Should Russia Interfere in the South China Sea Islands Dispute?

Both China and the US feel the need to introduce shared “rules of conduct” to minimize the risk of the hazardous military activities in the South China Sea. Russia does not interfere in third-party territorial disputes and conflicts, even if they involve its close strategic partners, like China.

Recent weeks have been marked by an aggravation in the US-China war of words over the disputed islands in the South China Sea. US Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter told the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue that his country was opposed to any changes in the regional status quo. Though admitting that China was not alone in trying to interfere with the current status of the Spratly Islands, he emphasized that Beijing was the most active contender.

Beijing responded by making assurances that its construction projects on the islands were a strictly peaceful operation, while their scale only reflected the degree of China’s responsibility as a major power.

The dispute over the islands in the southwestern South China Sea has deep historical roots. Apart from China, the ownership of the Spratly Archipelago is being contested by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Brunei. China insists that it holds the title to a large strip of the South China Sea, which is being challenged by its neighbors.

The new element to this old story is that the US is now trying (at least verbally) to play a more active role in the dispute, including it in the broader context of US-China relations. As a result, the dispute is taking on a “global dimension” in the form of a dialogue between two world superpowers, characterized by an intricate interplay of rivalry and cooperation, as well as a growing financial, trade, and economic interdependence — something that makes an open military and political confrontation between the two unlikely.

Even though Beijing has rejected Washington’s G2 proposal, rightly fearing that it has been relegated to the role of a junior partner, the prospect of the two setting up a modified G2 as part of the existing US-China “strategic dialogue” on a number of specific issues and problems of mutual interest cannot be ruled out.

Engaging in this dialogue, China will certainly urge equality and respect for its interests, as is evident from President Xi Jinping’s recent statement to the effect that “there is room for everyone in the Asia-Pacific Region,” which was clearly directed toward the United States. This amounted to an invitation to talks on spheres of influence in the South China Sea, and possibly, in the East China Sea; this comment also served as a response of sorts to US charges that China was militarizing the disputed islands and areas in the South China Sea.

This proposal can be viewed as a test of whether the Obama administration is prepared to have an equitable dialogue with Beijing on this particularly sensitive issue. If Washington agrees to regard the South China Sea as China’s sphere of influence and takes a neutral stance vis-à-vis the Chinese dispute with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other regional countries, then China might make concessions on other issues that are equally sensitive for Washington.

Beijing is aware that it will be difficult for Washington and the West as a whole to stop Chinese military preparations in the South China Sea (the building of artificial islands for subsequent deployment of military facilities) or to respond symmetrically. It’s also hard to reproach China within the framework of international law. In pursuing its years-long dialogue with ASEAN on this issue, China has invariably called for a peaceful solution to this problem. Beijing emphasizes that it is committed to dialogue and consultation as a method of dealing with every issue, and intends to maintain the free flow and safety of shipping in the South China Sea.

For their part, America’s military and political allies would like Washington to be more active in the islands dispute, thereby putting it in a quandary about whether to jeopardize US-China relations for the sake of what is in fact other countries’ territorial dispute.

Despite the propagandistic statements on both sides, the likelihood of a relevant US-China dialogue is rather high. Both China and the US feel the need to introduce shared “rules of conduct” (a set of confidence-building naval measures and steps to dispel China’s concerns over the US regional missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific Region) to minimize the risk of the hazardous military activities and incidents inevitable in the event of conflict between the two militaries.

Thus, Washington is faced with a difficult dilemma. It cannot be ruled out that the Obama administration, which ostensibly rejects the updated spheres of influence concept, will have to admit the obvious and put up with the existence of not only Chinese, but also Russian spheres of influence (Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries).

The Russian diplomatic position in this matter is much more reasonable and advantageous. Russia does not interfere in third-party territorial disputes and conflicts, even if they involve its close strategic partners, like China. True, occasionally Western media speculate about the hypothetical possibility of Moscow backing China in its dispute over the islands in the South China Sea in exchange for China’s support in the dispute with Japan over Russia’s “northern territories”.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, while on a visit to Tokyo not so long ago, said that “Russia never operates on an ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ basis.” This is a good (and aphoristic) prescription for making international relations in South East Asia and Asia-Pacific more stable and balanced. 

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.