What Is France Trying to Accomplish in Syria?

French president Emmanuel Macron has failed to convince US president Donald Trump to rejoin the Paris climate accord or to remain with the Iran nuclear accord. Macron however did succeed in getting Trump to delay the withdrawal of the at least 2000 US troops currently in Syria. Why does Macron care whether or not the US troops remain in Syria? What are Macron’s goals for Syria, and why has he sent an undeclared number of French special forces (estimated at around 200 soldiers) to Syria? 

France has long claimed an interest in Syria. At the end of World War I Britain and France in essence divided up former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. France got a “mandate” for Syria (and for Lebanon, while the British took control over the rest of the former Ottoman territories including Palestine), which allowed the French to maintain control over Syria until 1946. Twice France used combat troops and bombs to suppress Syrians’ efforts to win independence. The first, the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925, led the French to destroy much of Damascus to suppress the resistance.  The French bombed Damascus again in 1945 in a last ditch effort to block Syrians’ declaration of independence. 

France, as is typical of ex-imperial powers, always sought to retain its investments, economic ties, and geopolitical influence with its former colonies. The French enjoyed much less success in those realms in Syria than it did in Africa. French influence in Syria was displaced first by the United States, which fomented a military coup against the only democratically elected Syrian government in 1949. Later, the Soviet Union became the main military ally of Syria, and wealthy Arab countries the principal sources of investment capital and trade.   

France’s remaining economic stake in Syria is oil and gas. Syria itself has little oil, but waters in the Mediterranean claimed by Syria (and by Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority) have been found to hold massive amounts of gas. So far, Israel has been the largest exploiter of eastern Mediterranean gas, unilaterally drilling in waters claimed by various countries. French oil companies would love to get access to the gas, and Macron believes a new Syrian government would be far more likely to involve French firms than Assad would be. 

France’s main interest in Syria today is geopolitical. The ongoing civil war has produced over five million refugees. While a majority is in Turkey and most of the rest elsewhere in the Middle East, more than a million have come to Europe, creating a backlash that has propelled so-called populist parties to election victories that threaten to undermine EU unity. France, as Germany’s main partner in upholding EU principles of open borders and economic integration, sees resolution of the civil war as vital to ending the flow of additional refugees. 

There is a fundamental contradiction between two of France’s professed goals - ending the humanitarian crisis (by which the French mean above all ending the flow of refugees) and counterterrorism - and France’s actions within Syria of arming proxy armies and sending its own troops to fight. More weapons make it easier for factional armies to keep fighting. The arrival of French or US troops with sophisticated weapons, backed by fighter jets and bombers, create the illusion that the tide of war still can turn in favor of the French or American favored forces, encouraging revels to keep fighting.  Weapons are easily captured or sold. Despite the best efforts of Western governments to ensure that they do not aid ‘terrorists,’ American and French weapons do end up being used for terror attacks and groups the Americans and French were confident shared their democratic values often turn to attacking civilians themselves. 

Perhaps in the first years of the civil war, the French and Americans could believe that if they intervened they would be able to help the rebels defeat Assad’s government.  However, in 2018 that hope is just a delusion. At best, the French and Americans can help some rebel groups keep control of small parts of Syria. But those efforts produce counterattacks, increasing the level of civilian casualties. The main group that currently benefits from Western aid is the Kurds. However, the Kurds’ successes in defeating ISIS and gaining de facto control over the Kurdish region of Syria has provoked Turkey to intervene, leading to yet more deaths. 

There is another, far more cynical, interpretation of French goals in Syria. If it is impossible for the French to influence events in that country, they can make it impossible for anyone else to gain undisputed control. Continued chaos in Syria undermines Russian or Turkish plans to shape that country or the region. For a onetime great power now become a second level force, albeit with nuclear weapons, being a spoiler might be the only way for France to play a geopolitical role beyond Europe and a few extremely weak countries in Africa. Even strong countries provide aid to rebels that challenge other great powers. That is what France did in the 1790s when it aided American rebels in the thirteen colonies. It is what the US did to the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and what Pakistan is doing to the US in Afghanistan now.  The main reason to doubt this interpretation is not belief in the essential goodness of France, but that chaos in Syria, as I noted above, will produce more refugees undermining France’s essential interests in Europe. 

In fact, governments often are unable to pursue coherent policies. Militaries like to show their strategic prowess and test weapons and strategies, even if that leads to confrontations that are difficult to undo diplomatically. Diplomats intervene on behalf of corporations in their country even when that can lead to military conflicts with other nations. We can’t assume that France’s support for various rebel groups in Syria has a clear goal or will be pursued consistently. In any case, French intervention in Syria ultimately depends on parallel efforts by the US, and US policy has become and will continue to be volatile as long as Trump remains president. 

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.