Many people across the world have been asking this question for over 50 years. And it goes hand in hand with another quite topical one: can the "Singapore Miracle" be repeated, and how?
The simplest answer to it takes an anecdotal form: all you need to have in your country is as many Singaporeans as possible and at least another Lee Kuan Yew.
A serious answer to the question about the "Singapore Miracle" (that is what the phenomenal surge of poor little Singapore to the level of advanced world states is called) requires consideration of a whole set of objective and subjective prerequisites and conditions.
Singapore started its rush for modernization in the late 1950s in unfavourable conditions: socio-economic underdevelopment, shortage of natural resources (everything, including drinking water and building sand, had to be imported), extreme corruption, international tensions. In addition, the country was under enormous external pressure: complicated relations with the Federation of Malaya (later, Federation of Malaysia), strong pro-communist sentiments in Maoist China and countries of Southeast Asia looming over political stability.
But that was the objective situation that helped Lee Kuan Yew and his adherents understand that falling back was no longer an option and self-reliance was the only choice. The modernization vector was very well-picked (rehearsing the proverbial economic aspects of the "Singapore Miracle" is needless). Its main attribute is the combination of liberal market measures with austere, even authoritarian, methods of governance.
Regarding eradication of corruption in Singapore (which has sprouted myths and aphorisms), it was rooted in realization of simple truth: corruption is afunctional, it hampers modernization and discourages foreign investors. The result is a prosperous economy (rise of income per capita from $400 to over $12,000), the world's best conditions for doing business, low crime rate and high education level of the population.
The subjective prerequisites of the "Singapore Miracle" are bound with, first of all, the legendary figure of Lee Kuan Yew himself. He managed to build a sustainable system of economic and political institutions that has been functioning since his resignation. In addition, he successfully integrated the British legal system into it, leading to such astonishing effect in a blend with the customary economic efficiency of other Asian Tigers.
The phenomenon of inter-civilizational interaction merits special attention: the fusion of the Protestant ethics notoriously amiable towards business (it appears that the two honorary degrees Lee Kuan Yew got in Cambridge were put to good use) and the traditional Confucian ethics idolizing diligence, assiduity and discipline – the so-called can-do spirit Eastern Asia is rightfully proud of.
Other countries are amply capable of repeating the "Singapore Miracle". Singapore's experience was successfully adopted by another great reformer of the 20th century, Deng Xiaoping, who carved a world economic leader out of China.
Following Singapore's role model, China solves the key dilemma of modern reformation: achievement of an optimal combination of market mechanisms and government control. Hence, the specific path of Eastern Asian states towards democracy. It is unhurried and indirect, unlike the Western path (this provokes fallible judgement that they lack any democracy).
The distinct elements of Singapore's experience are visible in the ambitious "100 Steps" reform programme unveiled by President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. That is probably why it drew such high praises from German Gref (currently CEO of Russia's largest bank, Sberbank) and other adherers of liberal reforms in Russia.
By the way, Russia has old and close ties with the wonder-worker of the "Singapore Miracle". Lee Kuan Yew consulted the Russian government for years, he was honored with Russian state awards.
On the other hand, modern Russia is yet to learn the key lessons of the "Singapore Miracle": first of all, that outstanding reforms should not be put into cold storage and, secondly, that one should rely on a system of economic and political institutions, not on "manual control".
