The relationship between Kiev and the Minsk-2 agreement is ambivalent. The documents reflect a military power balance that was unfavorable to Ukraine.
The format of the recent meeting between Angela Merkel, François Hollande and Petro Poroshenko has often been interpreted in Russian and Ukrainian media as a “Normandy format” summit without Russia, heralding a new European approach regarding Donbass. For me, this vision does not correspond to reality. It must be recalled that the meeting was held at the request of the Ukrainian side, and that the French and German leaders did not want it to take place in Kiev, where they were invited for the 24th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine. François Hollande and Angela Merkel obviously informed Vladimir Putin of the content of the discussions in Berlin. As far as I know, no one in France or Germany was even thinking of changing the “Normandy format”, whether to exclude Russia or to incorporate Poland, for example. Everyone understands that there is no solution to the Ukrainian crisis without Russia, even more so against Russia. Those who think otherwise are putting at risk Ukraine and European security as a whole.
The relationship between Kiev and the Minsk-2 agreement is ambivalent. The documents reflect a military power balance that was unfavorable to Ukraine: its army was defeated in August 2015 in Ilovaysk, in January at the Donetsk airport, and in mid-February in Debaltsevo. Several points (mention of a special status, creation of a people's militia, etc.) are not easily acceptable by the Ukrainian public opinion and politicians, who are radicalized and whose reactions are often disconnected from reality. In a rather classic way, Petro Poroshenko has a selective reading of the Minsk-2 agreements and highlights what serves his needs (such as control of the border with Russia). The Ukrainian President has consistently refused any dialogue with the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, preferring a unilateral approach. This is understandable, but the Minsk-2 Agreements include the formula po soglasovaniju storon (as agreed by the parties), which implies consultation and dialogue. Poroshenko’s main concern is to preserve the political and financial support of the West. It is therefore important to not appear as the one who buried the Minsk-2 agreements. From this perspective, the recent developments at the Rada are problematic. Of course, in contrast Poroshenko appears as a moderate and these developments give arguments to the Ukrainian president, who regularly tells his European and American interlocutors that decentralization is not well accepted in his country. However should he fail to obtain a 2/3 majority in the Rada to endorse this crucial text, Russia could rightfully argue that Kiev has derailed the peace process. And one could also predict that the fragile consensus on EU sectoral sanctions against Russia would not last long.
In the Ukrainian case, we can see a battle with reversed fronts. Without publicly assuming it, Kiev scrapped Donbass, considering that it is a cancerous body against which the country must be protected. This is the main reason behind the blockade being imposed on those territories. Donetsk and Lugansk are tacitly considered as not worth rescuing. The majority of political, economic and media elites in Kiev chose “Little Ukraine”. Unlike what is repeated in public speeches, territorial integrity is no longer a priority if it is to lead Kiev to fund the reconstruction of Donbass and include representatives of Lugansk and Donetsk in the national political field.
In this context, it seems to me that Russia has no interest in freezing the conflict (at least, not as long as the political aspect of Minsk-2 is not applied). And, naturally, it wants to “dilute” the “Little Ukraine” with pro-Russian elements from Donbass. However, it has limited influence levers. The Kremlin is betting on the disintegration of the current regime and on the economic collapse of Ukraine, scenarios that are anything but absurd. It is betting on the weariness of the Ukrainian population: realities could bring the Ukrainians back on the path of realism, and therefore pragmatism in the relationship with Moscow. This is what we are beginning to see in Georgia. In other words, Russia does not consider that Ukraine is lost. The prospects of its entry into the EU and NATO in a foreseeable future are nil.
France and Germany, for their part, are trying to save Minsk-2, despite the unwillingness of the directly concerned parties. Both countries understand very well that the alternative scenario is not that of a frozen conflict, but that of a resumption of large-scale hostilities with - most likely - US arms deliveries and a direct Russian military intervention until the Dnieper. Actually, everyone has something to lose if this scenario takes place: Ukraine, which would disappear as a state, and Russia, which would be hit with new sanctions by far worse than those currently in force.
Today, the critical issue - besides the cease-fire - is that of the elections in Donbass. Which political forces will be able to participate in these elections? The parties represented in the Rada in Kiev, which support the “antiterrorist operation”, obviously have no chance to be represented. What about the Ukrainian Communist Party, which obtained good scores in Donbass but cannot run in the elections under this label in Ukraine due to the adoption of “memorial” laws? It can be observed that the current leaders in Donetsk and Lugansk do not want the former tycoons of the Regions Party to come back. There is no easy solution, especially as nobody is showing any goodwill. OSCE diplomats, including French Pierre Morel, who run the political subgroup at Minsk, have all the more merit.
