Through its efforts to step up its activities in Syria and to become directly involved in the armed conflict there, Russia has created new opportunities and also serious risks within and beyond its borders.
The situation has changed.
Even if the Syrian operation could, under certain circumstances, have a positive impact on Russia’s relations with the West, it seems that the status quo in the media is built to last. Some people will thus view Russia as backing a dictator (as usual) and carrying out airstrikes against the moderate opposition and civilians, while others will portray it as a Sunni enemy. This image will haunt Russia regardless of the true nature of the opposition, the actual targets of its airstrikes or the fact that almost 20 million Sunnis live in Russia.
Its image in the media has always been Russia’s weak spot, since its propaganda machine is less geared toward foreign audiences than the home-front. Meanwhile, blunders from official sources (such as reports concerning the crushing defeat of the Islamic State near Homs, which never saw any ISIS forces) do little to improve the situation.
However, its deteriorating image is not the main issue for Russia, which faces far more serious risks domestically and abroad.
There are three main domestic political risks.
The first risk is the rising terrorist threat from two primary sources. On the one hand, it emanates from IS sympathizers in Russia for whom the Syrian operation is a fight against true Islam. On the other hand, the jihadists who are pushed out of Syria, first to Iraq, and then on to other countries, could also be a threat for Russia. The Kremlin’s engagement in the Syria issue is underpinned by the idea of preventing hundreds or thousands of seasoned fighters integrated into global terrorist networks from returning to Russia.
The logic of IS’s development makes it inevitable that the “romantics of jihad” will be gradually driven from the territory they now hold and start exporting their struggle. It goes without saying that Russia’s southern regions will be among their first destinations.
The second risk in terms of domestic policy is the unpredictable public response to the losses that are inevitable in combat engagement. When the ISIS captured a Jordanian pilot and burnt him in a metal cage, thousands in Amman took to the streets to protest the country’s involvement in the war against the ISIS. How will Russians respond to similar developments remains to be seen, especially taking into account that the public perception of Russia’s prior military campaigns in the south has clearly been negative.
That said, the weakening social cohesion in Russia and the poor adhesion to liberal values and a civil consciousness make Russian society almost immune to human casualties.
Finally, the third domestic policy risk is related to the economic consequences of the Syria campaign. Regardless of its cost for the budget, the country is going through tough economic times, making it hard to explain why people have to tighten their belts once again to pursue unclear geopolitical interests in a remote and unknown country, not even a brethren people.
This risk will become increasingly relevant as the operation drags on. A serious negative response from Russians could be avoided if it will be completed within several months, while making a political victory.
However, there are also external risks.
Until recently, Russia’s Middle East strategy has been described by Western observers as the “art of being friends with everyone.” But this tradition has been broken. Russia has supported the Syrian government and established an Information Center in Baghdad, short of creating a Shia coalition in a mostly Sunni region.
The consequences are clear — opposition from Sunni Arabs headed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, a cooling of relations with Turkey and, possibly, Egypt, which depends economically on Saudi Arabia.
Although these countries no longer have sufficient clout to wage a full-blown economic war against Russia (low oil prices have also taken a toll on the Saudis), they are still central to the region and important players in the Islamic world. There is no way the region can be reformatted or stabilized without them.
There could be several ways to mitigate this risk.
First, while waging a military operation against the jihadists, Russia should promote a political settlement in Syria taking into account the interests of Gulf states. Bashar al-Assad should be pressured into making serious concessions to the moderate opposition. At the same time, dialogue with the West and Gulf states should continue to consolidate and strengthen this moderate opposition and make it a real partner of the Syrian government.
Second, if it becomes clear as the situation unfolds that keeping Syria within its initial borders would be impossible, the option of establishing a Sunni state in the east of Syria with the support of Gulf powers should be propounded.
Third, the Kremlin might benefit from the serious contradictions between Sunni countries. For instance, while dependent on Saudi Arabia, Egypt regards its relationship with it as a burden and would be pleased to have Moscow as an alternative partner. The Kremlin could create a Moscow-Cairo-Algiers axis as a counterweight to the Shia alliance in North Africa. Smaller Gulf states are not always eager to back the Saudis in their anti-Iranian stance, and Russia is a major economic partner of Turkey, which is mostly focused on Kurdish separatism.
Finally, Moscow could step up its initiatives on the Palestinian issue by giving a new impetus to the settlement process, thereby demonstrating its commitment to making a positive difference in the region.
However, Russia’s rapprochement with Iran on the Syria issue should not be regarded as a guarantee of a lasting alliance. It seems that Iran, tired of its pariah status, will be more inclined to establish closer ties with the West, making the Russia-Shia alliance fragile.
The last risk is related to the global, not regional, dimension of the Syria crisis. Although Moscow’s and Washington’s strategic objectives in the region are not contradictory, and despite the fact that efforts to combat jihadists could serve as a foundation for normalizing, to some extent, Russia’s relations with the US, there is a danger that the two countries will start projecting their existing contradictions on the Middle East. In this case, Syria will become a battleground between extra-regional actors playing a zero-sum game. Although this scenario seems unlikely, it is, of course, the most dangerous one and could pave the way to an escalation of the global stand-off.
