The Islamic Coalition: Who’s in it and Against Whom?

Can the newly formed coalition actually exacerbate the Shiite-Sunni rivalry? This is unlikely in light of the coalition’s current shapeless condition.

In December 2015, Saudi Arabia announced the creation of an anti- terrorist Islamic coalition of 34 Sunni Muslim countries, a development which has since evoked lots of comments. Formally, the alliance can position itself as a global Islamic project. It includes many non-Arab states, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Senegal, Malaysia, as well as states in which Sunnis are a minority, such as Uganda and Gabon, where, incidentally, the majority of the population are Christians, not Shiite Muslims.

It is still unclear why the Saudis created a coalition of widely different players who share neither the same goals nor strategic vision of the situation and who aren’t willing to act in a concerted manner militarily or even politically. Clarifications that were provided failed to make things any clearer. According to the Saudi foreign minister, the alliance will focus not only on military aspects of fighting terrorism, but also on curtailing the financing of terrorism and the spread of its ideology.

The willingness of the Muslim countries to reserve a place of their own in combating ISIS and other terrorist groups would be laudable, even if didn’t include direct involvement in hostilities, and only projected their willingness to make a coordinated effort to counter terrorist organizations claiming to be Islamic.

However, it appears that even this level of coordination isn’t in the picture. No joint agreement was signed, which would clearly spell out the areas on which their joint efforts should focus, including military maneuvers, administrative issues, etc. Statements by the invited countries about their willingness to fight terrorism added no value to either of the ongoing operations, the US-led coalition or the coalition formed by Russia.

Adam Taylor from The Washington Post wrote in detail about Saudi Arabia’s goals in creating the coalition and its possible consequences. He notes that the new Islamic military alliance looks more like another tool to promote the interests of individual countries rather than to create a united anti-terrorist Islamic front. First of all, it is about Saudi Arabia, which finds it important to showcase to the West its willingness to lead the fight against terrorism and extremism. Such a demonstration is particularly important in a situation where pundits have repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of showing sympathy to jihadists. Indeed, all sorts of Islamic foundations acting as non-governmental organizations, including some within Saudi Arabia, have been known to help the extremists.

No less important is the fact that the alliance does not include Iraq, Iran or Syria, countries which are actually waging an actual war against ISIS. The Lebanese government has had to provide assurances to the Shiite Hezbollah that the latter would not be targeted by the alliance. The coalition, however, did not feel the need to extend invitations to states where Shiites or other groups close to them play a major political role, a fact which led Adam Taylor to conclude that "the exclusion of Shiite nations in an alliance designed to represent the Islamic world seems to reinforce the belief that Saudi Arabia's alliance is motivated by a sectarian rivalry with Iran and not terrorism."

Even though the Saudi authorities disagree, such concerns are shared by many countries. So, while the Turkish authorities rushed to support the new coalition, some pundits and former political figures in Turkey were skeptical of it. For example, a veteran of Turkish foreign policy, retired Ambassador Faruk Logoglu, said on December 16 that Turkey’s joining the Saudi-led coalition was a mistake and will only lead to more sectarian violence in the region.

Can the newly formed coalition actually exacerbate the Shiite-Sunni rivalry? This is unlikely in light of the coalition’s current shapeless condition. Furthermore, the level of confrontation is already quite high. It is therefore unlikely that the coalition will become a meaningful force in fighting terrorism. However, the message is out. Unfortunately, it can be interpreted in more than one way.
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