the reality of a new military giant in the world, or it will miss out on the benefits of partnership with China. Beijing in this situation has the strategic initiative. But US and Chinese situational decisions in favor of containment can well trigger a series of responses. At some point this spiral will be impossible to stop.

What does this mean for Russia? If Washington and Beijing retain stable points of contact, Russia will find itself in an extremely unfavorable situation. In fact, there are signs of this right now, with some Chinese banks showing reluctance to work with Russia for fear of losing their share on the US market. If, however, disagreements grow, China will seek to expand and consolidate its alliances in the region. In this situation, Russia will be in a good negotiating position. It is a tall order for the United States to contain both Russia and China.

Second, there is the EU dilemma. It would seem that the conflict with Moscow removed the Euro-Atlantic solidarity issue from the agenda. But the Syrian crisis has demonstrated that NATO is unable to guarantee European security or protect Europe from terrorism and refugees. The EU itself has no effective security tools. If, however, individual countries take security into their own hands, this puts the EU’s main principles and advantages in jeopardy. A case in point is provided by the frequent threats by several countries to close their borders.

In this environment, the EU will feel a growing need for security organizations of its own – at least a European border service and intelligence. These may promote further security integration. The EU is quite likely to achieve division of labor in this area with NATO and neutralize Washington’s inevitable concern. But in this case the EU will become more important politically and have an opportunity to conduct a more independent policy. Brexit will only help this process, since a country that traditionally sought to play an independent role and potentially could have blocked Brussels’ far-reaching security plans will now be outside of the EU.

This course of developments doesn’t mean an easy life for Russia. The EU has proved to be a tough and aggressive player in the economic and humanitarian spheres. Security is unlikely to be an exception. Moreover, the process itself is certain to be protracted. But sooner or later this may lead to a revision of the European security concept itself.

The Turkish dilemma is also of importance for Russia in the European context. Will Turkey pursue European integration and its NATO role or try to become an independent regional power center focused on the Middle East? The latter option is fraught with considerable unpredictability and chaos, something that squares with Russia’s conception of the emerging world order. But in this case we’ll have to prepare for intense rivalry with Turkey or seek situational agreements.

Finally, the Indian dilemma is also important both for Russia and future world order. The question is how anxious India will feel in the face of China’s growing might and how its military and political relations with the United States will proceed. So far a “military alliance of two democracies” seems unlikely. But if it does materialize, it will be a significant event marking the final end of free floating by major powers. For Russia, this alliance is fraught with the loss of its large-scale ties with India, which today are increasingly confined to the purchase of military equipment.

The key Russian problem is not so much what to choose in these dilemmas. It is much more important that the powers involved in each of these have time for decision-making. Russia, for its part, has made its first move and will have to operate in a totally different environment.