Russia’s policy of multilateralism, the evolution of regional associations, the concept of Eurasianism and Russia’s links with China (and the BRICS) are undeveloped as challenges to Western hegemony.
Presentation by David Lane at Conference on The Role of Public Diplomacy.[Organised by the Society for Co-operation in Russian and Soviet Studies and the St Petersburg Association for International Co-operation, hosted by Rossotrudnichestvo's London office.]
Academic judgment provides a context in which events are interpreted and it influences public opinion either directly or indirectly through the media. Ideally, academia should contribute to the building of a body of informed knowledge. The current reality is that Russia in the West is perceived through two political lenses: in the right eye, it is conditioned by Western ‘soft power’ and in the left eye by the West’s ‘dark power’.
Capturing the Academic Field
Capturing the academic field with respect to the interpretation of post-communist countries is one of the tasks of Western ‘soft power’. Soft power seeks to extend a state’s authority by virtue of its culture, values and way of life – as opposed to the use of military force and political coercion. The notion of ‘soft power’ utilised by American academics/cum political advisers, such as Joseph Nye, is both descriptive and prescriptive; not only does it describe Western values and ways of doing things but concurrently claims that other people should adopt them.
Western soft power captures the academic imagination in terms of American values: the consumer entertainment society, electoral democracy, free markets, private property, free media and individual rights; such a competitive individualistic society gives people what they think they deserve. In showing how foreign countries fall short of Western soft power criteria, it defines a political agenda of research on foreign countries. In this context research sponsored by institutions such as Freedom House evaluates how countries perform on their indexes of political freedom and competitive markets. Sates which fall short are unfree and undemocratic. Such ‘policy based evidence’ influences politicians as well as public opinion and legitimates policies which call for change.
While this approach in endorsing Western institutions is relatively benign, many analysts go further and develop a form of ‘dark power’ which discredits and delegitimates foreign adversaries. The objective here is to highlight developments in other countries which challenge Western presuppositions. Unmasking deviations from these norms constitutes the West’s ‘dark power’. For instance, sentences on the ‘Pussy riot’ band are revealed as infringements of individual rights of expression. Such events are used to illustrate the malicious intentions of the Russian authorities.
So successful has been the ideological offensive that Russia is widely perceived as the demon in international affairs – a victory for the West’s ‘dark power’. For example, in Ukraine when the elected President is hounded out of power, the legitimate parliament is dissolved by the opposition and the country is enveloped in chaos, the blame is laid to rest on Russia (which ironically opposed the extra-political activity) rather than on the USA and EU (which supported it), or the insurgents who brought down the incumbent powers. Opinion polls conducted by Pew Research after President Putin said that he would reclaim the Crimea found that 72 per cent of people in the USA and 63 per cent of people in the UK had an ‘unfavourable view of Russia’. In July 2014, only 10 per cent and 12 percent respectively of respondents in the USA and the UK thought that ‘the government of Russia respects the personal freedoms of its people’ (five times fewer than in Russia itself – where people actually experience the effects of their government).
Russia’s ‘Soft’ Power
Russia has failed to find a Western audience for its own ideological and political position. Even prominent Russian commentators, such as Political Fund President, Vyacheslav Nikonov, when interviewed in 2006, opined that his country has ‘nothing to offer ideologically’. However more recently statements, such as those by Konstantin Kosachev and President Putin have suggested that Russia projects its traditional values as a counter image to the West. Kosachev writing in 2012 defines these as: ‘…civilisational values rooted in traditions, religion and basic ethic[al] norms (respect for the elders, help to one’s neighbor, family, honor, dignity and love for the homeland)’. Such values are very general and would be accepted by many in non-Russian societies.
Concurrently, the positive appeal of Russia to British academia relies on its cultural heritage: Pushkin rather than Putin; Russian music, literature and art, rather than politics, international affairs and economics. Russia as a civilisation has become the major appeal, embedded in history and religion and bypassing the Soviet period. Russia (unlike the Soviet Union) is never considered as a political and economic system worthy of emulation or even serious discussion. Study of the Russian language has experienced a steep fall. Russia as a sphere of political interest has moved to the periphery and its place has been taken by China. This may (or may not) be a matter of concern, but it illustrates that fact that China has succeeded in projecting a more positive image of itself than has Russia. It has been more successful in its soft power policy.
The Ambiguities of the West’s Soft Power
These rather depressing observations need to be addressed by placing Russian developments in the context of Western interventions in world politics and in the mounting economic and political crises facing the Western countries. The Hollywood/Coca Cola/AppleSmartPhones world is one part of Western consumer society soft power – and it has been effective.
But all countries, the USA included, have their dark sides which are naturally occluded in their own soft politics’ promotions. Other aspects include the universal decline in confidence in electoral democracy in states of the European Union. And armed Western interventions in Libya, Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have undermined the West’s claims to promote peace. Democracies claim that they do not go to war with each other (democratic ‘soft power’). They certainly go to war with what they define as non-democracies: between 1946 and 2003, Russia and the Soviet Union participated in only 9 inter-state wars compared to a total of 56 interstate wars for the UK, France and the USA, constituting the dark side of their military power.
Severe economic crisis and the bankruptcy and fraudulence of leading financial institutions have led to high unemployment and austerity programmes which have sapped confidence in the ability of the market led by private corporations to coordinate the economies. These attributes are the dark side of Western societies and have subjected Western norms, values and institutions subject to wide-ranging criticism as well as opposition from spontaneous civil society groups - not only in Third World countries but also in Western countries themselves.
Russia’s Soft Power
Post-Soviet Russia has been put on the defensive not only by the West’s soft and dark power offensives but by the effects of its headlong rush to embrace neo-liberal policies compounded by an illegitimate redistribution of property. There are unacceptable inequalities in wealth and income distribution; business practices and electoral procedures involve corruption; the economy is lacking both in investment and innovation.
However, there are some positive features which have arisen under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. These include the idea of national sovereignty which entails taking control over national assets to the benefit of national stake holders; such an outlook seeks to curb the power of transnational (and national) companies and hegemonic countries. Such ideas are potentially an alternative ideology to neo-liberalism, but scarcely recognised in Western academia. In the context of globalisation politics, such positions may be counter-posed to the dominant approach of neo-liberalism and have a considerable rapport in academia in the West.
Russia’s policy of multilateralism, the evolution of regional associations, the concept of Eurasianism and Russia’s links with China (and the BRICS) are undeveloped as challenges to Western hegemony. Here again positive state policies countering the effects of the global recession, as well as critiques of the institutions which have caused them, would find positive interest - if not an affirmative response. While Russia’s ‘respect for international law’ has been questioned following the incorporation of the Crimea into Russia, its foreign policy has been far less interventionist than the practices of Western states.
Western states have successfully projected their soft power and hidden their dark side. Whereas Russia’s soft power has been obscured by a concentration on the West’s dark side. The English language TV channel, RT, has countered Western positions by its use of Western academics as a vehicle to propel Russian ‘dark power’ in exposing the West’s duplicity. RT, however, has not succeeded in projecting a convincing soft power image of post-communist Russia. This is a reflection of the leadership’s emphasis on debunking the West, rather than extolling Russia’s virtues. For example, President Putin’s Valdai speech of 25 October 2014 was strong as a critique of US foreign policy (a ‘dark power’ scenario) failed to advance Russia’s soft power image. In comparison, China’s ‘Beijing consensus’ is again much more successful.
Ways to Promote More Academic Cooperation
To promote more positive participation by British academics in the study of Russia, initiatives might come from Western civil society associations (such as the SCRSS). But the major impetus must come from within Russia itself. An analogy here is with Western soft power sponsorship. The British Council plays a major part in projecting British values abroad and might be a model to emulate.
A Russian type British Council could involve bilateral arrangements with foreign countries with respect to the promotion of the interchange of students and academics and lecture tours by specialists; it would have a News Digest website and email and social media circulation to members; it would promote special events such as film festivals; celebrate contemporary Russian authors and support language courses. In Russia I have in mind something along the lines of the Morozov House which previously housed the Union of Socialist Societies for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. However, its former role of meeting with foreign delegations could be augmented to resemble the Kennan Institute in Washington DC which engages domestic and foreign elites with American foreign policy concerns.
The UK has a positive reputation abroad and some of this is due to the proselytising efforts of the British Council. In 2010 its budget was fifty times that of Russki Mir which illustrates the low priority given to soft power promotion by Russia. China is very ambitious and entrepreneurial in this respect. It has sponsored twenty-five Confucius institutes in UK (and 440 world wide). These focus on Chinese culture and language and promote exchanges with China. LSE has developed business studies and at Goldsmiths the Institute supports a degree on politics and international studies – with study of Chinese language and Chinese society. Other post communist countries are following this lead. Kazakhstan recently opened its Center for Peace and Accord in London.
Taking a cue from the USA where such soft power centres are financed by philanthropists, the many Russian oligarchs living abroad might be a source of finance for similar developments. Ukrainian oligarch Dmitry Firtash’s modest 8.7 million dollars to Cambridge University was used quite successfully to promote Ukrainian studies. By comparison, Roman Abramovich spent 129 million dollars on just two footballers’ transfer fees (Shevchenko and Torres) - such a sum would transform the study of Russia in the UK.
At present Russia falls woefully behind Western states in attracting foreign students who usually form a positive impression of the host country. The United States and Britain top the scales with 18 per cent and 10 per cent respectively of the total of foreign students (data for 2009, OECD). Russia attracts only 4 per cent. Scholarships with stipends are also rather meagre and not comparable even to other post-socialist states; for example, Poland in 2012 offered 2000 scholarships to Ukrainians whereas Russia only gave 200. This is hardly indicative of a country that seeks to develop a positive image abroad.
Soft Power Should Reflect Reality
Clearly adopting the measures I suggest would not create an attractive Russian image overnight, as it is also shaped by the mass media. But they would significantly improve the knowledge of people abroad with an interest in Russia - optimistically giving rise to higher levels of objectivity.
Improvements in links with academia are only one part of policy which would lead to a more positive representation of Russia. What underpins any kind of soft power promotion is what kind of a place Russia is thought to be. Its character shapes the image that it can project of itself. ‘Soft power’ is valid and desirable as a form of cooperation rather than force, but it must have some content. Here Russia is faced with a challenge. Emphasizing ‘traditional values’, which the present leadership promotes, does not address the character of contemporary Russia and relies on an image of Imperial (pre-1917) Russia. Unlike the Soviet Union (and the contemporary USA) which had a clear understanding of what it was and wanted to be, Russia has not developed a focussed and coherent ideological and political image. This is not just a problem of ‘image making’, but one of forming a social and political character on which an image may be created. Hence Russia has experienced an inherent deficiency in projecting itself as soft power.
