Valdai Club

The visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Moscow – its haste has been pointed out by many observers (Netanyahu decided not to wait for a meeting with President Vladimir Putin at the UN General Assembly in New York) – has raised questions around the nature and the intensity of threats sparked by the war in Syria that loom over international players.

Obviously, the threats are just as asymmetrical for Russia and Israel as the countries' goals in the Syrian conflict. Preservation of statehood in Syria, at least partially, is crucial for Moscow. It would bridle the impetuously aggravating chaos in the Middle East and beyond. Therefore, the problem is about weakening the extremists and guaranteeing that the Syrian legitimate government will take part in the transitional period, which would be concluded by political settlement. In this context, the fight against ISIS and its allies becomes an increasingly prominent issue, especially in light of the rising challenge the Jihadists pose to Russia. Worse, they embark on pulling all Muslims of Russia and Central Asia into their field of influence.

According to different assessments, several thousands of Russian citizens are currently fighting in the ranks of ISIS, and they may try to return to Russia in the future. These direct Russian goals are part of an even wider background of Moscow's strive to strengthen its positions on the international arena, demonstrating that there is neither peace without Russia nor chances to solve the most topical problems without its assistance. Syria is becoming an essential target of Russia's diplomatic efforts to organize the negotiation process and military efforts to send aid, weapons, specialists and instructors.

Israel's approach to the situation in Syria is absolutely different. Israel is hardly worried about the fate of Syria's statehood, especially if it means Assad's remaining at power, at least temporarily. For Israel, the Iran-Assad-Hezbollah chain is perceived as the main source of trouble and threats. Hezbollah in Lebanon's south is capable of shelling vital districts of Israel. Moreover, after the war in Lebanon in 2006, some Israeli specialists assumed that Hezbollah and Israel reached a level of mutual deterrence. This means that clashes between them are fraught with serious repercussions. Missiles are certainly launched from the Syrian side too. Israel responds to accidental or intentional attacks with airstrikes. At the same time, Tel Aviv does not regard ISIS, which fights against the regimes of Arab states, as the priority enemy, although ISIS and similar non-state actors have militarily substituted the old enemy, the regular Arab armies. It is believed that Israeli Air Forces and Special Forces counter the challenges from Jihadists in Syria with ease.

In this regard, the Israeli government is worried about shipments of defensive weapons that may block the Syrian skies for Israel. For instance, shipments of Russia's S-300 missile systems for the Syrian army are looked upon by Israeli military and political circles as a serious and unfavourable shift in the correlation of forces. Netanyahu will doubtlessly try to convince Moscow not to sell the weapons to Damascus. However, even without new shipments, the commitments of earlier contracts remain in force. This is where Israel wants to see clarity.

Besides, according to Reuters reports, Pantsir-S1 complexes capable of shooting down all modern types of aircraft at an altitude of 15km and in a range of up to 18km were shipped to Syria, probably to Israel's disappointment. Fears have constantly been voiced in Israel that Russian weapons may fall into the hands of Hezbollah. Resumption of Russia's military shipments to Iran may be taken by Israel as an equally threatening development as well.

Within the framework of the counter-terrorism campaign, the problem of coordination of efforts may gain prominence, considering such factor as Russia's military presence in Syria. Although limited, it is still an additional military and political resource for Russia. The new situation implies coordination of efforts with Moscow to execute potential joint actions and to prevent unprovoked clashes. While observers in the US and Europe are actively discussing the topic of possible threats to the positions of the West from Russia's military assistance to Assad and its solidifying positions in Syria, Israeli specialists are less prone to view Russia's policy in Syria through the prism of confrontation. According to Israeli military sources, IDF Air Forces have begun forging a mechanism for coordination of actions with the Russian army in light of the situation in Syria. The main goal is to prevent mistakes in identifying aircraft in the Syrian skies.

Generally speaking, leading Israeli experts Zvi Magen and Sarah Fainberg seem fair when they conclude that Russia's policy in Syria, which may mean either support to Assad's regime or support to a regime without Assad, is no threat for Israel. By all accounts, it is important for both countries that the changing paradigm of Russia's assistance to Syria and participation in the counter-terrorism fight would not tilt the established balances and would not complicate the quite balanced Russia-Israel relations. It seems that the Israeli side is trying to get guarantees at the top political level that Russia, while pursuing its goals, will show understanding of Israel's concerns.