Germany’s Unipolar Moment in the EU. What Does it Mean for Russia?

The internal balance of forces in the EU has changed irrevocably. From now on, Berlin will be the sole and indisputable EU hegemon.

The European Union has entered a period of sweeping transformation unlike anything since 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was approved. The political tsunami unleashed by the "wrong" choice made in the UK referendum – where ordinary people rose in revolt against the elites, globalization, migration and the outside world as it is today and is likely to be in the future – closes out the chapter in the EU's history that began in 2005 with the failure to approve the European Union's draft Constitution.

That period was characterized by sluggish integration and the swelling tide of a comprehensive crisis – economic, managerial, foreign policy, and, most importantly, integrational – something that the European elites were desperately attempting to represent as merely a string of tactical setbacks rather than a system-wide crisis. Given the fundamental differences between member-countries over where the EU should go and what it should become, the EU was in every way avoiding any discussions on the fundamental issues, including its future, its strategic goal, and the trajectory of integration. Some members – West European continental countries – favored further integration. Others – the UK, Poland, and to a certain degree the Netherlands and Hungary – wanted to freeze integration or even roll it back. Germany was the informal leader of the former group, the UK the latter. Reluctant to draw attention to the rift, the EU bureaucracy was plastering over cracks without addressing the deeper structural problems.

Brexit has put an end to all this. The precarious balance between supporters of more or less integration was disrupted. As France grew weaker economically and then politically, the UK became the second power center after Germany and the leader of a number of countries, both East European and those uninvolved in any integration projects (Schengen, Eurozone). More than that, it was one of the main pillars of US influence in the EU, aimed at ensuring European integration does not create an independent power center unattached to the United States. And now this country is withdrawing from the EU!

This is happening against the backdrop of a full-blown migration crisis, the continuing euro crisis, an unprecedented surge in Euroskepticism, and a crisis of political systems in European countries, as evidenced by the dramatic growth of populism, among other things.

In this context, Brexit represents a fork in the road for the EU, after which it will never be the same. That there will be no return to the past is clear judging by the calls from the continent urging London to immediately trigger the withdrawal procedure. There have been numerous statements around Europe to the effect that the UK's "special status" in the EU is over, and there is no way to simply ignore the vote and pretend like the Brexit referendum never happened.

David Cameron's referendum initiative was nothing more than attempted blackmail: he wanted to win new concessions by threatening to leave the EU (which he never contemplated seriously). He did obtain these in the form of a February 16 agreement on special terms of UK membership in the EU, which granted governments in member-countries additional powers to block EU decisions at the national level. In this connection, it is of crucial importance for the EU to neutralize the February deal (which has been officially announced), to make Brexit symbolize the lamentable outcome of any attempts to blackmail the EU, and by all means available prevent other member-countries from thinking they can follow Britain's example with impunity. Otherwise many other countries would be tempted to force concessions by threatening to leave.

This closes the door on any chance of a return to the status quo ante. Even if supporters of holding a second referendum gain the upper hand in London (which would amount to a gross manipulation of the democratic process and is therefore unlikely), the UK in any event will lose its privileged status within the EU, which it has enjoyed since the Thatcher era. In the current environment, it could only return to the EU on its knees and with the same rights as second-tier powers like Italy or even Spain. British leaders are unlikely to accept this.

The internal balance of forces in the EU has changed irrevocably. This is an irreversible process. And while it is the only change we can be certain of at this stage, it is also the most important one. The disappearance of the second power center and the political leader of countries campaigning for a less centralized EU as well as that of Central and East European countries and the Baltic states has inaugurated Germany's unipolar moment in the EU. From now on, Berlin will be the sole and indisputable EU hegemon.

To be sure, it did not happen overnight. For a few years, Germany has behaved as the EU's economic and political leader, pushing through its own decisions on domestic, economic and foreign policy issues, often in its own national interests rather than EU interests. This is explained by the decline of France, German economic success, and the EU's expansions in 2004 and 2007 that shifted its center of gravity eastwards, enhanced Poland's role, and turned Germany into a truly central EU country. But Britain's withdrawal and/or weakening have made the reality of German leadership even more obvious and inescapable.

The new reality became clear on the day after the Brexit referendum, when German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier convened a meeting of EU founding member-countries in Berlin to discuss the EU's future. The current chair of the EU Council of Ministers is the Netherlands, which is also one of the founders of the European Union. It would seem more logical and appropriate to hold the meeting there. But it was held in Berlin and the choice of venue was simply assumed, which clearly indicates who calls the shots within the EU.  

Along with the consolidation of German leadership, Brexit will mean the strengthening of the West European continental countries as a whole, the majority of which favor further European integration and uniform rules for all members. The integration project is losing its key opponent, a country that symbolized reservations and exemptions from European rules and a multi-speed Europe (with countries choosing the integration options that work for them).

It is quite likely that within the next few years the German-led West European continental countries will attempt to revive the integration process. Today their resolve is expressed in a consensus that the EU cannot accept any further concessions to London or any further cherry picking by London – enjoying all the benefits of European integration (the common market) without shouldering its full responsibility (free movement of labor, financial contributions to the EU budget, participation in the migration policy, common European currency). In Germany and other West European continental countries, tolerance towards exemptions of this kind has declined exponentially. The prevailing attitude is either you participate fully or not at all. Indicatively, the associated countries, Norway and Switzerland, have joined the Schengen zone and contribute to the EU budget even though they are not full members, in exchange for being allowed access to the EU common market.

Importantly, the new attempt to deepen integration will be led precisely by the group of West European countries with Germany at the head rather than by the EU's supranational integration institutions. The same group will wield the real power. This constitutes the key distinction of the upcoming stage from all earlier ones that were dominated by the European Commission, and the deepening of integration was expressed in the enhancement of its expanded competences and powers. Recent years have seen the two components of European integration – supranational and intergovernmental – become misaligned, with the whole structure tilting towards the latter. Since the failure of the constitutional project and the approval of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the member-states (and primarily the major ones) have been shoring up their power. The institutions are trying to compete with them, but more often than not they become tools in the hands of governments.

It is the governments of EU member-countries rather than the Commission that are involved in decision-making on such basic issues as Eurozone governance, migration regulation and negotiations with the US on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The absence of the European Commission and European Parliament chairmen at the "Berlin council" on the EU's future the next day after Brexit is yet another sign that the EU's future will be decided by governments and not institutions.

Thus, the upcoming attempt to achieve a new high in European integration will boil down to closer coordination between the national governments with Germany in the leading role. The governments will be engaged in decision-making on the most important matters and possibly will hand down decisions to the European Commission to implement. In fact, there is already an inner circle of partners – France and Italy – which will participate in strategic decision-making along with Germany. It is quite likely that within the next few years the Berlin-Paris-Rome triangle will emerge as the main power configuration in the European Union, replacing both the Franco-German tandem of earlier decades and the balance between Germany and the UK.

At the same time, while Brexit weakened opponents of further integration, it failed to solve the main contradiction between them and pro-integration countries. You cannot make them renounce their positions, as this may lead to new withdrawal referendums. Euroskepticism is strong in most EU countries, including those whose governments favor large-scale integration. No matter how much the West European elites would like to return to "standard rules for all," this is no longer possible under the current circumstances. This means that the strengthening of (intergovernmental) integration will proceed by degrees and selectively without embracing all EU member-countries.

Therefore, the post-Brexit EU development trend will rely on the same, albeit upgraded, Multi-Speed Europe model, where some member-states support a greater number of integration projects than others. It is another matter that the skeptics will now be squeezed to the periphery, which had not been the case previously. A core of pro-integration countries is being formed within the EU: they have a clear edge both in numbers and, above all, politically. The emerging periphery will at best influence only certain areas of EU development and politics. Germany is the indisputable leader of this core group of countries and its closest allies are France, Italy and EU founders in general. Poland is likely to aspire to the role of new periphery leader.

What does this mean for Russia and its future relations with the EU?

These trends may prove favorable. A country that has urged the EU to adopt a tougher and more confrontational approach to Russia for years has left and/or grown weaker. The group of Central and East European and Baltic countries insisting on confrontational policies with regard to Moscow and an active rivalry in the post-Soviet space (up to and including holding out the prospect of Ukraine joining the EU) has lost an important EU patron. Instead, a group that has traditionally upheld a more constructive policy with regard to Russia is going from strong to much stronger. Today Italy is one of the more friendly EU countries to Russia. In France, the National Assembly and the Senate have called for the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions. Finally, the likely deepening of integration within the EU's West European continental core may work in Moscow's favor. After all, Russia has always signaled an interest in a more cohesive and viable, though not anti-Russian, European Union.

All of this is opening new diplomatic opportunities. It is high time for Russian diplomacy to warmly embrace the countries that will probably shape the European future within the next few years and encourage the EU to steer a course toward strategic partnership with Russia as an element of its development. In this context, Vladimir Putin's recent statements to the effect that Russia always was and will continue to be committed to a "common economic and humanitarian space" with the EU were fully justified and necessary from the tactical point of view.

On the other hand, it could be difficult to take advantage of these opportunities and capitalize on the dramatic reversal of the balance of forces within the EU. It would be naïve and erroneous to assert that the consolidation of the EU's West European core and the emergence of the Germany-France-Italy leadership triangle will not be painful for the EU as a whole and will be accompanied by an effort to evolve a constructive policy with regard to the Russian Federation. Regrettably, the reality is much more complex.

First, this scenario would entail the total marginalization of the peripheral countries, including Poland and other Central and East European nations, on Eastern policies they regard as a priority. Warsaw has signaled that it will try to prevent the German-led West European core from taking all decisions and that it will suggest alternatives. Indicatively, Poland has invited all the countries that were not invited to Berlin to discuss the EU's future in Warsaw.

It should be noted that Warsaw's support is of critical importance to Germany, and is viewed as a condition of German leadership in the EU. It is by balancing between West and East European countries that Berlin has formed, in recent years, a political basis for its leadership of the EU. It is highly unlikely that Germany will change course in this new environment and choose instead to antagonize Poland and other new EU members. This would be fraught with a new rift and, as a consequence, Germany's loss of its EU leadership.

Second, the potential domination of the EU by Germany and other West European countries is causing concern in yet another major power that is critically important to the EU. I am referring to the United States whose role in Europe has already been seriously challenged by Brexit. Consolidation of a continental West European core within the EU, if not accompanied by stronger transatlantic ties and consideration of the views of pro-American Central and East European countries and the Baltic states, could lead to the emergence in Europe of a power center independent of the US.

In this connection, Washington will try to prevent "German unipolarity" and the consolidation of a West European core from weakening the transatlantic ties. This problem is likely to be solved by the strengthening of NATO, completion of the TTIP, and insistent calls to respect the foreign policy views of the East Europeans, primarily Poland. At the same time, the United States will seek to replace the UK with a new "special partner," most likely Germany, which Washington will attempt to turn into the main bulwark of its influence in the EU for years to come.

Both Berlin and Washington have a vested interest in this configuration. Maintaining close ties with the United States and making it a "special partner" within the EU will legitimize Berlin's EU leadership in the eyes of both East and most West European countries. In isolation from the US, German hegemony would immediately conjure up associations with the Third Reich. However, coupled with a strong American military, political and economic presence, it will become more acceptable and an alternative of sorts to Germany's "dilution" within European integration institutions. Finally, Germany is keen to strengthen trade ties with the US as one of the main markets for its products.

In effect, the insistence that Germany (and other core countries) heed East European views and the consolidation of this core in combination with closer ties with Washington to the point of a "special relationship" to replace that between the US and Britain, mean just one thing – the continuation of anti-Russian policies. Keeping in place the anti-Russian sanctions, rejecting meaningful dialogue with Russia on a new configuration and rules of the game in Greater Europe, continuing a policy of geopolitical containment of Russia, driving wedges between Russia and the former republics of the USSR, and supporting NATO's strategy of military and political containment will most likely be the price Berlin will have to pay to both East Europe and the US for their backing of its EU leadership. The West European countries will be paying the same price for the peripheral countries and the United States consenting to their role as core members of the EU.

There are reasons to believe that this is precisely what will happen in the short term. Berlin will remain for Russia one of the most difficult and critically disposed partners. (It is another matter that this will not prevent Germany from profiting from certain cooperation projects like Nord Stream-2.) Moreover, considering the Polish and US factors and the importance of both countries' support for German leadership, Berlin may become even more critical of Russia. This will be fully in keeping with the tougher line towards Russia to be pursued by Hillary Clinton should she win the presidential election in November.

Later, however, the situation may start to change. Even with US support, German hegemony could over time anger West European countries, particularly France (which could reclaim some of its power), Italy and even Poland. The source of French and Italian disaffection is likely to be the confrontational policies vis-à-vis Russia continued by Germany and the United States – policies with the potential to further deepen the rift in Europe, perhaps resulting in military escalation.

As a result, German "unipolarity" in the EU may just as soon become a thing of the past, followed, a few years later, by a new round in the power struggle. Its outcome cannot be predicted at this time. A new period of uncertainty will ensue, which, as usual, will create both new challenges and new opportunities for Russia. And yet, since the EU's future will be uncertain, its ability to accept a new kind of relationship with Russia and be a viable partner on common challenges will be limited. 

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.