THE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE
More of China!

The Russian president’s visit to Beijing is a good pretext for discussing an expansion of China-Russia cooperation in Central Eurasia and any obstacles that exist that need to be overcome.

So far, it is not clear whether Russian elites and public opinion perceive active involvement of outside players into regional affairs as desirable. For some historical reasons, it is believed that Russia should bear sole responsibility for regional security. The apprehension that Chinese involvement, unlike the fragmentary US presence, will be of system-wide nature still plays a role.

Luckily, these apprehensions failed to stop the signing of the historic China-Russia agreement in May of 2015 on the coordination of the Eurasian integration project and the Silk Road Economic Belt. But their preservation in the public consciousness makes for a cautious approach to Beijing’s bilateral relations with countries in Central Asia. These countries’ traditional apprehension of what they see as likely “Chinese expansion” plays a role as well. Not so long ago Kazakhstan witnessed anti-Chinese riots, which were provoked by amendments to the Land Code allowing auction sales of 1.7 million hectares of agricultural lands.

China’s certain reserve with regard to active involvement in the internal affairs of its neighbors and the formation of standing security cooperation institutions should not be forgotten either. Emerging as one of the superpowers, China has inherited foreign policy principles and trapping characteristic of a developing nation that constantly seeks to safeguard its sovereignty, mostly through non-participation in alliances and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Both reflect the mentality of a young power that has recently achieved full independence and is not ready to restrict its sovereignty even to ensure its own security and peace in neighboring regions.

Meanwhile, new and sovereign China is 67 years old, which is a venerable age. Moreover, its economic capabilities make it possible to increase the scale of its responsibility for surrounding developments. China’s highly conservative foreign policy is still based on the belief that economic development can solve all problems. This might prove true in Central Asia, but then Chinese contributions now should already involve creating a lot of new jobs for young loiterers in Dushanbe or Bishkek. So far, China’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative seems not to be making much headway. In the longer term, China will most likely have to reappraise its reserved approach.

Currently China is providing limited military aid – weapons and gear – for the destitute military in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. But it’s unclear whether the scale of this aid is sufficient for these countries to effectively respond to outside – and potentially domestic – terrorist threats. What will China do, if a number of Central Asian countries become a scene of dramatic internal upheavals? Can Russia be sure that in this event its military will not remain there alone? Assisted by Uzbekistan, Russia already stopped a civil war in Tajikistan. Few serious analysts have any doubt that the sheer length of the Russia-Kazakhstan border, let alone its proximity to the industrial base in the Urals, and the restless areas in the North Caucasus, will leave Moscow indifferent to the fight against radical threats waged by the Central Asian security forces. Under presumed critical circumstances, China will most probably have to practice more active cooperation with Russia, which will certainly remain the main provider of “hard” security in the region. Flexible forms of interference – diplomatic support and economic recovery effort – will be in high demand.

It is also important to foresee how China’s active economic presence in the region may influence its readiness for a more active involvement if a crisis does occur. Since 2001, China’s accumulated investment in Kazakhstan, according to its Central Bank, amounts to about $13 billion (or 75% less than the Dutch investment – $64 billion – and half that of the US with $23 billion). In Tajikistan, direct foreign investment (DFI) amounted to $395.6 million between 2001 and 2012, with China as the main investor. Kyrgyzstan in the same period received DFI mostly from China ($299 million) as well as Russia ($161 million). The important thing is whether this comparatively solid investment can serve as a guarantee that China will not remain indifferent to developments in the receiving countries. Prior to Libya’s collapse in 2011, China invested about $19 billion there but has seemed to forget its multi-billion losses with comparative ease.

The dominant point of view today is that neither Russia nor China regard a military-political alliance as the aim of their rapprochement. All official statements and analysis by influential governmental experts indicate that both parties are satisfied with the existing format of relations and are not in the mood for its expansion or greater formalization. Few peripheral researchers in China and even fewer in Russia point to the need for an allied relationship. Outside observers are even more reserved in their estimates concerning the likelihood of a formal alliance between the two powers.

Moreover, it has already become a fixture in international scientific discourse that this behavior is quite consistent with the idea that in modern conditions the great powers are unable to form permanent coalitions to contain dominance-seeking states. This is particularly true of a situation where this state is a “naval” superpower, while its potential balancers are “land” powers, as stated by Jack Levy and William Thompson in their brilliant 2010 research. This is explained by the fact that the “naval” power is for its “land” partners an extra-regional player not directly present in their periphery and thus deserves less attention than “land” challenges.

But the applicability of this observation to the current situation is restricted by the fact that the United States is very much present in the direct proximity of Russian and Chinese borders and sensitive facilities. To an extent, this makes the US a regional superpower, something that may necessitate its containment by the regional players. Simultaneously the United States, like Europe, is not bearing the risks and costs linked to a direct presence in a problematic region. This last circumstance can also make its behavior less responsible.

In the current environment, any great power alliance without US participation will inevitably be anti-American, which also has much potential for containment. Logically, this will invite a strong reaction from Washington and its allies and is likely to unbalance, if not destroy, the entire world economic system, of which China and Russia, albeit to an incomparably smaller extent, are beneficiaries. Russia is also quite reserved about the prospect for deploying its huge nuclear deterrent behind the PRC’s back, especially with China pursuing an increasingly confident policy in Southeast and East Asia.

Simultaneously both parties have done a lot over the years to eliminate even the smallest objective factors that might lead to rivalry between them. This makes it possible for leaders in Moscow and Beijing to say with confidence that bilateral relations have assumed a “new form of great power relationship,” as they are defined within the Chinese foreign policy conceptual framework. Importantly, this unprecedented rapprochement is taking place in a fundamentally new domestic context for both powers, as compared with the period after World War II.

But what seems even more important is that it is impossible to ignore are structural changes on the global scale. Moreover, these changes have become institutionalized in recent years. The US has come up with an initiative to create new coalitions to govern the global economy, coalitions challenging both existing institutions and other major players. If realized in practice, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and other initiatives will lead to the emergence of a “matrix” of tariff and non-tariff trade and economic regulation measures, as well as multilateral agreements between the participating countries, which will take into account their operating bilateral agreements.

There is every reason to believe that even if the TPP runs into ratification problems (primarily in the US Congress) the signatories will implement its provisions anyway in one form or another. According to Russian expert Igor Makarov, this is explained by the huge amount of effort involved in paperwork and the coordination of interests of all participating states and the existence of a clear demand on the part of the leading economies in the region (except China) for a system of relations offered by the Agreement. There are debates on creating a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the Western Hemisphere, which will pool the US and EU economies as well as those of some other countries.

It could be assumed that the scale of these changes will prove so vast that it will call into question the viability of the polycentric structure of the international system. (This system began to take shape after the end of the Cold War and China has been seeking to be part of it.) As a result, China’s attempts to become an important and respected member of the 25-year-old system of world governance may prove largely unsuccessful. China has not closed the door on the chance for talks with the TPP founders, if the TPP ever materializes. For Russia, the new partnerships are less of a challenge by virtue of its export structure and the modest scale of its integration in international production chains. But it will have to heed the new realities, if they do materialize, and adjust its foreign economic policy accordingly.

To reiterate: All “pros” and “cons” with regard to a hypothetical Russia-China alliance are based on an assumption that it should be aimed at counter-balancing the United States, which is perceived as a hegemon threatening the interests of both powers. But there is a tendency to disregard the likelihood of relations more reminiscent of an alliance with a positive joint agenda directed both at pursuing equally important objectives and consolidating an order in bilateral relations that would satisfy either party.

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of researchers of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies (CCEIS HSE) Dmitry Novikov, Anastasia Pyatachkova, Andrey Skriba and Ilya Stepanov. The author is also grateful to Dmitry Suslov, Programme Director of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club, Vasily Kashin and Igor Makarov, senior fellows at HSE, for their useful advices.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.